command is found at the point where the Narrative is contained in other liturgies. Moreover, the Anamnesis contains no explicit offering of the elements such as occurs in the Eucharistic Prayer of the Apostolic Tradition. There is also an archaic simplicity about much of the phraseology of the prayer. Attention is called in the foot-notes to a few points of interest.

"Worthy of praise from every mouth and of thanksgiving from every tongue, and of adoration and exaltation from every creature is thy adorable and glorious name [O glorious Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost], who didst create the world by thy grace, and its inhabitants by thy pitifulness, and didst save mankind by thy compassion, and hast showed great grace unto mortals. For thou hast shown great grace unto us which cannot be repaid, in that thou didst put on our manhoodt that thou mightest quicken us by thy Godhead, and hast exalted our low estate and hast restored us from our fall, and hast raised our mortality, and hast forgiven our trespasses, and hast justified us from our guilt, and hast enlightened our knowledge, O our Lord and God, and hast condemned our enemies, and hast granted victory to the weakness of our frail nature in the overflowing mercies of thy grace. We also, O my Lord, thy weak and frail and miserable sinners, who are gathered together in thy name and stand before thee at this time, have received the example which is from thee and hath been delivered unto us,‡ rejoicing and praising and exalting and commemorating and celebratings before thee this great [and dread|]] and holy and life-giving and divine mystery of the passion and death and burial and resurrection of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. And may there come, O my Lord, thine holy Spirit and rest upon this oblation of thy servants [and bless and hallow it]¶ that it may be to us, O my Lord, for the pardon of offences and the forgiveness of sins, and for the great hope of resurrection from the dead, and for new life in the kingdom of heaven with all those who have been well-pleasing in thy sight. For all this great and marvellous dispensation towards us we give thee thanks, and glorify thee without ceasing in thy Church, redeemed by the precious blood of thy Christ, with unclosed mouths and open faces ascribing praise and glory and honour and thanksgiving and adoration to thy living and holy and life-giving name, now and ever and for ever and ever. Amen."

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O my

* Probably the phrase between brackets displaced an earlier Lord or "O my Lord and God." A definite naming of the Trinity in prayer can hardly be considered early.

†The Incarnation is here spoken of as the act of the whole Godhead. This inexactness is surely characteristic of quite early times.

We have here a distinct allusion to the Lord Christ's institution of the Eucharist and to His command for its observance. It is noteworthy that this allusion is made at the point where the complete narrative is introduced in other (and later?) rites. § We note here the absence of a definite oblation of the elements, such as is found, for example, in the Apostolic Tradition (" memores igitur mortis et resurrectionis ejus offerimus tibi panem et calicem ").

This word "dread " is probably a later addition; cf. Mr. Bishop's article already mentioned, p. 325, note 1.

The specification ("to bless and hallow it ") is not found in the Apostolic Tradition. Both liturgies, however, agree in asking, with reference to the Holy Spirit, for His action upon the oblation (cf. Apostolic Tradition: Et petimus ut mittas spiritum tuum sanctum in oblationem sanctae ecclesiae").

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H. R. GUMMEY.

REVIEWS

A FAITH THAT ENQUIRES. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the years 1920 and 1921. By Sir Henry Jones. Macmillan. 1922. Pp. x+361. 18s. net.

This book was published within a day or two of the author's death. It is his last message to the world, and it expresses all that was central and permanent in his teaching.

Henry Jones was a prophet among philosophers. In his youth he sat at the feet of Edward Caird; he imbibed the master's doctrine and followed him with unfailing loyalty and affection. In his own thinking there is perhaps nothing of striking novelty; but he had imagination and the gift of style; he saw how his thinking applied to life, the vision fired him, and he could make others see it also. Philosophers often feel the need of not letting themselves go, lest interest in the result should hamper the critical spirit. Thinking is a very intricate business and is very apt to err when self-criticism weakens. Hence the living interest in thought and its issues is repressed, and a book on philosophy may read like a dialectical exercise. Of this attitude there is no trace in the author's work. His writing is always full-blooded; even when the argument is abstract the seriousness of the problem and the emotions it provokes are apparent. It is a question of the meaning of life, and no attempt is made to view it with indifference.

There is another feature about the book which deserves mention. When it was writing, the author was under sentence of death, and he knew it. Ten years before he had emerged from a dangerous operation with shattered health. But he carried on his work with immense courage, exulting in the triumph of mind over bodily weakness. When the time came for his Gifford Lectures, the disease had reasserted itself; only a few of the lectures could be given in public; and all were composed in a time of struggle with physical pain. Of all this there is no hint in the book. Yet it is well to remember it as we read his discussion of the problem of suffering. The denial of the right of anyone to claim exemption from the common lot and the faith which finds the significance of suffering in its contribution to the evolution of the Best-these arguments acquire new impressiveness when we understand the experience from which they emerged.

It is hard to criticize such a book; but the author himself would have wished it to be taken on its merits. As was to be

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expected, there are some things in it which might have been changed had opportunity been given for revision. For example, there are a number of references to the views expressed by the founder of the lectureships in his Will-surely one of the most remarkable wills ever recorded in the Scottish Court of Session. Lord Gifford is made by the author to speak of "the science of religion," and there is a reference to "what he called 'Natural Religion.' Oddly enough, Lord Gifford never used the word religion" at all in this connection. His term was always Natural Theology." Again, the author's discussion of agnosticism, towards the beginning of the book, is made to hinge upon some words of Gifford's referring to the knowledge of God: "I think such knowledge, if real, lies at the root of all wellbeing." Commenting upon this, Jones speaks of the ominous words- if real,'" and says: "They suggest the possibility that all so-called religious knowledge may, in its very nature, be delusive. Its objects may be unreal." But this was not what Gifford meant. He would never have spoken of knowledge of God if there were no such being as God to be known. What he did mean is made quite clear in an earlier paragraph of the Will, in which he distinguishes felt knowledge from "mere nominal knowledge." To be effective knowledge must not be a mere intellectual assent to propositions; it must be realized in life. And so he goes on to say that he is "convinced that this knowledge [of God], when really felt and acted on, is the means of man's highest well-being, and the security of his upward progress."

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true and

But these are small matters. To anyone interested in the course of philosophical thought in England, one of the most significant things in the book is the definite cleavage it reveals between two parties in what may be called the English Hegelian School. Since 1893 outside observers have often wondered how long T. H. Green and Mr. Bradley would continue to be spoken of together as if they both taught very much the same view of reality. As we can now see, the situation was better gauged by the leaders of Idealism than by the rank and file. The Life of Edward Caird, issued last year, contains letters interchanged by Caird and Jones immediately after the publication of Appearance and Reality. They recognized that its arguments would have a disintegrating effect upon their own doctrines as well as upon those of naturalism. But Caird was averse from public controversy, and went on with his own work -though not unperturbed.

Green's argument about relations, whereby he had sought to confute the naturalists, was deftly turned by Mr. Bradley against the spiritual interpretation (indeed any interpretation)

of reality-much as Hume turned Berkeley's arguments against matter so as to destroy mind as well. This central point may not have had the prominence that it deserves in Caird's mind or in Jones's. But, in the present book, the author joins issue both with Mr. Bradley and with Mr. Bosanquet. He tells us that he has never learned the meaning of appearance." And this after all Mr. Bradley's laborious dialectics! Yet it is not surprising. The antithesis of Reality and Appearance is one variant among many others such as God and the world, the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative, the one and the many, the eternal and the temporal, noumenon and phenomenon. It is the latest formula, but not necessarily the best. Its meaning takes colour from the others as occasion serves; but fundamentally and by derivation it comes from that subjective idealism according to which what a man knows is but his own mind turned inside out.

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Perhaps the fundamental thought of the author's philosophy might be expressed by saying that all these antitheses are contrasts within a unity. Every rational contrast," as he puts it, "falls within a unity of some kind "; and the nature of knowledge is always the discovery of the whole to which a fact belongs. Thus the opposed terms of the antitheses are not contradictory but complementary. If they were contradictory, then one aspect-the finite, the temporal, the manywould be false and unreal; and of the other aspect-the infinite, the eternal, the one-nothing would be predicable. But according to Jones both sides are real-the contrasting aspects of a unity. Thus man, the finite being," has not to go beyond himself in order to reach the infinite. . . . .. He is the infinite in process." Similarly, from the other side, its reality lies in its expression in forms of finitude: "The 'eternal' is that which puts forth an endless series of successive 'nows ';" and again: The Absolute is the process, or the constant creative activity, which appears to us as the fixed order of the scheme of things."

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A good deal might be said in criticism of this position and of the arguments by which it is supported, did the occasion call for such criticism. Perhaps too much play is made with abstract terms, while their precise meaning is not always kept clearly in view. To say that the eternal puts forth an endless series of successive "nows," or that man is the infinite in process, goes only a very little way towards solving the difficulties in the relation of the eternal to the temporal or of the infinite to the finite; but they are graphic statements of the significance of time and of human life.

Man "is the infinite in process"; "the Absolute is the process." "The two-man and the Absolute-are thus brought

very close together; and, as the author would say, it is a living God that he has found. Here it is only possible to record, not to examine. But room should be found for a concluding sentence: "To me the idea of God as the perfect in process, as a movement from splendour to splendour in the spiritual world, as an eternal achievement and never-resting realization of the ideals of goodness in human history, is endlessly more attractive and, I believe, more consistent with our experience in the present world than the idea of a Divine Being who sits aloof from the world-process, eternally contemplating His own perfections."

With the title of the book is connected the appeal to the Churches to" treat the articles of the creeds not as dogmas but as the most probable explanation "; and in the Preface the author expresses the "hope that the Church will accept my service of its greater ends in the spirit in which it is offered."

W. R. SORLEY.

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY

PART I.-THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES

VOL. II., PROLEGOMENA; II., CRITICISM.*

THE publication of the second volume of the work planned on a large scale by Dr. Foakes Jackson and Dr. Kirsopp Lake makes it clear that we have to deal with a careful summary of the literary and historical criticism of the last generation rather than with an attempt to open up any new method of approach to the study of the beginnings of Christianity. The volume at present under discussion is divided into three parts, to which are added three appendices.

PART I.

THE COMPOSITION AND PURPOSE OF ACTS.

1. The Greek and Jewish Traditions of Writing History. Henry J. Cadbury and the Editors.

2. The Use of the Greek Language in Acts. J. de Zwaan. 3. The Use of the Septuagint in Acts. W. R. L. Clarke.

4. The Use of Mark in the Gospel according to Luke. F. C. Burkitt.

5. The Internal Evidence of Acts. The Editors.

Pub

Vol. I.

*Edited by F. J. Foakes Jackson, D.D., and Kirsopp Lake, D.D. lished by Macmillan and Co., 1922. The price of the volume is 24s. dealt with general prolegomena to the Acts, and Vols. III. and IV. will consist of a commentary on the Acts.