Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land ReformCambridge University Press, 15 wrz 2015 When and why do countries redistribute land to the landless? What political purposes does land reform serve, and what place does it have in today's world? A long-standing literature dating back to Aristotle and echoed in important recent works holds that redistribution should be both higher and more targeted at the poor under democracy. Yet comprehensive historical data to test this claim has been lacking. This book shows that land redistribution - the most consequential form of redistribution in the developing world - occurs more often under dictatorship than democracy. It offers a novel theory of land reform and develops a typology of land reform policies. Albertus leverages original data spanning the world and dating back to 1900 to extensively test the theory using statistical analysis and case studies of key countries such as Egypt, Peru, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. These findings call for rethinking much of the common wisdom about redistribution and regimes. |
Spis treści
Actors Interests and the Origins of Elite Splits | 26 |
A Theory of Land Reform | 60 |
Measuring Land Reform | 112 |
A CrossNational Analysis of Land Reform in Latin | 142 |
Perus | 190 |
Venezuelas | 225 |
Latin America in Comparative Perspective | 266 |
Latin America 19002010 | 271 |
Conclusion | 304 |
| 321 | |
| 345 | |
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Kluczowe wyrazy i wyrażenia
Acemoglu and Robinson actors agrarian reform agricultural Albertus autocracy autocratic regime beneficiaries Boix Bolivia Brazil capture Ch´avez Chapter coalitional split coding Colombia compensation COPEI countries coup democracy democratic dictatorship distribution Ecuador elections elite splits elite’s elites and landed expropriation fixed effects groups Guatemala hacienda hectares incentives income increase Independent Smallholders initial support coalition labor land colonization land expropriation land inequality land invasions land negotiation land redistribution land reform program land titling land transfers landed elites large landowners latifundios Latin America leaders likelihood low institutional constraints measure Mexico military million hectares Model negotiation and land nonetheless Paraguay peasants percent Peru population redis redistributive land reform reform law region revolt ruling political elites rural poor Rural Pressure sector social statistically significant Table targeted tax rate theory Thiesenhusen threat tion tobit models types of land variable Velasco Venezuela Veto Points vote voters Zimbabwe