said that the higher powers are ordained of God; has not St. Peter said as much, by telling us that so is the will of God, that with well-doing we may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men? If St. Paul has said, we must obey for conscience' sake; are we not under the same obligation, by knowing, from St. Peter, that obedience is the will of God?

The commentators have given themselves unnecessary trouble in inquiring into the characters of the princes at the time these Epistles were written; for the dispute was with those who rejected all sorts of government, whether they were under good or bad princes: with the temporal rights of princes they meddled not. St. Peter, who wrote to the dispersed in Asia, where the governments had always been despotic, exhorted them, in the first place, to due obedience to the king, and then to those who were put in authority under him: whereas St. Paul, in writing to the Romans, where the form of government was not fully established, being in the hands of the emperor, sometimes with and sometimes without the concurrence of the senate, made choice of an expression that has avoided that difficulty, and directs obedience to be paid to the higher powers, without determining who they were; which was a point in which he had no right to interpose his authority.

I shall leave this subject without drawing any consequences, excepting one only, for the sake of which I entered into this inquiry; namely, that the Scriptures are not to be tortured to speak in favor of one side or another; for they stand clear of all disputes about the rights of princes and subjects: so that such disputes must be left to be decided by principles of natural equity and the constitutions of the country.

SUMMARY OF DISCOURSE LXIII.

GENESIS, CHAP. XVIII.-VERSE 19.

THESE words of the Lord concerning Abraham contain the reason why God made choice of him, to make of him a nation to whom should be committed the oracles of God: the verse before the text contains the same sentiment. It has been matter of difficulty with curious inquirers to assign the reasons of God's regard to Abraham and his posterity, while the rest of the world was permitted to remain in ignorance and superstition it is not intended to examine all the reasons that may be assigned for this selection; but since God has been pleased to give one, it concerns us to consider it, as instructing us how to render ourselves acceptable to God, and draw down a blessing on ourselves and our posterity: Gen. xviii. 18. 19. We may plainly see the connexion of the text with the preceding verse, and the reason given for the distinguishing mercy bestowed on Abraham, which is founded on these two propositions, and supposes the truth of them: first, that it is the duty of every father and master of a family so to command his children and household, that they shall keep the way of the Lord: and, secondly that the same duty is incumbent on the governors and magistrates of all nations. If we suppose the virtue here commended proper only to fathers and masters of families, the reason assigned in the text for making Abraham a great and mighty nation is very absurd: nay, it would rather have been a good one to keep all public authority out of his hands: this point enlarged on generally with respect to magistrates, and in its application to the present subject. It has been dis

puted whether government is derived from the paternal authority, and is only the extension of it, or from the consent and choice of the people: a point of greater curiosity than use; since the rights of nations will be determined by their respective laws and usages, not by the speculations of philosophers. But as to religion, every magistrate's duty, with respect to his people, is the same as every father's with respect to his household. This was the case with Abraham; otherwise this care over his family could have been no reason for extending his authority over a great and mighty nation. The magistrate's care with respect to the religion of his people, and the father's with respect to that of his family, are so much the same, that they must stand or fall together; both having the same reasons to support them, and being liable to the same objections. If the father has his authority from God, is the case of the magistrate different? If the happiness of a family and its members consists in a due conformity to the principles of virtue and reason, and if it be the father's duty naturally to guard them against vice, is the happiness of a kingdom less concerned in the virtue of the people? or ought a prince less to regard the welfare of his subjects? Turn it as you will, the arguments are the same, and applicable to both cases. If you object to the magistrate's authority in religion, and the impropriety of temporal rewards and punishments, are they not as improper in the hands of a father as of a prince? This point enlarged on. From the text thus explained, it is inquired wherein the care of religion, public and private, consists, and the means necessary to its support are justified. If we consider the nature and disposition of mankind, we shall perceive two things necessary to guard the practice of virtue and religion, viz. instruction and correction: one, a proper remedy for the weakness of the understanding; the other, for the perverseness of the will. Where these two are joined together, the instruction is properly authoritative; and this is the case both of parents and magistrates;

therefore Abraham's care is expressed by the word command. The same precept, called teaching in Deut. xi. 19. is in xxxii, 46. called commanding. This duty princes cannot perform personally to all their people; therefore there has been an order of men set apart as teachers and ministers of religion in every civilised nation; which, on the footing of natural religion, the supreme power has doubtless a right to appoint: such was the case with the people of Rome; and had their religion been right, no fault could have been found with the constitution of their priesthood. This right under the law of Moses was limited to one family, while the priesthood under the gospel is confined to such methods of conveyance as Christ and his Apostles have appointed or approved; and being owned and established by the public, they have the commission and authority of the magistrate for the edification of the people. The power of correction is proper to be preserved in the hand of the magistrate, to be applied for the punishment of wickedness and vice, and for the maintenance of true religion and virtue. As these methods are necessary for the promoting and preserving the virtue of nations, so are they for the good government and improvement of private families: as to instruction separate from correction, no one but a friend to libertinism can object to it. Some have thought that, since God has given all men reason to direct them, they should be left to its guidance in discovering the truths of religion, without having any principles instilled into them by others, which they esteem only as so many prejudices. Not to insist how contrary this is to all the rules of Scripture which relate to the duty of parents, and to the practice of nations, it is enough to observe that had God intended this, he must have supplied all men with leisure for speculation as well as with reason. If men have so much reason as to be able to discover their duty without assistance, they can distinguish between truth and falsehood, when proposed to them by others, and are not in more

danger of being betrayed, than if left to themselves. Those who have not reason enough for this, must be governed by other methods. It is certain that general errors have been perpetuated by traditionary instruction, as well as general truths; but if an end must for this reason be put to all instruction, what single thing of use can be preserved in life? Must the world be starved, because some have suffered by intemperance? or left in ignorance, because some, through false teachers, have been miserably deceived? But the strongest objections lie against the use of correction in matters of religion. All allow the magistrate to punish crimes which injure the state, or private persons; a concession not to be despised in behalf of religion, since our duty to God and to our neighbor so concurs that he who punishes offences offered to men, will so far punish vice and immorality. Hence the plea for excluding the magistrate from matters of religion can only affect such cases where the honor of God alone is concerned, as profaneness, impiety, and the like. The reason assigned for this is, that human punishments cannot make men religious: they can make men comply outwardly with the law, but cannot reach to the purifying their hearts, in the integrity of which the virtue of religion consists. But, first, it ought to be considered that such impiety is prejudicial to the public, by the contagion of ill example. The reverence men have for God is the best foundation of obedience to temporal governors: this point enlarged on, with the ill consequences of taking away this reverence for God. But, secondly, it is want of the knowlege of human nature, which leads men to make this objection: for though it is true that the sinner who abstains from vice through fear of temporal punishment, cannot be said to act on a religious principle in so doing; yet we must consider the consequence which punishments produce. If you keep a sinner from vice at first through fear, he will by degrees habitually do well; his relish for vice will abate, and by length of practice