whole city of Jerusalem itself: vii, The time when this testimony was published, respecting which the same reasoning applies which does to the circumstance of place: viii, The motives by which those witnesses were actuated, and which could be no other but the satisfying of their own consciences, as so far from having a temporal interest to promote, by the publication of this event, every temporal interest pressed in the opposite direction.

3. But we have likewise, of this truth, demonstrations properly so called. With these we are furnished in the miraculous gifts communicated to those who attest it: of which we cannot entertain any doubt, without taxing with extravagance three sorts of persons, equally clear of all ground of suspicion on such an occasion: i, The apostles, who give the history of those miracles, and who relate in a manner the best adapted to expose imposture, on the supposition of their having been impostors ii, Their enemies, who in their writings against them, have not denied that they wrought miracles, but that these miracles were a proof of the truth of their doctrine: iii, Finally, their proselytes, who had the greatest imaginable interest in examining whether it was true that the apostles wrought miracles, who had all possible opportunities of ascertaining the fact, and who sacrificed their property, their reputation, their life, for a religion entirely resting on this truth-The apostles work miracles. These we call so many demonstrations.

This recapitulation sufficiently instructs us, that we are not called upon to believe an event so very extraordinary, as if it were destitute of proof: on the contrary, we believe it on proofs clear, cogent, and decisive. When, therefore, Jesus Christ saith, Blessed are they who have not seen, and yet have

believed, he means not to say, that it is blessed to believe things destitute of evidence: he speaks only of things which have not the evidence of object, but which have that of testimony.

Let us pursue this thought a little farther. The idea which we have suggested of obscure faith, distinguishes it from three kinds of conviction, which are but too frequently confounded with it: the faith extorted by tyranny; the faith generated in the brain of the enthusiast; and the faith of the superstitious.

(1) The faith of which we speak, must be carefully distinguished from the faith which is extorted by tyranny. We do not here understand that which violence would attempt to produce by the terror of punishment. Never did racks, gibbets, and stakes produce, in the soul, any thing like conviction in favor of a religion, which pretended to establish itself by arguments so odious and detestable. But there is a tyranny of a different kind, which has produced believers not a few. By dint of attesting fictions, men have forced themselves into credit: by dint of insolent pretentions, to infallibility, the simple have sometimes been prevailed upon to admit it: and the simple generally constitute the bulk of mankind.

We denominate that the faith extorted by tyranny, which is yielded to the insolent decisions of a doctor, who gives himself out as infallible, without proving it; or to fabulous legends, unsupported by any respectable testimony. How, under the pretext that I am bound to believe facts, which I may never have seen with my own eyes, am I laid under an obligation to swallow every thing that a legendary is pleased to tell me? How, under the pretext that I am bound to believe truths which are above the reach of my reason, am I laid under an

obligation to believe every thing proposed to me by a man who may be practising upon my credulity? And upon my refusing to believe on such a foundation, shall I be taxed with being incredulous like Thomas, and with saying as he did: Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe.

If you would have me believe the facts which you propose, produce me the proofs which support them, if not as complete as those which assure me of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, at least such as are somewhat of a similar nature and if you wish I should consider you as infallible, like the apostles produce me proofs of your infallibility, equivalent to those which the apostles produced of theirs. But if on examining such pretended facts, I discover that they are fictions merely; if on examining the foundation upon which your infallibility rests, I find that the men who give themselves out for infallible, while they lay claim to the infallibility of the apostles, are undermining the doctrine of the apostles, I shall not reckon myself obliged to pay the slightest deference to their decisions. The faith which these decisions attempt to produce, will be faith extorted by tyranny, and which will have no relation whatever to that faith which Jesus Christ expects from his disciples, and which is, in truth, obscure, but, nevertheless, well-founded; which is destitute, indeed, of the evidence of object, but which is ever accompanied with the evidence of testimony.

(2) In the second place, the faith of which we are treating, must be distinguished from that of the enthusiast: I mean that of certain Christians, who found the reasons which induce them to believe, entirely on such and such impulses, which

they pretend to be the operation of the Spirit of God: impulses destitute of illumination, and which determine the person thus agitated, to yield his assent to a proposition unsupported by proof, or, at most, recommended by an air of probability. One of the marks which distinguish false zeal from true, is, that this last, I mean true zeal, sacrifices its own glory to that of religion, and is infinitely better pleased to acknowledge its own error, than to spread the slightest cloud over that pure and genial light in which religion is arrayed. A man, on the contrary, who is actuated by a false zeal, sacrifices, without hesitation, the glory of religion to his own; and maintains, at the expence of truth itself, the errors which he has advanced.

This has been found to be the case with certain eminent names, on the subject of our present discussion. The vehemence of controversies which have been carried on, respecting the operation of the Holy Spirit on the soul of believers, has frequently carried some of the disputants farther than they themselves intended. In the heat of argumentation, they have asserted, that the action of the Holy Spirit, which operates in the faithful, is carried so far as to give them a degree of faith, superior to the reasons which they have for believing. When pressed by their adversaries, they ought to have acknowledged this to be one of the propositions which one is tempted to advance in the warmth of dispute, and which candor, without hesitation, is disposed to retract, after the heat has subsided. But this were a sacrifice too great for self-love to make it is deemed better that religion should suffer from the intemperate zeal of the sophist, than that the sophist should correct his hasty position, by the illumination of religion.

Thus, in order to support one absurdity, a still

greater absurdity has been advanced. It has been maintained, not only that the following proposition is true, namely, the impulse of the Holy Spirit gives us faith, superior to the reasons which we have for believing: but this is absolutely necessary for, it has been alledged, that the Christian religion being destitute of proofs which enforce assent, all those who should refuse to believe what is destitute of this kind of proof, must, in so doing, refuse to believe the Christian religion.

God forbid that we should attempt to defend, with weapons so empoisoned, the truths of religion! It was not thus that they were defended by Jesus Christ and his apostles. They called on men to believe but they, at the same time, adduced proof of what they wished to be received as the object of faith. The spirit of God, undoubtedly, operates on the soul of every one who implores his assistance; but it is by making them feel the force of the proofs, not by convincing them of what it is impossible to prove. And who could be condemned for not having believed, were Christianity destitute of sufficient proof? Would not the infidel be warranted in alledging: "I am not to blame, if I withhold my assent to such a proposition: I do not feel that impulse which engages one to believe what cannot be proved?" But the notion which we have given of faith, confounds every one who refuses to believe. We say, with Jesus Christ of the unbelievers of his time: This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil, John iii. 19.

(3) Finally, the notion which we have given of faith, distinguish it from that of the superstitious. To believe, in the view of doing honor to religion, a doctrine weakly proved, whatever may be the