CHAPTER II.

OF THE ARGUMENTS CONCEIVED TO FAVOR THE DOCTRINE OF ENDLESS MISERY, WHICH ARE NOT FOUNDED ON THE EXPRESS DECLARATIONS OF SCRIPTURE.

SECTION I.

OF THE INFINITE EVIL OF SIN.

ONE of the arguments urged in support of the doctrine of endless misery is so obviously fallacious, that it scarcely deserves a serious consideration; namely, that sin is an infinite evil, and therefore deserves an infinite punishment.

That sin is not only an evil, but the greatest which can possibly attach to a moral and accountable being, is an undisputable truth; but that the slightest transgression is an infinite offence and deseryes an infinite punishment, are positions to which neither reason nor revelation afford the shadow of support.

The advocates of this extraordinary opinion endeavour to establish it by an argument no less singular than the doctrine itself. Sin, say they, is an infinite evil, because it is committed against an Infinite Person. The heinousness of an

offence, they contend, increases in proportion to the dignity of the personage against whom it is committed; hence, a crime against a king is always visited with greater severity of punishment, than an offence against an ordinary person. Since, therefore, God is infinite, and since every sin is an offence against God, every sin is an infinite evil.

The full reply to this reasoning is, that it is not rank and station which aggravate a crime, but its tendency to occasion misery. An of fence against a king, it is true, is of a greater magnitude, and is punished with more severity, than the injurious treatment of an ordinary person; but the reason is, that an offence against a king is likely to be attended with worse consequences than one against a private individual. If a king be treated with insult or injustice, a whole nation may be injured and thrown into commotion. In the one case, the evil attaches to a single individual, in the other to millions of persons: in the one case, therefore, it is as much greater than the other, as the sum of an evil which extends to millions exceeds that which attaches only to a single individual.

Besides, were sin an infinite evil, there could be no degree in transgression: for when speaking of infinity, it is absurd to talk of greater or less. All human actions, therefore, all the language of mankind, all laws, human and divine, and all

punishments, contradict this opinion: for they all proceed upon the principle, that some crimes are of greater magnitude than others. We know too, that the Deity distinguishes in the most exact manner between different offences; that he apportions to each an equitable degree of punishment, and that he who has sinned greatly shall be beaten with many, and he who has offended less, with fewer stripes.

Indeed, it is when we consider the minute shades by which different sins and even different characters are discriminated, that we perceive in the most forcible manner the impossibility both of the doctrine of endless misery, and of limited punishment terminated by destruction. How slight is the difference between the worst good man and the best wicked man! How impossible is it for the utmost exertion of human sagacity to distinguish between them! Yet for this imperceptible difference in character there is, according to these doctrines, an infinite difference in destiny! He who is lowest in the scale of goodness, and who differs from the best wicked man only by the slightest shade, is admitted to infinite happiness: he in whom wickedness preponderates upon the whole, but in so small a measure that no human penetration can discern it, is shut out from the enjoyment of heaven; doomed by one doctrine to inconceivable torments through endless ages, and by the other to dreadful suf

fering for a very protracted period, and then to endless extinction of being. According to one opinion the positive torment, according to the other the positive loss, is infinite, yet the difference in desert is indistinguishable! This is a disproportion to which there is no parallel in any of the works of the Deity, and which cannot exist, it is reasonable to believe, in any of his dispensations.

SECTION II.

OF THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF ENDLESS MISERY, FOUNDED ON THE DIVINE JUSTICE.

As the Author of the beautiful system of the universe must possess almighty power and infinite wisdom, so he must be endowed with every moral excellence. He who gave to all things the relations they possess, must be perfectly acquainted with them; and since he cannot possibly err, nor have any motive to commit injustice, he must always act with undeviating rectitude.

Justice is one of those virtues which are essential to the perfection of the moral character. The intercourses of society could not subsist without it, and it is peculiarly necessary in a governor and judge. It is, therefore, with the greatest propriety, attributed to the wise and benevolent Ruler of the world.

Yet while it is universally admitted that the Deity possesses this excellence in the highest perfection, many persons entertain very erroneous ideas respecting it. It is usual to speak of it as a stupendous and awful attribute, inexplicable in its nature, terrible in its consequences,