EMOTION; a state of feeling entirely different both from the perception of the object which goes before such emotion, and the desire of the object which follows after it. Ac cordingly, we may feel at liberty to state, in general terms, that no man ever desired an object, or could by any possibility desire it, in regard to which he had experienced no emotion, but had always been in a state of perfect indifferency. Such, in the matter under consideration, is obviously the fixed law of the mind

304. The desires characterized by compara .ve fixedness and perma

nency.

But

There is one mark or trait attending the feelings under consideration which appears to be worthy of notice. We refer to the fact, that the desires, as compared with the emotions, appear to possess a greater degree of fixedness or permanency. It is well known that our emotions rapidly go and come; sinking and rising on the mind's surface like the unfixed waves of a troubled sea. the desires, which are subsequent to them in the time of their origin, and may be regarded as produced in, and as emerging from, the troubled waters of emotion, evidently exhibit less facility and elasticity of movement. Having once entered their allotted position, although they are not absolutely immoveable, they occupy it with so much pertinacity as to render it proper to regard this as one of their characteristics.

There certainly can be no great effort necessary in understanding the statement which has been made; and no great difficulty, as we suppose, in recognising and substantiating its truth. Take, for instance, the case of a man who is an exile in a foreign land, or of the unfortunate individual who is unjustly condemned to the occupancy of a prison; and they will assuredly tell you, that the desires they have to see once more the light of heaven, their native land, and the countenances of their friends, sustains itself in their bosoms with a pertinacity which defies all change; and that they might as well rend away the fibres of the heart itself, as to separate from it a feeling so deeply rooted.--We give this as an illustration; but it is more or less so in every case where the desires have decidedly fixed themselves upon any interesting topic.

§ 305. Desires always imply an object desired.

An additional characteristic of Desires is, that they al ways have an object, generally a distinct and well-defined one; and cannot possibly exist without it. To speak of a desire, without involving the idea of an object desired, would be an anomaly in language. They differ in this espect from emotions; which, although they have their ntecedent causes or occasions, do not possess, in their own nature, a prospective or anticipative bearing, but terminate in themselves. Desires, on the contrary, are always pointing onward to what is to be hereafter. "And this is probably one reason of their greater degree of fixedness or permanency. The desires lean upon the objects which they have in view, as a sort of pillar of support; they may be said, with strict truth at the bottom of the expression, to cling around it as the vine encircles and rests itself upon the elm; and, of course, are not left loose and fluttering, which is substantially the case with the states of mind which immediately precede them, at the mercy of every passing wind.

§ 306. The fulfilment of desires attended with enjoyment.

As a general thing, it may be said of the emotions that they are either pleasant or painful, although, in some instances, even of those feelings it might not be easy to predicate distinctly and confidently either the one or the other. And this last statement is true particularly of the desires; which, although they exist distinctly and welldefined in the view of the mind's consciousness, and constitute a powerful motive to action, can hardly be said, for the time being, to involve, in their own nature, either pleasure or its opposite. At any rate, we find it difficult. in ordinary cases, distinctly to detect either of these traits.

But, however this may be, there is still another characteristic circumstance, which aids in distinguishing them from other mental states. It is this. Every desire, when the object towards which it is directed is attained, is attended with a degree of pleasure. It is absolutely inseparable from the nature of desire, that the acquisition of the object of its pursuit, whether that object be good or evil, will be followed by the possession of some enjoy.

ment. Sometimes the enjoyment is very great, at others less; varying generally with the intensity of the desire.

§ 307. Of variations or degrees in the strength of the desires. There is this further statement to be made in refererce to the Desires, applicable, however, to a multitude of other states of the mind, that they exist in different degrzes As a general thing, they will be found to exist in a greater or less degree, in accordance with the greater or less vividness and strength of the antecedent emotions. The original cause, however, of these variations, making allowance for some occasional constitutional differences, is to be sought for in the intellect or understanding. The more distinctly we perceive or understand a thing, the more distinct and vivid, we may reasonably expect, will be our emotions. And as the Desires are based upon the emotions as the antecedent occasion or ground of their existence, they may, in like manner, be expected to exhibit, as has already been intimated, a vividness and strength, corresponding, in a very considerable degree, to that of the feelings which preceded them.-It will be noticed, that we do not speak here of the permanency of desires, which is a very different thing, but simply of their intensity or strength for the time being.

308. Tendency to excite movement an attribute of desire.

We shall conclude this notice of the nature of desire with remarking that there is one other characteristic attribute which particularly distinguishes it, and which undoubtedly must enter as an element into every perfect delineation of it. Such is the nature of desire, that it is of itself, in virtue of its own essence, a prompting, exciing, or, as Mr. Hobbes would term it, a motive state of the mind. In other words, its very existence involves the probability of action; it sets the mind upon the alert; it arouses the faculties, both mental and bodily, and places them in the attitude of movement. -It is true that the desire does not, in point of fact, always result in action. Before action can be consummated, another power, still more remote in the interior structure of the mind, must be consulted, that of the Will. If the Will decidedly oppo

Er

ses the desire, its tendency is, of course, frustrated in the object aimed at; but the tendency itself, although disappointed of its object, still remains. It is there, and cannot be otherwise than there, while the desire exists.

This important tendency does not exist, as a general thing, in other departments of the mind. It does not exist, for instance, in the cognitive or intellective part of the mind, in itself considered. If the intellect were insulated from the nature which is back of it, man would be a being of speculation merely, not of action. Nor does it exist in the emotions. If man were formed with the emotive sensibilities only, without the accompaniment of those ulterior sensibilities which are built upon them, he would be as unmoved and inoperative as if he were constituted with the single attribute of perceptivity. He would be like a ship anchored in the centre of the ocean, agitated and thrown up and down on the rising and falling billows, but wholly incapable of any movement in latitude or longitude. The tendency to excite movement, as an inherent or essential characteristic, exists in the desires, and nowhere else, except in the corresponding portion of the moral sensibilities, viz., the feelings of moral obligation. The tendency in question belongs to these two mental states alike. It is the office of the Will, as a separate and relatively a higher part of our nature, to act in reference to this tendency, either in checking or aiding, in annulling or consummating it.

309. Classification of this part of the sensibilities.

If we were called upon to consider the Desires in then simplest form only, we might perhaps feel at liberty to dismiss the subject with what has already been said. But the circumstance that they are subject to various modifications and combinations sets us upon a new field of inquiry of great extent and interest. The Desires are sometimes modified by being directed to particular ends. In other words, they are constituted witli specific tendencies, from which they seldom vary. This is the case with the Instincts, properly so called; and probably not less so, in their original and unperverted action, with the Appetites. In regard to the Affections, a distinct class of the active or

sensitive principles which come under this general head, it seems, as far as we can judge, to be the fact, that the DESIRES exist in a close and inseparable combination with certain emotions, and are thus made to assume an aspect which they would not otherwise possess. Accordingly, we have a basis, an ample and distinctly defined one, for a subordinate classification. And it is to the examination of the Desires, as they exist in this classification, that we now proceed; beginning with those which, in the gradations of regard we are naturally led to bestow upon them, are generally adjudged as lowest in point of rank, and proceeding upward to those which are higher. In accordance with this plan, they will present themselves to notice, and be made the subject of distinct consideration, in the order of the Instincts, the Appetites, the Propensities, and the Affections.

§ 310. The principles, based upon desire, susceptible of a twofold operation.

There is one important remark which is applicable to all the principles, with the exception of the Instincts, which now present themselves for examination. It is, that, with the exception just mentioned, they all have a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. This statement, of course, will not apply to the pure instincts; for the very idea of their being instincts, in the proper sense of the term, seems to imply an absolute exclusion of their being voluntary. But as we advance from the Instincts to the Appetites, and still upward to the Propensities and Affections, we find each and all of these important principles susceptible of being contemplated in this twofold aspect. Each, under circumstances of such a nature as to preclude inquiry and reflection, is susceptible of an instinctive action; and each, under other circumstances more favourable to the exercise of reasoning, is susceptible of a deliberate or voluntary action. This remark is important in our estimate of these principles, considered in a moral point of view.