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tests, has now been pretty generally abandoned. We have with practical aut unanimity reached the conclusion that government must find its justifica-as tion not in its form, or in its origin, but in the degree of service which it renders. In other words, government rests upon expediency. We cannot say whether a particular form is good or bad, justifiable or not justi- **** fiable, until we find out what it is doing. Nor is it sufficient to find out ~ · what it is doing in general; but we must, in order to determine whether thi or not it is justifiable in a given State, find out what it is doing in that particular State. For a given kind or form of government, like any other means to an end, may work well in one State and badly in another, and the fact that it works well in the one is not a sufficient justification for continuing it in the other. To illustrate: a plow is a means for putting soil in a better condition for raising a crop, but a given form or kind of plow might work very well in smooth soil which would not work well. at all in stony ground. It would be nonsense to insist upon using it in the latter simply because it worked well in the former. A given form of knife, which we commonly call a razor, is very well adapted to the use to which it is generally put, but it would not be indicative of common sense to insist that because it works well in cutting beards it would therefore work well and should be used for trimming apple trees.
There is altogether too strong a tendency upon the part of most of us to consider government in the abstract rather than in the concrete, whereas all governing must be done in the concrete. We are too apt to conclude that because self-government sounds well in the abstract it will necessarily work well in all cases in the concrete. We are prone to consider some rules too sacred to admit of exceptions. And yet the great apostles of "consent of the governed," the men most quoted by the apotheosists of self-government, did not hesitate to make exceptions. At the same time that Thomas Jefferson was preaching the doctrine of "consent of the governed" he held slaves, and there is no record that he ever advocated giving them a voice in the government by extending to them the right of suffrage, neither did he protest against excluding from the electorate "Indians not taxed." For equally practical reasons, Lincoln, at the same time that he was championing the doctrine that no man is good enough to govern another man without that other man's consent, was insisting that the Union should govern the Confederacy regardless of its consent. He had sufficient faith in the conviction that the Federal Government knew better what was good for the Confederacy in the way of government than the Confederacy knew itself, so that he was willing to use the whole of the Federal forces for the purpose of enforcing his ideas.
These men were not demagogues. They were not advocating the doctrine of self-government merely for the delectation of the rabble, but because they believed that upon the whole it was a sound principle of political science-a principle of far too great vitality to be destroyed by occasional variations from it, when these variations are rendered advisable by circumstances and prompted by practical common sense. The man who insists that there shall be no compromise in government in order to get the best that can be had under the circumstances, has secured his ideas of government from studying it in the abstract rather than observing it in the concrete. Burke was not far wrong when he said that "all government is a matter of compromise." But whether or not we can safely go that far, we can with entire assurance as to our correctness reach the conclusion that ideas of government, unlike the theorems of geometry, are not something which can wisely be worked out without regard to the conditions under which they are to be applied. The nations which have made the greatest progress in the art of government and to whom political science is most greatly indebted are those which have thrown the emphasis upon conditions rather than upon theories.
If, then, we may abandon the theory that self-government, however bad, is better than government, however good, by another, we are free to ask ourselves the question whether the Korean Government had not by reason of its failure to fulfil the prime objects for which governments are instituted the protection of life, liberty and property-forfeited its claim of right to continued existence? For my own part I can see no justification for the existence of a government after it has failed to fulfil these fundamental requirements, as the Korean Government had, and has shown no capacity for regenerating itself and no inclination to accept advice as to necessary reforms.
In order that my conclusions with reference to the merits of the Korean Government may not be thought unnecessarily harsh, I submit the following conclusions reached by Mr. George Kennan after a careful study of the situation at close range. He says: "It takes from the people, directly and indirectly, everything that they can earn over and above a bare subsistence, and gives them in return practically nothing. It affords no adequate protection to life or property; it provides no educational facilities that deserve notice; it builds no roads; it does not improve its harbors; it does not light its coast; it pays no attention whatever to street-cleaning or sanitation; it takes no measures to prevent or check epidemics; it does not attempt to foster national trade or industry; it encourages the lowest forms of primitive superstition, and it corrupts and demoralizes its subjects by setting them examples of untruthfulness,
dishonesty, treachery, cruelty and cynical brutality in dealing with human rights that is almost without a parallel in modern times." To this indictment I might add the more concise one by Mr. Gale, a Korean scholar of ability and ample opportunity for becoming familiar with the facts: "No government ever existed that was more infected with rottenness to the bones."
But it may be objected that the Korean nation had sufficient vitality to regenerate its government, however bad that government had become. The difficulty with this supposition is that it does not seem to be in accord with the facts. Those who by their disinterestedness and careful observation are in the best position to judge agree that "Korea presents case, not of arrested development, but of disintegration and decay. Its civilization has not become stagnant, it has rotted." Time was when a country might remain isolated, and such conditions as existed in Korea. a few years ago continue for years or even centuries; but for a country situated as Korea is, isolation is impossible in the twentieth century. The development of the means of communication has rendered national isolation a mere relic of the golden age. To some this may seem hard, but it is an accomplished fact.
With the possibility of isolation out of the question, it follows that when a State gets hopelessly out of joint with its environment and manifests neither the inclination nor the capacity to readjust itself to changed conditions, it must be pushed off the stage, as it is no longer performing a useful part. You may call this the "survival of the fittest" or what you will; it is a law which operates with States as with individuals; it is no respecter of persons, names or sentimentalities.
The work of establishing in Korea a government which will perform the functions for which governments are instituted having fallen to Japan by reason of her location and interests, it remains to be seen whether or not her work will justify her intervention. Even under the disadvantages of a residency she has succeeded in inaugurating some substantial reforms. The amount expended for education and for the encouragement of productive industries has been increased over a hundred-fold. Hospitals have been established and a conscientious attempt made at police reorganization. Reforms of far-reaching effect have been begun in the administrative and judicial departments. A loan of 10,000,000 yen has been secured for the building of wagon roads and a greater amount has been expended in the building of railroads. Over 50,000,000 yen have been expended in the building of water-works. But reforming by means of advice against the wishes of a government in which the dominant class are opposed to change as such is a most difficult task
-so difficult, in fact, that it would soon become intolerable. The change to a protectorate was as inevitable in Korea as in Egypt. It was perhaps a mistake to have attempted to govern through the medium of a residency rather than declaring a protectorate at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. Now that a protectorate has been established we may look for more rapid progress.