3. I confefs, Sir, this Argument is pretty fubtle and furprizing; but I conceive the Knots of it may be untied by this Answer. First, It may be juftly queftion'd, Whether the first part of your Dilemma be neceffarily attended with the appendant Abfurdity. 'Tis true indeed, not to think ones felf as happy as another, is the Spring of Envy or Discontent, among Men in this World) but whether this be the genuin and constant Effect of that Confideration, or whether it ought not rather to be ascribed to the prefent Infirmities and Imperfections of Human Nature, may admit Difpute. Nay, I rather think that fo indeed it must be accounted for, and that fuch a Confideration would not be productive of fuch an Effect in Heaven, confidering the perfect Charity of the Saints, and their as perfect fubmiffion to the Divine Will. But in cafe this Abfurdity fhould infeparably cleave to the first part, then I might my felf to the later, That in Heaven one Saint fhall think himself as Happy as another. Then, according to my own Notion (fay you) it will follow, that he is really fo. No, I deny the Confequence, the invalidity of which will plainly appear, by diftinguishing the Ambiguity of the Phrase. For this Expreffion, One Saint thinks himself as Happy as another, may be taken in a double fenfe, either that he thinks himself as Happy as he himself thinks that other; or, that he thinks himself as Happy as that other thinks himself. I grant, fhould one Saint think himself as Happy as another in this later Senfe of the Phrase, he would, according to my Hypothefis, really be fo; fo that this would bring in Equality. And therefore in this Senfe, I deny the Propofition; and that without the least danger of fplitting upon the first Abfurdity. But for the former Senfe, that has no fuch levelling Quality;for to fay that I think my felf as Happy as I think another, amounts to no more than this, That in my Apprehenfion another does not exceed me in Happiness: But tho' he does not in my Apprehenfion, yet he may in reality; for tho my Opinion gives Meafures to my own

A Refolution relating to a Paffage in the foregoing Treatife.

By way of Letter.

SIR,

"TH

HE kind Entertainment which you gave my Idea of Happiness, does not only encourage, but oblige me to endeavour the fatisfaction of that Scruple, which the Perufal of it has occafion'd.

2. You fay you fhould like my Notion concerning the Reality of that which is ufually call'd Imaginary Happiness, that is, (as you well explain both your own and my meaning) that altho' the Object may be an Imaginary Good, yet the Happiness which confifts in the Fruition of that Object, will not be Imaginary too, but Real; and confequently, that 'tis impoffible for a Man to feem to himself to be Happy, and not to be really fo, all Happiness confifting in Opinion. This Notion, you fay, you fhould like rarely well, could you free your felf from one Difficulty which it engages you upon; (viz.) That hereafter, in the State of Glory, either one Saint fhall think himself as Happy as another, or not; if not, this must needs occafion Envy or Difcontent; but if one fhall think himself as Happy as another, then, according to my Hypothefis, That Opinion is the MeaJure of Happiness, 'twill follow, that he will already be fo; and this brings in Equality of Happinefs, which you look upon (and I think justly too) as another Abfurdity.

3. I confefs, Sir, this Argument is pretty fubtle and furprizing; but I conceive the Knots of it may be untied by this Anfwer. First, It may be juftly queftion'd, Whether the first part of your Dilemma be neceffarily attended with the appendant Abfurdity. 'Tis true indeed, not to think ones felf as happy as another, is the Spring of Envy or Difcontent, among Men in this World; but whether this be the genuin and constant Effect of that Confideration, or whether it ought not rather to be ascribed to the prefent Infirmities and Imperfections of Human Nature, may admit Difpute. Nay, I rather think that fo indeed it must be accounted for, and that fuch a Confideration would not be productive of such an Effect in Heaven, confidering the perfect Charity of the Saints, and their as perfect fubmiflion to the Divine Will. But in cafe this Abfurdity fhould infeparably cleave to the first part, then I might my felf to the later, That in Heaven one Saint fhall think himself as Happy as another. Then, according to my own Notion (fay you) it will follow, that he is really fo. No, I deny the Confequence, the invalidity of which will plainly appear, by diftinguishing the Ambiguity of the Phrase. For this Expreffion, One Saint thinks himself as Happy as another, may be taken in a double fenfe; either that he thinks himself as Happy as he himself thinks that other; or, that he thinks himself as Happy as that other thinks himself. I grant, fhould one Saint think himself as Happy as another in this later Senfe of the Phrase, he would, according to my Hypothefis, really be fo; fo that this would bring in Equality. And therefore in this Senfe, I deny the Propofition; and that without the leaft danger of fplitting upon the firft Abfurdity. But for the former Senfe, that has no fuch levelling Quality;for to fay that I think my felf as Happy as I think another, amounts to no more than this, That in my Apprehenfion another does not exceed me in Happiness: But tho' he does not in my Apprehenfion, yet he may in reality; for tho my Opinion gives Measures to my own

Happiness, yet it does not to another Man's. So that one Saint may be faid to think himself as Happy as another in the former Senfe, without equalling the Happinefs of the Bleffed; tho, I confefs, I fhould much rather adhere to the contraryPropofition, (viz.) That one fhall not think himself as Happy as another, in cafe fuch an Opinion be not neceffarily attended with Envy or Difcontent, as I think it is not. Because it feems unreasonable to make them ignorant of the degrees of one anothers Blifs, unlefs that ignorance be neceffarily required to prevent the alledg'd Abfurdities. But I determin nothing in this Point; my bufinefs was only to break the Fórce of your Dilemma, and to fhew that my Notion does not involve you in the Difficulty fuppofed. This, Sir, is all that I think neceffary to fay to a Perfon of your Apprehenfion; and therefore I end these nice Speculations with this profitable reflection, That although the Notion of Happiness be intricate and obfcure, yet the means of attaining it are plain; and therefore 'twould be most advifable both for you and me, chiefly to apply our felves to the later here; and we fhall understand the former with the best fort of Knowledg, that of Experience, hereafter.

Yours,

J. N.

An

An Account of Plato's Ideas, and of Pla

tonic Love.

By way of Letter.

Tanta vis in Ideis conftituitur, ut nifi his intellectis, Sapiens effe nemo poffit. S. Auguftinus.

I.

SIR,

WE

Ere I not as well acquainted with your fingular Modefty, as I am with your intellectual Accomplishments, I fhould readily conclude, that your directing your Enquiries to me, proceeded not fo much from a Čuriofity to improve your own Knowledg, as to try mine. But when I confider, that you are ignorant of nothing fo much as of your own Worth and Abilities, I begin to think it poffible that you may propofe thefe Questions, even to me, out of a defire to be inform'd. Which way foever it is, I acknowledg my felf to be obliged to you for affording me an opportunity of ferving you, efpecially in fuch an Inftance, where I cannot gratifie your Requeft without humouring my own Genius at the fame time. For indeed to my Appre henfion, there is not a finer or more fublime Piece of Speculation in all Plato's Philofophy, than that of his Ideas, and that of his Love, tho' it has undergone the fame hard Fate with many other excellent Theories; first to be either ignorantly misunderstood, or maliciously mifreprefented; and then popularly vilify'd and decry'd.