ment; and we do so with the more satisfac- | 1st of September 1815, he appears to pretion, that it has hitherto been our misfortune clude himself from a criticism of those who to differ with him so frequently. The fol- waited, not three months alone, but four lowing passage is remarkable for its justice years. His inconsistency is here very strikand moderation :ing. He considers the strong measures of the Congress of Carlsbad (1819) to have "In nations, as individuals, it too often hap-been produced (and very truly so) by popupens that promises made during a period of dan- lar discontent-and he thence assumes that ger, or under the influence of extraordinary feel- this popular discontent destroyed the hope ings of terror or gratitude, are forgotten when of political liberty; while he has already the peril is over, or the period of excitement is shown that the question had been settled in past. The selfishness of libertines has invented the minds of the German rulers before the the infamous maxim, that lovers' vows are made discontent arose. only to be broken, although many a noble heart and heroic deed has (have ?) proved the falsehood of the assertion; but there are, unfortunately, fewer instances of unswerving faith in governments, whether monarchical or democratic. The monarchs of Germany broke faith as completely with the people, who had won for them the victory, after it was gained, as the Tiers Etat of France did with the clergy, whose accession had gained them the majority over the privileged orders at the commencement of the Revolution. Ten days after the signature of this solemn act of the Confederation, which guaranteed Parliaments to all the States of Germany, the battle of Waterloo was fought, the independence of the country was secured, and, with the danger, all memory of the promises passed away. The 1st of September came, but no committee met to arrange and settle the organization of the provincial and national representation in Prussia; years elapsed, but nothing was done generally towards the formation of the estates of the realm in any countries of the Confederation."-Hist. 1815-52. Vol. v., pp. 17, 18. These remarks are a virtual recantation of what has passed before. Surely all this official malversation is a very obvious cause of the German revolutions of 1848. No doubt there was a principle of " human corruption" at work; and Sir Archibald shows very clearly that the scenes of its operation were the Cabinets of the German States. The zeal with which the people came to the succour of their sovereigns in 1813 (if we merely follow the author's narrative of that period in his former history) indicates that their pervading spirit was a loyal patriotism. How, then, does he account for this revulsion of popular feeling, but by throwing the blame on Government itself? This morbid desire to prove that every revolution has but injured the cause it was designed to befriend, draws the author into many inaccuracies of fact as well as of reasoning. He tells us the same story of the Revolutions of 1830. The following pasthe politics of Northern Germany with resage betrays a remarkable misconception of ference to that event : "It is probable, therefore, that the rapid growth of population, wealth, and prosperity in Prussia would have had its usual effect in inducing a struggle for political power much earlier than it actually occurred, were it not for another event which occurred ere long, and for a considerable period totally altered the ideas and prevailing Revolution of 1830. passion of men. That event was the French of freedom, that great event was in an especial "Calamitous in every quarter to the interests manner fatal to Teutonic liberty. It gave a new direction to men's minds, and in the end, for a course of years substituted the terror of French conquest for the sturdy spirit of German independence.”—Vol. v., p. 43. Is Sir A. Alison aware that every statesman-every merchant-in Germany at this day will concur in referring the "wealth and prosperity of Prussia" during the last quarter of a century, in great degree, to the Prussian Customs League; and that the Prussian Customs League (though shadowed forth indeed in the most vague manner, in a previous and temporary remission of duties) was incontestibly a result of the general movement of 1830? According, therefore, to his own just estimate of the influence of But our perusal of Sir A. Alison's works popular wealth on government, this moveinvolves very much what Burns has termed ment must, pro tanto at least, have accele"drops of joy with draughts of ill between." rated Prussian liberty. The very concession A few pages further on, the author throws to commercial wishes (and in such this meathe blame upon the German people, for sure arose in a great degree), is in itself not their insurrectionary demonstrations in 1819. simply an indication, but a result, of a cerIt appears, from his own statement, that they tain freedom, whether the act were that of a waited patiently during four years for these theoretically absolute sovereign, or of a repromised political rights; and when Sir presentative Chamber. With regard to the Archibald has before criticised the German next statement, that this Revolution was Courts for not beginning to reform on the" in every quarter calamitous to freedom," D-12 VOL. XXVII. and "in an especial manner fatal to Teutonic | because it is one of the few facts connected liberty," as Sir Archibald calls it, can he with the German Confederation which had possibly be unaware that the movement of not been already told by successive histo1830 gave birth to Constitutional Govern- rians. ment in several of the more considerable We beg Sir Archibald to understand, that states of Germany; and that the commer- we in no greater degree sympathise with cial wealth of Saxony, for instance, was com- revolutions in the abstract than he does puted in 1848 to have nearly doubled its himself. We readily concur with him, that, amount in 1830? It is true that much of as a historical fact, the results of many revothis increase may be ascribed (if it can lutions have done injury to the cause of really be dissociated from the legislative freedom. We cheerfully acknowledge, also, action of the Chambers, which did much to that the immediate tendency of many has secure the inclusion of Saxony into the Zoll- been so strongly anti-social, that the recoil verein) to the Prussian Customs League- even of military despotism has been preitself, however, according to Sir A. Alison, ferable beyond comparison to governments, an indirect element of liberty. "The terror often rather anarchies, which are founded of French conquest," described as enduring upon them. But we refer that tendency, for "a course of years," is an equal mis- in nearly every instance, to the impolicy of statement: M. de Metternich and M. de the previous despotism. And the ill-sucHardenberg soon began to snap their fingers cess of just and intelligent reformers is, to at Louis Philippe, though he was apparent- us, matter not of satisfaction, but of sorrow. ly secure upon the French throne within But the author's view of the uniform action two years after his accession. But if this of revolutions is as contracted, as his notion "terror of French conquest" had continued, that a national religion and a national polity nothing would have been more likely, as in could be overthrown by the writings of two 1813, to provoke "the sturdy spirit of Ger- imaginative indeed, but superficial sceptics. man independence !" We will take another subject. What shall it be? We will take Turkey. When we meet with such misconceptions of the leading relations of German politics, Sir A. Alison is by no means at home in it becomes hardly worth while to point out Turkey. He is not au fait of dates; he how little Sir A. Alison has availed himself enjoys a very limited knowledge of facts of the authentic records before the public, in general; he is apt to atone for the originwhich would have enabled him to follow the al unkindness of the gifts of memory and most important and interesting of the his- application by availing himself of that of toric negotiations connected with his sub- the imagination; and his deductions occaject. Thus he devotes a great deal of ap- sionally run in an opposite direction to the plause to the Germanic Confederation of facts upon which they are based. He tells 1815. He terms it, rather quaintly, " aus, both in the contents page, and in the sage constitution ;" and enumerates its pro- text at page 491, of the fifth volume, that visions which "received the consent of all the date of the Treaty of Adrianople was parties concerned." Now, in a measure so 1828,-whereas every one knows that, in novel and so important, it would have been 1828, the Turkish and Russian power was interesting to know something of its origin, nicely poised in battle, and that the Treaty and to learn how this "consent of all par- of Adrianople was signed in 1829. As a ties" was brought about. If the author had set off against this repetition of a wrong referred to the Castlereagh Correspondence, date, he fires three shots at the date of the he would have seen that this "consent of all great Treaty of 1841, hoping, like an indifparties" was the ultimate result of a fierce ferent sportsman in chronology, to bring it contention; that the scheme was that of down between them! At p. 566 of vol. V., Prince Metternich, and of Prince Metternich he tells us that it was signed on the 13th alone; that it encountered very strong op- of March; at p. 105 of vol. VI., that it was position even at the Austrian Court; and signed on the 13th of February; and at that that minister, after a contest which it is p. 107 of the latter volume, that it was as amusing as it is instructive to read, car- signed on the 13th of July. This is not ried his point against the strong opposition mere carelessness. In the first place, it of the Emperor Francis, of Prince Schwar- happens that this treaty was a provision zenberg, and the heads of the Austrian consequent on the expiration of the Treaty bureaucracy, and finally against the other of Hunkiar Skelessi, which did not expire German Governments. We advert to this, because the fact was not generally known until the publication of one of the later volumes by the late Lord Londonderry; and until the 5th of July; and, as Sir A. Alison declaims so strongly upon the question of this treaty, he might as well have ascertained when its provisions expired. He Turn, then, to the criticism on the Treaty of 1841 itself: would then have seen that the Treaty of this lugubrious and egotistical foreboding 1841 could not have been signed either in of the fall of the East? February or March, because they contravened the stipulations of Hunkiar Skelessi. In mitigation of this error, it must be remembered that Sir Archibald was by no means aware, as we shall see, that the two treaties did run in opposition to each other; although he only saves his logic at the expense of his learning. In the second place, it was a peculiarity of this treaty, that Lord Palmerston, who went out of office with the Melbourne Ministry, which resigned on the 30th or 31st of August, was fortunate enough to make an entire settlement of the Eastern Question, but just before his retire ment. Now, the neutralization of the Channel of Constantinople, which was the chief provision of the treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, and that against which Sir A. Alison's blind invective is directed, has long been a cardinal point in our diplomatic faith. Without appealing, however, either to reason or to precedent, we have a shorter way of meeting Sir Archibald: we shall judge him, as we have judged him before, out of his own mouth. It is necessary, first, to set the author right with respect to the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi, of 1833, where he alludes to our non-interference in that year : "Instead of this, what did England do? She refused succour [italics of author, who has just before said that she had no succour to give "Unquestionably one set of dangers was obviated by its successful issue; for the authority the imminent risk the Ottoman Empire ran after of the Sultan over Egypt was re-established, and the battle of Konieh removed. But is that the greatest danger that Turkey really ran? Is it from the north or south that its independence is most seriously menaced? Has it nothing to fear from the Northern Colossus, to whom, by this treaty, the Euxine became an inland, inaccessible lake? Undertaken to rescue Constantinople from the perilous exclusive guardianship of Russia, the war left the Sultan tête-à-tête with the Czar in the Black Sea; intended to secure British influence in the Isthmus of Suez, the high-road to India, it left the Pacha bound by strong ties of interest and gratitude to the French government! The terrible war of 1854, intended to open the Euxine to foreign vessels, and terminate the fatal supremacy of Russia in its waters, was the direct the victories of Beyrout and of Acre !"-Vol. v., consequence of the Treaty of 1841, purchased by p. 567. We would not write with needless discourtesy; but we must tell Sir A. Alison plainly, that he knows nothing of what he writes. 1. The Treaty of 13th of July 1841, which is represented as "first recognising the vast concession of the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi," did just the reverse: it repudiated the concession. The obnoxious stipulation of Hunkiar Skelessi provided for the closing of the Dardanelles against all threw the Ottomans into the arms of Russia, who extorted, as the price of her protection, the Treaty powers with whom Russia might be at war; of Hunkiar Skelessi; which converted the Euxine while it recognised, in practice, the opening into a Russian lake, and left the forts of the Bos- of the Bosporus to Russia (for Russian aid porus vis-à-vis to the bastions of Sebastopol, with had already been demanded and obtained). a few sail of the line, ill manned, to combat It was, therefore, the effect of this treaty to eighteen line-of-battle ships, the skill of whose lay open Constantinople to Russia on the gunners England so fatally experienced on the ramparts of the Malakoff and the Redan! one side, and to preclude, in any danger, Thus are nations led to destruction by the want the summoning by Turkey of the naval suc of foresight in the national councils."-Vol. v., cour of any power whom Russia might p. 568. choose to ostracise by a hostile declaration. It was the provision of the Treaty of 1841, We suggest the reading, in lieu of the on the other hand, to close the Bosporus last sentence, "Thus are authors brought against Russia, by reciprocally closing the to destruction for want of knowledge and Dardanelles against other powers, so long reflection."-Is it possible that Sir A. Ali- as Turkey was at peace. The one treaty son was not aware that this stipulation was extended the authority of Russia to the merely temporary-having expired, as we Egean; the other neutralized the whole have said, on the 5th of July, 1841-that on Channel of Constantinople. the 13th of the same month, it was replaced posing her to be the apprehended or the by a permanent treaty between Turkey and open enemy) was excluded from the Bosall the Great Powers, recognising the ex- porus, by the Treaty of 1841, both in peace act antithesis to the principle involved in and in war the other Powers, excluded the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi,-and that from the Dardanelles in peace, were admisfrom the 13th of July 1841, the Black Sea sible in war by the free suffrage of Turkey. was no more a Russian lake than it had 2. Sir A. Alison speaks of the "Northbeen prior to 1833, which is the date of all ern Colossus, to whom, by this treaty, the Russia (sup t Euxine became an inland, inaccessible lake" | history, and at page 445. Unlucky para[Quotation, Vol. V.]; and of "the Treaty graph! Here we take leave of Sir A. Alison on of 13th July 1841, which first recognised as "A broad inland sea, enclosed within impreg part of the public law of Europe," etc. nable gates, gives its navy [i. e., the Turkish] the [Vol. VI., p. 107]. The Treaty of 1841, extraordinary advantage of a safe place for pacion the contrary, introduced no fresh princi- fic exercise and preparation; narrow and windple. It simply re-asserted the immemorial ing straits, on either side of fifteen or twenty law of the Ottoman Empire. It is certain miles in length [they happen to be sixteen on one that the writer can never have read the side, and seventy on the other], crowned by heights treaty which he thus criticises, or he would forming natural castles, render this matchless metropolis impregnable to all but land forces!" have seen it, at a glance, stated at the very outset, that this was its principle and its aim." If he had ever so little as looked at the Turkey, with the friendly advice, that, before Turkish Capitulations, he would have seen he favours the world with his threatened histhat this point had been always reserved. If he had ever read the Treaty of the Dar-tory of the late war in the East of Europe, he should acquaint himself a little with the danelles, and known anything of its history, he would have been aware that this was the geography of that region; and that, if he treaty between Great Britain and Turkey historic relations of Turkey with the Great were less absolutely ignorant of the leading which the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi had Powers, he would also be less flippant in his overruled-which the Treaty of 1841 called criticisms of the policy of the most accomagain into action, with the concurrence of the Great Continental Powers and which was rather humiliating to find one's self the dupe plished statesman of Europe. It is certainly negotiated by Sir Robert Adair in 1809, at of one's own inconceivable self-confidence, the instance of the much-belauded Adminis- after assuming such a majestic superiority tration, led by the Duke of Portland, and Mr. Perceval, and Lord Castlereagh, and but over such statesmen also as Lord Lans-not, indeed, over Lord Palmerston alone, Mr. Canning! rendon (who, in 1841, were his colleagues downe, Lord John Russell, and Lord Clain the administration)-over the astute M. Guizot, and the wary and anti-Russian M. de Metternich-and over statesmen, in the 3. We are told that "the Sultan was left tête-à-tête with the Czar in the Black Sea;" and, again, we find the following intelligent criticism: English Aberdeen. "Lord Palmerston, having succeeded in bringing all Europe into his measures, thought he had secured the independence of the Ottoman Empire, by adopting the Russian Treaty of Hunkiar Ske- Let us turn to the chapters which treat of lessi, closing the Bosporus [this is just what that Spain. Sir A. Alison favours us with a long treaty took care not to do] and Dardanelles statement of the condition of that country. against foreign vessels of war; forgetting that Now, if a historian design to describe the Russia, with eighteen ships of the line, was already condition of a country at such length, he there; and that the only result of his diplomatic should do so with fidelity. We are speaktriumph was to leave Constantinople, with (?) its fleet destroyed at Navarino, unsupported, vis-à-ing, not of its transient, but of its permavis of Sebastopol, with its impregnable bastions nent characteristics, which must hold as true and four thousand pieces of cannon."-Vol. vi., now as they did in 1820. And we say (if p. 108. we may speak on personal authority), that much of this description of Spain is a gro tesque caricature. But, as this is a defect of less moment on the part of a historian, we will pass to historical subjects. It seems clear, from this passage, that Sir A. Alison supposes Sebastopol to be on the Bosporus, and in all probability, mistakes it for Scutari ! ["Russia was there al Take the question, for instance, of the ready" on the Dardanelles!] But we pro- French invasion of Spain in 1823, and_of mised Sir Archibald to confute him out of the recognition of the South American Rehis own mouth. The confutation is to be publics. Sir Archibald is fond of paradox, found in the tenth* volume of his former and the paradox is not always very defensible. That which is set up on this occasion * Edition of 14 vols., already quoted from. 1850. is, that the French invasion of Spain was Chap. 69, on Turkey. Among other curiosities in justifiable, and that our intervention in South contradiction, there are two distinct accounts of Constantinople, each opposite to the other, and both America was not. The author's proposition, irreconcileable with the truth. These are to be is stated as follows: found respectively in vol. x., p. 445 (Old Hist.), and vol. iii., p. 38 (New Hist.). The latter speaks of the shortly before the late war broke out, and formed a "charming suburb of Galata," which we visited widely different opinion of. 1857. Sir A. Alison's Histories. of "No doubt can now remain that the French | powerful intervention? Was the freedom invasion of Spain, against which public feeling in England menaced by the re-establishment of this country was so strongly excited at the time, Spanish authority in South America? Confesswas not only a wise measure on the part of the edly it was not; the hope of commercial advanBourbon Government, but fully justitiable on the tages-the vision of a vast trade with the inbest principles of international law. The strength surgent states, was the ruling motive. But comof this case is to be found, not in the absurdity mercial advantages will not constitute legal right, and peril of the Spanish constitution, or even the or vindicate acts of injustice, any more than the imminent hazard to which it exposed the royal acquisition of provinces will justify an unprofamily in that country, and the entire liberties voked invasion. It sounds well to say you will and property of the country, it is to be found in call a new world into existence to redress the the violent inroads which the Spanish revolution- balance of the old; but if that new world is to ists, and their allies to the north of the Pyrenees, be carved out of the dominions of an allied and were making on France itself, and the extreme friendly power, it is better to leave it to itself."hazard to which its institutions were exposed in Pp. 739, 740. Hist., consequence of their machinations." 1815-52, vol. ii., p. 738. Now, the whole of this statement proceeds upon a false parallel between France This, then, is the case on behalf of France; and England. The author argues as though and it is a novelty to argue with Sir Archi- the French Government did one thing, and bald on international law. Now, the law the English Government another. The deof intervention, stated broadly, is pretty cisive intervention of England was that of clear in theory, although it is often a very individuals, in opposition to the views of nice question to demark right and wrong in their Government. The author's sneer at its application. If the independence or the Mr. Canning, who is designated in the passage with regard to "the new world," is vital interests of one state are so threatened by another, as to render intervention an act answered by himself. Thus he says (p. of self-preservation, the right is clear. Let 716):us take, first, the theory, and then the facts, on which this intervention proceeded. Sir A. Alison assumes it to have been the spontaneous act of the French Government in If he will defence of its national interests. refer to the records of the Congress of Verona, he will find that this intervention proceeded on the authority of the Holy Alliance of which France made herself the instrument. "But be the intervention of England in South America justifiable or unjustifiable, nothing is demerit belongs to Mr. Canning. The independmore certain than that neither its merit nor its ence of Columbia was decided by a charge of British bayonets on the field of Carabobo, on the 14th of June 1821, more than a year before Mr. Canning was called to the Foreign Office." It is possible that Mr. Canning's lanThis surely involves an important distinction in the right of intervention; guage may not have been justified by his and the act of the French Government was share in the transaction. But it is clear no more immediately based on the theory from Sir A. Alison's own statement, that of special interest, than the Austrian inter- before the recognition of independence in vention in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, South America, which was the work of Mr. which proceeded on the authority of the Canning, and the first direct act of the And with reCongresses of Laybach and Troppau (1820 British Government, individuals had decided and 1821), without even the fact of terri- the whole question in fact. torial proximity to support the plea of "self gard to the author's stricture on the repeal preservation." The illegal assumptions of of the Foreign Enlistment Bill, he elsewhere the Holy Alliance thus indirectly subtracted himself quotes Lord Castlereagh's statefrom the legal privileges of each component ment, that British officers engaging in the Whatever leaning, thereState, and went far to bar the plea of self- South American revolt would forfeit their preservation, which would otherwise at any commissions. rate have been plausible. Waiving, how- fore, the British Government may naturally ever, this difficulty in the theory of inter- have entertained towards the emancipation vention, what were its grounds? Sir A. of South America from the worst rule that Alison tells us that they were to be found, this century has seen, it is clear that Sir A. not simply in the conduct of the Spanish Alison's position involves, virtually as well revolutionists, but in that of the subjects of the King of France in his own territory. But the counterpart of the propositionthe justification of our interference in South America-remains: "What was the justification of this armed and as theoretically, a comparison between a government and a body of individuals, upon which no legal argument can be founded. Let us see, too, how the author reasons out this proposition by analogy : "England saw very clearly the iniquity of |