out the eye, and what else is this wisdom but God the Father?* The Word (the Logos) is the law and the norm of our judgments, and teaches us to think of ourselves with humility according to the true wisdom. And the Spirit of both, the divine love, is the food of the will (Spiritus amborum, Deus charitas, lac est voluntati)." The practical application follows, of course. The three persons in the Trinity were referred in a peculiar way to the development of the history of the world. According to Hugo of St. Victor, (De tribus Diebus, quoted by Liebner, p. 383, note), the day of fear commenced with the promulgation of the law given by the Father (power); the day of truth with the manifestation of the Son (wisdom); and the day of love with the effusion of the Holy Spirit (love). Thus there was a progressive development of the times towards greater and greater light!—Amalrich of Bena and the mystico-pantheistic sects, on the other hand, interpreted these three periods after their own notions, in connection with millennarian hopes. (Comp the Eschatology.) [A similar view was advanced by Joachim of Flore, and forins (says Baur, Dogmengesch., 253), the chief contents of his three works, viz., Concordia Vet. et Nov. Test., Expositio in Apocalyps., and Psalterium decem Chordarum. The Father is the principium principale, the Son and Spirit are the principia de principio. In the period of the Father (the more materialistic), God appears as the mighty-the terrible God of the law. The Son assumes human nature, to reveal the merciful love of God; and the Spirit appears in the form of the dove, the figure of the holy mother, the church. This revelation is a progressive one, gradually subduing the fleshly and material, and transforming it into the spiritual, etc.] Although the doctrine of the Trinity was generally reckoned among the mysteries, which could be made known to us only by revelation (compare § 158), yet there was still a controversy on the question, whether God could make himself known to the natural consciousness as triune, and in what way? Compare on this, Baur, Trinitätslehre, ii. 697, 8q. [This is entirely denied by Aquinas, and admitted in a qualified way by Duns Scotus.] [The scholastics, says Baur, Dogmengesch. 252, give to the Trinity a more refined character, but in a sense not congruent with the dogma of the church. What they called persons, were not persons in the sense of the church, but relations. To construct the Trinity, they (with the exception of Anselm and Richard), did not get beyond the psychological distinction of intelligence and will, putting these into a merely coordinate relation, instead of endeavoring to grasp the different relations, in which God as Spirit, stands to himself, from the point of view of a vital spiritual process in its unity and totality. The more profound mystics struggle after such a conception, in what they say of a speaking of God, etc., see above, note 13.] § 171. THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION, PROVIDENCE, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.-THEODICY. The pantheistic system of John Scotus Erigena,' found no imitators among the orthodox scholastics; they adhered rather to the idea of a creation out of nothing.' Later writers endeavored to define this doctrine more precisely, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, as if nothing could have been the cause of existence.'— *Here he calls the Father Wisdom; the scholastics applied this term to the Son. Comp. above, note 14. The Mosaic account of the creation was interpreted literally by some, and allegorically by others. The opinion still continued generally to prevail, that the world is a work of divine goodness, and exists principally for the sake of man.' Though mysticism tended to induce its advocates to regard the independence of the finite creature as a separation from the Creator, and consequently as a rebellion, and thus to represent creation as the work of Satan (after the manner of the Manicheans), yet these pious thinkers were roused by the sight of the works of God to the utterance of beautiful and elevating thoughts, and lost in wonder and adoration." On the other hand, the schoolmen, fond of vain and subtle investigations, indulged here also in absurd inquiries.-Concerning the existence of evil in the world, the scholastics adopted for the most part the views of Augustine. Thus, some (e. g., Thomas Aquinas) regarded evil as the absence of good, and as forming a necessary part of the finite world, retaining however, the difference between moral evil and physical evil, (the evil of guilt, and the evil of its punishment)." Others adopted, with Chrysostom, the notion of a twofold divine will (voluntas antecedens et consequens)." 1 Comp. above § 165, 1, and De divina Natura, ii. c. 19, quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 63. 'God is not only the former (factor), but the creator and author (creator) of matter. This was taught by Hugo of St. Victor (Prolog. c. 1. Liebner, p. 355), and the same view was adopted by the other mystics. The advocates of Platonism alone sympathised with the notions of Origen. Fredegis of Tours defended the reality of nothing, as the infinite (allembracing) genus, from which all other genera and species of things derive their form: comp. his work De Nihilo, and Ritter, Gesch. der Christl. Phil. vii. 189, 89. Alexander Hales (Summa, P. ii. Quæst. 9, Membr. 10), drew a distinction between nihilum privativum and negativum; see on this point Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 61, 62.-Gieseler, Dogmengesch. 495. [The nihil privativum abolishes the object of the act, the negativum, the act itself: the creation from nothing is in the former sense.] Thomas Aquinas (Pars. i. Qu. 46, art. 2), represented the doctrine of a creation out of nothing as an article of faith (credibile), but not as an object of knowledge and argumentation (non demonstrabile vel scibile), and expressed himself as follows, Qu. 45, art. 2: Quicunque facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit, præsupponitur actioni ejus et non producitur per ipsam actionem......Si ergo Deus non ageret, nisi ex aliquo præsupposito, sequeretur, quod illud præsuppositum non esset causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra, quod nihil potest esse in entibus nisi a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius esse. Unde necesse est dicere, quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse producit. Comp. Cramer, vii. p. 415, ss. Baur, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 716: "The fact that Thomas considered God the first cause and type of all things, plainly shows that in his opinion the creation, which is designated as a creation out of nothing, was not a sudden transition from non-existence to existence." Quæst. 44, art. 2: .... Ipse Dicendum, quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum.... Deus est primum exemplar omnium.-While Thomas and still more Albertus Magnus draw no distinct line of demarcation between the idea of emanation and that of creation (Baur, l. c. p. 723, ss.), Scotus adheres to the simple notion that God is the primum efficiens; nevertheless he distinguishes between an esse existentiæ and an esse essentiæ; but both can not be separated in reality, and the latter presupposes the former; see lib. ii. Dist. 1, Qu. 2, and other passages in Baur, 726, sq. • Thus Hugo of St. Victor thought that the creation out of formless matter in six days might be literally interpreted. The Almighty might have made it differently; but in this way he would teach rational beings in a figure, how they are to be transformed from moral deformity into moral beauty...... In creating the light prior to all other works, he signified, that the works of darkness displeased him. The good and evil angels were separated at the same time, when light and darkness were separated. God did not separate light from darkness, till he saw the light, that it was good. In like manner, we should first of all see to our light, that it is good, and then we may proceed to a separation, etc. Observing that the phrase "and God saw that it was good," is wanting in reference to the work of the second day in the Mosaic account of the creation, this mystic scholastic was led into further inquiries respecting the reason of this omission. He found it in the number two, which is an inauspicious number, because it denotes a falling away from unity. Nor is it said, in reference to the waters above the firmament, as is done with regard to those under the firmament, that they were gathered together unto one place-because the love of God (the heavenly water) is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost. This love must expand itself and rise higher; but the waters under the firmament (the lower passions of the soul) must be kept together. Fishes and birds are created out of one and the same matter, yet different places are assigned to them, which is a type of the elect and the reprobate, from one and the same mass of corrupt nature: Comp. Liebner, p. 256, 57.-Friar Berthold saw in the works of the first three days of the creation, faith, hope, and love; see Kling, p. 462, 63. Joh. Dam. De Fide Orth. ii. 2, (after Gregory of Nazianzum and Dionysius Areopagita): Ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὑπεράγαθος Θεὸς οὐκ ἠρκέσθη τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρία, αλλ' ὑπερβολῇ ἀγαθότητος εὐδόκησε γενέσθαι τινὰ τὰ εὐεργετηθησόμενα, καὶ μεθέξοντα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθότητος, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει καὶ δημιουργεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα, ἀόρατά τε καὶ ὁρατὰ, καὶ τὸν ἐξ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου συγκείμενον ἄνθρωπον.—Petr. Lomb. Sententt. ii. Dist. i. C. Dei tanta est bonitas, ut summe bonus beatitudinis suæ, qua æternaliter beatus est, alios velit esse participes, quoniam videt et communicari posse et minui omnino non posse. Illud ergo bonum, quod ipse erat et quo beatus erat, sola bonitate, non necessitate aliis communicari voluit..... Lit. D: Et quia non valet ejus beatitudinis particeps existere aliquis, nisi per intelligentiam (quæ quanto magis intelligitur, tanto plenius habetur), fecit Deus rationalem creaturam, quæ summum bonum intelligeret et intelligendo amaret et amando possideret ac possidendo frueretur...... Lit. F.: Deus perfectus et summa bonitate plenus, nec augeri potest nec minui. Quod ergo rationalis creatura facta est a Deo, referendum est ad creatoris bonitatem et ad creaturæ utilitatem. Comp. Alan. ab Ins. ii. 4 (quoted by Pez, Thes. i. p. 487, 88). Hugo of St. Victor also said (quoted by Liebner, p. 357, 58) "The creation of the world had man, that of man had God for its end. The world should serve man, and man should serve God; but the service of the latter is only man's own advantage, since in this service he is to find his own happiness. For God being all-sufficient to himself, nor standing in need of the services of any one, man has received both, i. e., all, viz., the good under him, and the good above him, the former to supply his necessities, the latter to constitute his happiness, the former for his benefit and use, the latter for his enjoyment and possession. Thus man, though created at a later period, was nevertheless the cause of all that was under him, and hence the high dignity of human nature." Thomas Aquinas supposed God to have no other object than the communication of his own being, Summa, P. i. Qu. 44, art. 4: Primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicujus finis: sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quæ est ejus bonitas. Et unaquæque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quæ est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinæ. Sic ergo divina bonitatis est finis rerum omnium. Comp. Cramer, vii. p. 414, 15. Baur, Trinit. ii. 731, sq. Ritter, viii. 284. [Christl. Phil. i. 650. Bonaventura, on the end of God in creation, argues, "that God's highest end must be his own glory, for it is said, God created all things for himself; not as if it was necessary for him, or to increase his glory, but in order to reveal and communicate it, in which the highest well-being of his creatures consists... Should any one say, that such a highest end is egotistic, the answer is, that it is one thing in God, and another with the creature; for in God there is no distinction between the general and the particular good; he is the original ground of all good, and of the highest good. If He, from whom all other goodness is derived, were not to perform all his acts on account of himself, the effect that proceeded from him would not be truly good. Since the use of the creatures depends altogether on their relation to the supreme good, everything proceeds from the love of God, since he makes all things tend towards himself... What is the highest end of creation must also be the same for human actions." See Neander, Hist. of Dogmas. pp. 564-5.] According to the author of the work, German Theology (cap. 1, from the commencement) the ideas of being a creature, being created, being an ego, and self-hood, are synonymous with love of the world, love of the creature, self-love, self-will, natural carnal sense, and carnal pleasure. The creature must depart, if God is to enter. He thinks it sinful "to esteem created things, and to look upon them as something, while they are in realitynothing." Subsequently he admits, however, that those things have their being only in God: "Out of that which is perfect, or without it, there is no true existence, but all is mere accident, or mere semblance and glitter, which neither is nor has true being, except in the fire from which the shining proceeds, like the brightness which proceeds or flows out from fire, or light, or the sun."-Some of the heretical sects of the middle ages entertained views on these points which bordered upon Manicheism. Thus Berthold, a Franciscan monk, said in a sermon (quoted by Kling, p. 305; Wackernagel, Lesebuch, i. Sp. 678): Some heretics believe and maintain that the devil created man, when our Lord created the soul in him. Comp. Ermengardi, Opusc. contra Hæreticos, qui dicunt et credunt, mundum istum et omnia visibilia non esse a Deo facta, sed a Diabolo, edited by Gretser in Bibl. Max. PP. T. xxiv. p. 1602. Gieseler, Church History, ii. § 82, note o. [Comp. Vaughan's Hours with the Mystics, 2d ed., 1859.] 7 Henry Suso (c. 54, quoted by Diepenbrock, p. 208) said: "Now let us remain here for a while and contemplate the high and excellent master in his works. Look above you and around you, look to the four quarters of the world, how wide and high the beautiful sky is in its rapid course, and how nobly the master has adorned it with the seven planets, each of which, with the exception of the moon, is much larger than the earth, and how it is beautified with the innumerable multitude of the bright stars. O, how clearly and cheerfully the beautiful sun rises in the summer season, and how diligently it gives growth and blessings to the soil; how the leaves and the grass come forth, how the beautiful flowers smile, how the forest, and the heath, and the field resound with the sweet airs of the nightingale and other small birds, how all the animals which were shut up during the severe winter come forth and enjoy themselves, and go in pairs, how young and old manifest their joy in merry and gladsome utterances. O, tender God! if thou art so loving in thy creatures, how fair and lovely must thou be in thyself!-Look further, I pray you, and behold the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and all the wonderful things in them, the variety and diversity of men, quadrupeds, birds, fishes, and the wonders of the deep, all of which cry aloud and proclaim the praise and honor of the boundless and infinite nature of God! O Lord, who preserves all this? who feeds it? Thou takest care of all, each in its own way, great and small, rich and poor, thou, O God! thou doest it, thou God art indeed God!" 8 • John Damascenus, De Fide Orth. ii. 5, ss. treated of the whole range of natural science (cosmography, astronomy, physics, geology, etc.), so far as it was known to him, in the section on creation. Most of the scholastics followed his example. Comp. Cramer, vii. p. 388, ss. But in introducing natural history into the province of dogmatic theology, they thought that they might put limits to physical investigation by the doctrine of the church. Thus it happened that e. g., in the time of Boniface [Bishop of Mayence], the assertion of Virgilius, a priest, that there are antipodes, was considered heretical; see Schröckh, xix. p. 219, 220.* • Anselm himself taught that this world is the best (omne quod est, recte est, Dial. de Ver. c. 7); and Abelard agreed with what Plato asserted (in the Timæus): Deum nullatenus mundum meliorem potuisse facere, quam * An additional point in reference to the work of creation was the question, whether it is to be assigned to only one of the persons of the Trinity? The theologians of the present period adopted the opinion of the earlier church, that all the three persons participated in it; Thomas Aquinas, Qu. 45, art. 6, Cramer, vii. p. 416. This was, however, scarcely more than a speculative idea. The power of creating was supposed to be more particularly possessed by the Father, for the very reason that power was peculiarly ascribed to him; though various expressions were used, in the liturgical services, e. g. in the hymn: Veni Creator Spiritus. |