6

but he was only God in them." (Second Sermon on All Saints' Day, fol. 307, a. Schmidt, 1. c. p. 694.)—“ Pantheism is a great and noble phenomenon deceiving us by a peculiar charm, in the case of those who burn with love, and are, as it were, intoxicated with a sense of God, and the contemplation of divine things. But where it is only the result of subtile conclusions and philosophical definitions, or the proud but confused dream of an indefinite religious feeling, it loses its grand relations, and its mysterious poetry; and those faults which we once felt disposed to overlook, now become manifest, together with all the contradictions in which they involve us." Schmidt, 1. c. Suso showed in a highly characteristic way that a pantheistic disposition was nothing but a transitory excitement of feeling, which must first of all subside (in a quotation given by Diepenbrock, p. 189).—“I call that state of our mind flourishing, in which the inner man is cleansed from sinful carnality, and delivered from remaining imperfections; in which he cheerfully rises above time and place, since he was formerly bound, and could not make free use of his natural nobility. When he then opens the eyes of his mind, when he tastes other and better pleasures which consist in the perception of the truth, in the enjoyment of divine happiness, in insight into the present now of eternity, and the like, and when the created mind begins to comprehend a part of the eternal, uncreated mind both in itself and in all things, then he is wonderfully moved. Examining himself and reflecting on what he once was, and what he now is, he recollects that he was a poor, ungodly, and wretched man, that he was blind, and lived far from God; but now it seems to him that he is full of God, that there is nothing which is not God; further, that God and all things are one and the same. He then goes so hastily to work, that he becomes excited in his mind like wine in a state of fermentation, that has not as yet formed a sediment." etc. "Such men are like bees which make honey: when they are full grown, and come for the first time out of their hives, they fly about in an irregular manner, not knowing whither to go; some take the wrong direction and lose themselves, but others come back to the right place. Thus it is with the men before spoken of, when they see God as all in all, without their reason being regulated,” etc. Gerson acutely defended the distinction between God and the creature (however highly favored) in opposition to Ruysbroek and Eckart, though he was not always consistent with himself. Comp. Hundeshagen, p. 62, ss. Tauler maintained (Predigten, vol. i. p. 61), that "nothing so much prevented the soul from knowing God as time and space: time and space are in his opinion parts, but God is one; therefore if the soul will know God, it must know him beyond time and beyond space; for God is neither this nor that, as those manifold things are, but he is one." The assertion of Wessel that "God alone is, and that all other things are what they are, through him" (De Orat. iii. 12, p. 76), and some other of his declarations, might lead to the supposition that he too was a pantheist; but compare, on the other hand, the appropriate observation of Ullmann, p. 230, note.

§ 166.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

a. The Relation of God to Time, Space, and Number. (The Omnipresence, Eternity, and Unity of God.)

The writings of John Damascenus,' and his successors in the Greek church, contain less ample definitions and classifications of the attributes, than the works of the schoolmen, which are very copious on just this point. Though Anselm and others insisted upon the importance of the proposition laid down by Augustine, that the attributes of God not only form one whole, but are also identical with the divine essence itself, and can not therefore be regarded as something foreign and manifold, which is merely attached to God," yet the speculative and systematizing tendency of the scholastics frequently led them to lose sight of this simple truth. Concerning the omnipresence of God, some, e. g., Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, defended the substantial omnipresence among the metaphysical attributes of God; Anselm laid most stress upon the eternity and omnipresence; the former showed that there could not be in God either an Aliqando or an Alicubi in the proper sense of the terms, in opposition to the merely dynamic view, while others endeavored to unite the two. A difference was also made between the eternity of God, and a • mere sempiternitas, the latter of which may be ascribed even to creatures (e. y., angels and the souls of men). And lastly, it was asserted that the unity of God, which many of the schoolmen numbered among his attributes, was not to be regarded as a mere mathematical quantity. The theologians of the Greek church signified this by extending the idea of a numerical unity to that of a unity which is above all other things."

1 John of Damascus De Fide Orth. i. 4 : "Απειρον οὖν τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀκατάληπτον· καὶ τοῦτο μόνον αὐτοῦ κατάληπτον, ἡ ἀπειρία καὶ ἀκαταληψία ὅσα δὲ λέγομεν ἐπὶ θεοῦ καταφατικῶς, οὐ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν δηλοῖ. Κἂν ἀγαθὸν, κἂν δίκαιον, κἂν σοφὸν, κἂν ὅ τι ἂν ἄλλο εἴπῃς, οὐ φυσιν λέγεις θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν. Εἰσὶ δὲ καί τινα καταφατικῶς λεγόμενα ἐπὶ θεοῦ, δύναμιν ὑπεροχικῆς ἀποφάσεως ἔχοντα· οἶον, σκότος λέγοντες ἐπὶ θεοῦ, οὐ σκότος νοοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι φῶς, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τὸ φῶς· καὶ φῶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι σκότος. Comp. cap 9: Τὸ θεῖον ἁπλοῦν ἐστι καὶ ἀσύνθετον· τὸ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων συγκείμενον, συνθετόν ἐστιν. Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄκτιστον καὶ ἄναρχον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰώνιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δημιουργικὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ουσιώδεις διαφορὰς εἶπομεν ἐπὶ θεοῦ, ἐκ τοσούτων συγκείμενον, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ σύνθετον· ὅπερ ἐσχάτης ἀσεβείας ἐστίν. Χρὴ τοίνυν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπὶ θεοῦ λεγομένων, οὐ τί

κατ ̓ οὐσίαν ἐστὶ σημαίνειν οἴεσθαι, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ τί οὐκ ἐστι δηλοῦν, ἢ σχέσιν τινὰ πρός τι τῶν ἀντιδιαστελλομένων, ἤ τι τῶν παρεπομένων τῇ φύσει ἢ évépyetav. Comp. cap. 19, and what was said § 164, note 1.

2. Comp. Ullmann, Nicolaus von Methone, etc., p. 69, ss., and § 164,

note 1.

' Monol. c. 14-28. Hasse, ii. 127, sq. God is not only just, but he is justice itself, etc., cap. 16: Quid ergo, si illa summa natura tot bona est, eritne composita tot pluribus bonis, an potius non sunt plura bona, sed unum bonum tam pluribus nominibus significatum ?....Cum igitur illa natura nullo modo composita sit et tamen omni modo tot illa bona sit [sint], necesse est, ut illa omnia non plura, sed unum sint. Idem igitur est quodlibet unum illorum quod omnia [sunt] sive simul, sive singula, ut cum dicitur vel justitia vel essentia, idem significet quod alia, vel omnia simul, vel singula. Cap. 18 Vita et sapientia et reliqua non sunt partes tui, sed omnia sunt unum, et unumquodque horum est totum quod es, et quod sunt reliqua omnia. Hugo of St. Victor adopted similar views, see Liebner, p. 371. Comp. also Abelard, Theolog. Christ. iii. p. 1264: Non itaque sapientia in Deo vel substantialis ei forma vel accidentalis, imo sapientia ejus ipse Deus est. Idem de potentia ejus sentiendum est et de cæteris quæ ex nominum affinitate formæ esse videntur in Deo quoque sicut in creaturis, etc. Alanus also said, 1. c. art. 20 (quoted by Pez, i. p. 484): Nomina enim ista: potentia potens, sapientia sapiens, neque formam, neque proprietatem, neque quicquid talium Deo attribuere possunt, cum simplicissimus Deus in sua natura nihil sit talium сарах. Cum ergo ratiocinandi de Deo causa nomina nominibus copulamus, nihil quod non sit ejus essentia prædicamus, et si transsumtis nominibus de Deo quid credimus, improprie balbutimus. [Duns Scotus, Comm. in Sent. 1, Dist. 8, Qu. 4, maintains a real difference in the attributes: e. g., in application to the Trinity. Comp. Baur, ubi supra, 249.]

See Monolog. c. 18, sq. Hasse's Anselm, ii. 134, sq.-Of God we can say Est, and not, Fuit or Erit. Time and space are to him no bounds: comp. Proslog. c. 19. Hasse, ii. 282, sq. So, in respect to omniscience, God has not his knowledge from the things, but the things have their being from God.

5

Hugo of St. Victor, De Sacram. Lib. i. P. ii. c. 17: Deus substantialiter sive essentialiter et proprie et vere est in omni creatura, sive natura sine sui definitione et in omni loco sine circumscriptione et omni tempori sine vicissitudine vel mutatione. Est ergo, ubi est, totum, qui continet totum et penetrat totum; see Liebner, p. 372. From the proposition that God is potentialiter in all things, Richard of St. Victor drew the inference that he also exists essentialiter in them; de Trin. ii. 24, see Engelhardt, p. 174. He is above all the heavens, and yet he is at the same time in them; he is in all that is corporeal and spiritual, in all that he has created, and governs according to his will. This notion of an essential presence of God was substantially the same as that of Peter Lombard, though he acknowledged that it was above human comprehension; Sent. i. Dist. 27, g. According to Alexander Hales, God is in all things, but he is not included in the same; he is without all things, but he is not excluded from them. God exists in things in a threefold manner; essentialiter, præsentialiter, potentialiter; these three

modes, however, do not differ in themselves, but only in our idea of them. God does not exist in all things in the same manner, e. g., in those whose sins are pardoned, in the sacraments, etc. The question was also started: Can the indwelling grace of God be in the body of a man prior to its union with the soul? etc., see Cramer, vii. p. 295, 7. The definitions of Thomas Aquinas are based on the system of Alexander; Summa 1, Qu. 8, art. 1, (quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 49): Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiæ, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet enim omne agens conjungi ei, in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute illud contingere... . Art 2: Deus omnem locum replet, non sicut corpus......immo per hoc replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quæ replent omnia loca. Art. 3: Substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, etc. Art. 4: Oportet in omuibus esse Deum, quia nihil potest esse nisi per ipsum.-The dynamic (virtual) scheme of the Thomists was opposed by the ideal view of the Scotists. See Münscher, ed by von Cölln, ii. p. 50. Bonaventura, Comp. Theol. (Edit. Mogunt. 1609, p. 695,) said: Ubique Deus est, tamen nusquam est, quia nec abest ulli loco, nec ullo capitur loco (August.). Deus est in mundo non inclusus, extra mundum non exclusus, supra mundum non elatus, infra mundum non depressus. Ex his patet, quod Deus est intra omnia, et hoc quia omnia replet et ubique præsens est. Ita extra omnia est, quia omnia continet, nec usquam valet coarctari. Sed nota, quod hæc propositio, " extra," dicit ibi non actualem præsentiam ad locum, sed potentialem, quæ est Dei immensitas, quæ infinitos mundos potest replere, si essent. Idem ipse est supra omnia, quia omnibus præstat nec aliquid ei æquatur. Item infra omnia est, quia omnia sustinet et sine ipso nihil subsisteret. Dicimus etiam, quod ubique est, non ut indigeat rebus, quod ex eis sit, sed potius res sui indigeant, ut per eum subsistant. Sciendum est ergo, ut aliquid est in loco circumscriptive et diffinitive, ut corpus; aliquid diffinitive, non circumscriptive, ut angelus; aliquid nec sic, nec sic, ut Deus, et hoc ideo, quia non individuatur per materiam, ut corpus, neque per suppositum, ut Angelus. Aliquid est etiam in loco, partim circumscriptive, partim diffinitive, ut Corpus Christi in sacramento...... Corpus autem Christi...... in pluribus tamen locis est...... sed non ubique...... Nota, quod Deus est multipliciter in rebus, scilicit per naturam : et sic est ubique potentialiter, præsentialiter, essentialiter. Item per gratiam; sic est in bonis .....Item per gloriam; sic est in rationali virtute animæ, ut veritas, in concupiscibili, ut bonitas, in irascibili, ut potestas. Item per unionem; sic fuit in utero virginis unitus humanæ naturæ, et in sepulcro unitus carni, et in inferno unitus animæ Christi, etc.-They even went so far as to ask, whether and in what manner God was in the devil? and to reply in the affirmative, so far as the devil is composed of nature and spirit!-St. Bernard said in his Meditations (cap. i. quoted by Bonaventura, 1. c.): Deus in creaturis mirabilis, in hominibus amabilis, in angelis desirabilis, in se ipso incomprehensibilis, in reprobis intolerabilis, item in damnatis ut terror et horror.-Tauler also made a distinction between the presence of God in things, and that in men God is no less present in a piece of wood and stone, than in men, but the former are not conscious of it. If the piece of wood knew God, and felt his nearness, even as the highest angels know him, the one would be quite

.....

as happy as the other. Man is happier than a piece of wood, because he recognizes God, etc. (Predigten, vol. i. p. 58, 59.) [Comp. also Anselm, Monol. c. 22. Albertus Magnus, Summa, P. i. Qu. 70, Membr. 1.]

This was done, e. g., by Alexandar Hales, see Cramer, l. c. p. 209, ss. Comp. Bonaventura, Comp. i. 18. He defined æternitas (after the example of Boëthius) as interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio (interminabilitas).

John Damascenus, De Fide Orth. i. 5. Nicolas of Methone, Refut. p. 25 (quoted by Ullmann, 1. c. p. 72), said: "When we call the unity [God] beginning, we do not mean to draw a comparison between it and that which is posterior to the beginning; for the same reason we do not merely use the term 'beginning,' without further qualifying it, but we say over-commencing beginning; nor do we restrict ourselves to the term 'unity' as such, but we call it the over-all-one; and instead of the first, and first of all, we say the over-first, instead of the great or the greatest, we make use of the term over-great." He called God the vπερÉv and even used the expression vπéρOεоç μоvás kai τpiás (Refut. 26). Comp. Hugo of St. Victor, quoted by Liebner, p. 371; he understood by unity not the numerical unity, but also simplicity (vera unitas), and immutability (summa unitas). [Abelard, Introd. in Theol. L. iii. 2: Nulla tanta fieri concordia, vel regi possunt, quanta illa quæ unus tantum vel condit, vel regit. Richard of St. Victor, de Trin. Lib. i. 14.]

§ 167.

b. The Relation of God to Existences-Omnipotence and

Omniscience.

The application of the divine knowledge and power to things out of God easily gave rise to anthropomorphitic notions and absurd subtilities,' which were best removed by regarding the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience not as separate attributes, but in their connection with the divine essence. Anselm' and Abelard agreed in asserting that God can do everything which may be done without interfering with his infinite perfection; Peter Lombard, Hugo of St. Victor, Richard of St. Victor, and others, adopted the same view. The knowledge of God was farther looked upon as immediate and omnipresent, and a distinction was made between that aspect of this knowledge which refers to things (as habitus), and that which has regard to himself (as actus). Respecting the divine omnipotence some, e. g., Abelard, maintained that God could make nothing else and nothing better, than what he really makes ; others, e. g., Hugo of St. Victor, thought this assertion blasphemous, because the infinite power of God is thus restricted within certain limits.'

1

1 E. g., whether God could make undone that which is done? whether he