de Civ. Dei xii. 2, though he himself (Ep. 177, 4), speaks of God as substantialiter ubique diffusas.* Comp. Boëthius De Trin. c. 4: Nan quum dicimus: Deus, substantiam quidem significare videmur, sed eam, quæ sit ultra substantiam. Augustine's writings, however, contain many profound thoughts relative to the knowledge of God. But every thing he says shows how much he felt the insufficiency of language to express the nature of God; De Doctr. Christ. i. c. 6: Imo vero me nihil aliud quam dicere voluisse sentio. Si autem dixi, non est quod dicere volui. Hoc unde scio, nisi quia Deus ineffabilis est: quod autem a me dictum est, si ineffabile esset, dictum non esset. Ac per hoc ne ineffabilis quidem dicendus est Deus, quia et hoc cum dicitur, aliquid dicitur. Et fit nescio quæ pugna verborum, quoniam si illud est ineffabile, quod dici non potest, non est ineffabile quod vel ineffabile dici potest. Quæ pugna verborum silentio cavenda potius quam voce pacanda est. Et tamen Deus, cum de illo nihil digne dici possit, admisit humanæ vocis obsequium et verbis nostris in laude sua gaudere nos voluit. Nam inde est quod et dicitur Deus.-On this account he, as well as Tertullian (§ 38, note 3), assigns to anthropomorphism its proper position, De Vera Rel. 50: Habet enim omnis lingua sua quædam propria genera locutionum, quæ cum in aliam linguam transferuntur, videntur absurda; and the subsequent part of the passage; De Genesi c. 17: Omnes, qui spiritaliter intelligunt scripturas, non membra corporea per ista nomina, sed spiritales potentias accipere didicerunt, sicut galeas et scutum et gladium et alia multa.-But he prefers this anthropomorphism, which forms an idea of God from corporeal and spiritual analogies, though it may be erroneous, to the purely imaginary speculations of a conceited idealism, De Trinit. Lib. i. ab init. It is not we that know God, but God who makes himself known to us, De Vera Rel. c. 48: Omnia, quæ de hac luce mentis a me dicta sunt, nulla quam eadem luce manifesta sunt. Per hanc enim intelligo vera esse quæ dicta sunt, et hæc me intelligere per hanc rursus intelligo.-The same spirit is expressed in the beautiful passage from the (spurious) Soliloq. Animæ c. 31: Qualiter cognovi te? Cognovi te in te; cognovi te non sicut tibi es, sed certe sicut mihi es, et non sine te, sed in te, quia tu es lux, quæ illuminasti me. Sicut enim tibi es, soli tibi cognitus es; sicut mihi es, secundum gratiam tuam et mihi cognitus es. ...Cognovi enim te, quoniam Deus meus es tu (comp. Cyril of Jerusalem below, § 127, note 1).-According to Gregory the Great, Mor. xx. c. 32, our knowledge of God does not correspond to his nature. But it is not on that account false; we now see him in image. Thus none can look steadfastly into the sun when it rises; but from the mountains it shines upon we perceive that it is rising, comp. Lau, p. 348, ss.

Orat. xxviii. 7-10, p. 500 sqq. in Ullmann, p. 530. The negative knowledge of God is of no more use than to be told that twice five are neither 2, nor 3, nor 4, nor 5, nor 20, nor 40, without being told that it is 10. Gregory thinks that the words ó v and Oɛóç are, comparatively speaking, the best expressions to denote the divine being; but gives the preference to the name o v, partly because God applied it to himself (Ex. iii. 14),

* The (Pseudo-) Dionysius the Areopagite (De Divinis Nominibus) goes still further, having no hesitation in saying that God, because elevated above all being, is rò μ» žv. [Comp. Baur, Dogmengesch. 161.]

partly because it is more significant. For the term Oɛóç is a derivative, and to be understood relatively (like the name Lord); but the appellation & ŵv is in every respect independent, and belongs to none but God. Orat. xxx. 17 and 18, p. 552, 553. Ullmann, p. 324, note.

6

• Comp. what is said respecting Theopaschitism, § 102, note 3.

§ 125.

THE UNITY OF GOD.

Polytheism and Gnosticism having been defeated, it was of less importance in the present period, than in the preceding, to defend the unity of God. The dualism of the Manicheans alone called for a defense of Monotheism against those outside of the church.' The definitions respecting the Trinity, moreover, made it necessary that the church should distinctly declare that the doctrine of the Trinity does not exclude that of the unity of God.' In treating of this subject, theologians used much the same language as those of the former period.

1

Athanasius Contra Gent. p. 6, combated the dualism of the Gnostics. In opposition to the Manicheans, Titus of Bostra (Contra Manich. lib. i. in Basnagii Mon. t. 1. p. 63, ss.),* Didymus of Alexandria (ibid. p. 204, 205), Gregory of Nyssa (contra Manich. Syllogismi x. Opp. iii. p. 180), Cyril of Jerusalem (Cat. vi. 20, p. 92 [94]), and Augustine in his polemical writings, defended the doctrine of one Divine being. These objections, however, did not make the desired impression upon the Manichees, since they really held that only the good being, the ground of all, was God; comp. Gieseler, Dogmengesch. 302.

2

Comp. e. g. the Symbolum Athanasianum, § 97: et tamen non sunt tres Dii, etc. On the controversy with the Tritheites and Tetratheites, see § 96. 3 E. g. Lact. i. 3. Arnob. lib. iii. Rufin. Expos. p. 18: Quod autem dicimus, Orientis ecclesias tradere unum Deum, patrem omnipotentem et unum Dominum, hoc modo intelligendum est, unum non numero dici, sed universitate. Verbi gratia si quis enim dicit unum hominem, aut unum equum, hic unum pro numero posuit; potest enim et alius homo esse et tertius, vel equus. Ubi autem secundus vel tertius non potest jungi, unus si dicatur, non numeri, sed universitatis est nomen. Ut si e. c. dicamus unum solem, hic unus ita dicitur, ut alius vel tertius addi non possit: unus est enim sol. Multo magis ergo Deus cum unus dicitur, unus non numeri, sed universitatis vocabulo notatur, i. e., quia propterea unus dicatur, quod alius non sit.

* [Titi Bostr. quæ ex Opere contra Manich. edito in codice Hamburgensi servata sunt græce ed. P. Ant. de Lagarde, Berol. 1854.-The same work, libri quatuor syriace, also edited by Lagarde, Berol. 1859.]

§ 126.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

Several theologians, e. g., Gregory of Nazianzum, Cyril of Jerusalem, and others, maintained that what we call the attributes of God, are only expressions by which we designate his relation to the world, and that these predicates are either negative or figurative.' But Augustine proved, in a very acute manner, that the attributes of God can not be separated from his nature as contingent phenomena.' Other theologians of the present period were equally cautious in defining particular attributes, e. g., those of omniscience and omnipresence. Some endeavored to refine the idea of the retributive justice of God, and to defend it against the charge of arbitrariness ;* while others again sought to reconcile the omniscience of God, and consequently his foreknowledge, with human liberty."

1

3

Gregory says, Orat. vi. 12, p. 187: "There can be no antagonism in the Godhead, because it would destroy its very nature; the Godhead, on the contrary, is in such perfect harmony not only with itself, but also with other beings, that some of the names of God have a particular reference to this agreement. Thus he is called 'peace and love." Among the attributes of of God he assigns (next to his eternity and infinity) the first place to love, see Ullmann, p. 333.- Cyril of Jerusalem maintains that our ideas of God, and the attributes which we ascribe to him, are not adequate to his nature, Cat. vi. 2, p. 87 (Oxon. 78): Λέγομεν γὰρ οὐχ ὅσα δεῖ περὶ θεόν (μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα γνώριμα), ἀλλ' ὅσα ἡμετέρα ἀσθένεια βαστάσαι δύναται. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ, τί ἐστι θεὸς, ἐξηγούμεθα· ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἀκριβὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἴδαμεν, μετ ̓ εὐγνωμοσύνης ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἐν τοῖς γὰρ περὶ Θεοῦ μεγάλη γνωσις, To Tv ȧyvwoíav buoλoyɛiv (comp. also the subsequent part of the passage). Arnobius Adv. Gentes, iii. 19, protests very strongly against all predicating of attributes: Quis enim Deum dixerit fortem, constantem, frugi, sapientem? quis probum? quis sobrium? quis immo aliquid nosse? quis intelligere? quis providere? quis ad fines officiorum certus actionum suarum decreta dirigentem? Humana sunt hæc bona, et ex oppositione vitiorum existimationem meruerunt habere laudabilem. Quis est autem tam obtusi pectoris, tam bruti, qui humanis bonis Deum esse dicat magnum? aut ideo nominis majestate præcellere, quod vitiorum careat fœditate? Quidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitæ mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transiit et corrumpitur sensum; nec habet propriæ significationis notam, quod nostris dicitur verbis, atque ad negotia humana compositis. Unus est hominis intellectus de Dei natura certissimus, si scias et sentias, nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi.

' De Civ. Dei xi. 10: Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod vel possit amittere; vel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet; sicut vas aliquem liquorem, aut corpus colorem, aut aër lucem sive

fervorem, aut anima sapientiam. Nihil enim horum est id quod habet: nam neque vas liquor est, nec corpus color, nec aër lux sive fervor, neque anima sapientia est. Hinc est, quod etiam privari possunt rebus quas habent, et in alios habitus vel qualitates verti atque mutari, ut et vas evacuetur humore quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur, et aër tenebrescat, et anima desipiat, etc. (This reasoning is identical with the proposition of Schleiermacher, that in that which is absolute the subject and the predicate are one and the same thing; see his work, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 166.) Comp. Boëthius De Trin. 4: Deus vero hoc ipsum, quod est, Deus est; nihil enim aliud est, nisi quod est, ac per hoc ipsum Deus est. Gregory the Great treats of the attributes of God in the same manner, comp. Lau, p. 350, ss.

* God does not know things, because they are; but things are, because he knows them, Aug. 1. c.: Ex quo occurrit animo quiddam mirum, sed tamen verum, quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset: Deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset. Arnobius had already taught (i. 31), that God is cause, place, and space (prima causa, locus et spatium rerum). So, too, Augustine says, loc. cit. qu. 20: Deus non alicubi est; quid enim alicubi est, continetur loco, quid loco continetur, corpus est. Non igitur alicubi est, et tamen quia est et in loco non est, in illo sunt potius omnia, quam ipse alicubi. He also excluded not only the idea of place, but (in reference to the eternity of God) that of succession of time, Conf. ix. 10.2: Fuisse et futurum esse non est in vita divina, sed esse solum, quoniam æterna est. Nam fuisse et futurum esse non est æternum. Comp. de Civ. Dei xi. 5.-He also rejected the notion of Origen (condemned by Justinian) that God had created only as many beings as he could see to; De Civ. Dei xii. 18.

Lactantius wrote a separate treatise: De Ira Dei (Inst. lib. v.) on this subject. His principal argument is the following: If God could not hate, he could not love; since he loves good, he must hate evil, and bestow good upon those whom he loves, evil upon those whom he hates. Comp. Augustine, de Vera Rel. c. 15: Justa vindicta peccati plus tamen clementiæ Domini quam severitatis ostendit. Ita enim nobis sic adetur a corporis voluptatibus ad æternam essentiam veritatis amorem nostrum oportere converti. Et est justitiæ pulchritudo cum benignitatis gratia concordans, ut, quoniam bonorum inferiorum dulcedine decepti sumus, amaritudine pœnarum erudiamur. De Civ. Dei i. 9, and elsewhere.

B

Chrys. in Ep. ad Eph. Hom. i. (on ch. i. 5), distinguishes in this respect between an antecedent (θέλημα προηγούμενον), and a subsequent will (θέλημα δεύτερον). According to the former (τὸ σφοδρὸν θέλημα, θέλημα εὐδοκίας), all are to be saved, according to the latter sinners must be punished. Comp. the section on Predestination. [August. De Civ. Dei v. c. 9, de Lib. Arbitr. iii. c. 4. Boëthius De Cons. Phil. v.]

§ 127.

CREATION.

After the idea of generation from the essence of the Father was applied to the Son of God alone, and employed to denote the differ

ence between him and the other persons of the Trinity on the one hand, and between him and all created beings on the other, the idea of creation was limited by a more precise definition. The views of Origen were combated by Methodius,' and rejected by the chief supporters of orthodoxy, viz., Athanasius and Augustine.' The figurative interpretation of the narrative of the fall fell into disrepute along with the allegorical system of interpretation. It became the more necessary to abide by the historical view of the Mosaic account, inasmuch as it forms the basis of the history of the fall, and its objective historical reality was the foundation of the Augustinian theology. But Augustine endeavored, even here, to spiritualize the literal as much as possible, and to blend it with the allegorical.' The dualistic theory of emanation held by the Manicheans and Priscillianists was still in conflict with the doctrine of a creation out of nothing.*

1 In his work περὶ γενητῶν· cod. 235, p. 301.

Extracts from it are given by Photius Bibl.

Athan. Contra Arian. Orat. ii. (Opp. T. i. p. 336). Augustine endeav ored to remove the idea of time from the notion of God, and to save the doctrine that the creation had a beginning in time, by representing God as the author of time. Conf. xi. 10, ss. c. 13:.... Quæ tempora fuissent, quæ abs te condita non essent? Aut quomodo præterirent, si nunquam fuissent? Cum ergo sis operator omnium temporum, si fuit aliquod tempus, antequam feceras cœlum et terram, cur dicitur, quod ab opere cessabas? Id ipsum enim tempus tu feceras, nec præterire potuerunt tempora, antequam faceres tempora. Si autem ante cœlum et terram nullum erat tempus, cur quæritur,' quid tunc faciebas? Non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus. Nec tu tempore tempora præcedis; alioquin non omnia tempora præcederes. Sed præcedis omnia præterita celsitudine semper præsentis æternitatis, et superas omnia futura, quia illa futura sunt, et cum venerint, præterita erunt; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficiunt.*-Cf. de Civ. Dei vii. 30: xi. 4-6 xii. 15-17.

Thus he said, in reference to the six days: Qui dies cujusmodi sint, aut perdifficile nobis, aut etiam impossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere; De Civ. Dei xi. 6. Concerning the seventh day (ibid. 8), his views are very nearly those of Origen: Cum vero in die septimo requievit Deus ab omnibus operibus suis et sanctificavit eum, nequaquam est accipiendum pueriliter, tamquam Deus laboraverit operando, qui dixit et facta sunt, verbo intelligibili et sempiterno, non sonabili et temporali. Sed requies Dei requiem significat eorum, qui requiescunt in Deo, sicut lætitia domus lætitiam significat

* “A confounding of the antagonism of the ideal and the real with that of the universal and particular, is the reason why in the above we neither have creation in time clearly enounced, nor yet the difference from (contrast with) the emanation theory distinctly brought out.... To make Augustine consistent, we must distinguish the eternal being of ideas in the divine intelligence, from that act of God by which they become productive. The former is then their ideal, the latter their real side," etc. Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Phil. i. p. 167.