might be made subject, so that every spirit need not be believed. Such an one was more definitely sketched by Vincens of Lerins, who laid down the three criteria of antiquitas (vetustas), universitas, and consensio, as marks of true ecclesiastical tradition; and thus the quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est was fixed as the canon of what had authority in the church."

1

Comp. Münscher, Handbuch, iii. p. 100: "Such exalted views on inspiration can not appear strange to us, since they existed in an age when Christians believed and recorded numerous divine revelations and inspirations still granted to holy men, and especially to monks.”—Such revelations, of course, were supposed not to be contradictory either to Scripture, or to the tradition of the church. Thus the voice from heaven, which said to Augustine; “Ego sum, qui sum,”—and "tolle lege," directed him to the Scriptures. Confessions, viii. 12.

* The decisions of the councils were represented as decisions of the Holy Spirit (placuit Spiritui Sancto et nobis). Comp. the letter of Constantine to the church of Alexandria, Socrat. i. 9: Ὃ γὰρ τοῖς τριακοσίοις ήρεσεν ἐπισκόποις, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕτερον, ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ γνώμη, μάλιστά γε ὅπου τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τοιούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ἀνδρῶν διανοίαις ἐγκείμενον τὴν Oɛíav Boúλnoiv ¿žεpúτiσεν. The Emperor, indeed, spoke thus as a layman. But Pope Leo the Great expressed himself in the same way, and claimed inspiration not only for councils (Ep. 114, 2, 145, 1), but also for emperors and imperial decretals (Ep. 162, 3. Ep. 148, 84, 1), even for himself (Ep. 16, and Serm. 25). Comp. Griesbach, Opusc. i. p. 21. Gregory the Great, too, declares that he ascribes to the first four Ecumenical Councils equal authority with the four gospels. Concerning the somewhat inconsistent opinions of Gregory of Nazianzum (Ep. ad Procop. 55), on the one hand, and of Augustine (De Bapt. contra Don, ii. c. 3), and Facundus of Hermiane (Defensio Trium Capitul. c. 7), on the other, see Neander, Church Hist. ii. 177, and Hist. Dogm. 278. In accordance with his views on the relation of the Septuagint to the original Hebrew (§ 121), Augustine supposes that the decisions of earlier councils were completed by those of later ones, without denying the inspiration of the former, since "the decision of councils only gives public sanction to that result which the development of the church had reached." Inspiration accommodates itself to the wants of the time. Respecting this "economy," and its abuses, see Münscher, l. c. p. 156, ss.

'Commonitorium, or Tractatus pro Catholicæ Fidei Antiquitate et Universitate (composed in the year 433). Vincentius sets forth a twofold source of knowledge: 1. Divinæ legis auctoritas. 2. Ecclesiæ catholicæ traditio. The latter is necessary on account of the different interpretations given to Scripture. The sensus ecclesiasticus is the only right one. Vincentius, like Augustine, also supposes that tradition may in a certain sense advance, so that an opinion, respecting which the church has not as yet pronounced a decision, is not to be considered heretical; but it may afterwards be condemned as such, if it be found contrary to the more fully developed faith of the church. Thus many of the opinions of the earlier Fathers might be vindicated as archaisms. [Baur, Dogmengesch. 159 sq., says that the notion

of tradition was already more methodically and definitely fixed than any other doctrine of the church. The canon of Vincens, he states, was brought forward in relation to the Augustinian predestination-the latter could not stand this test. This canon was mechanical, allowing no room for progress, and it also contradicted the principle of the sufficiency of the Scriptures.]

2. THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING GOD.

§ 123.

THE BEING OF GOD.

The prevailing tendency to dialectic demonstrations led to the attempt to prove, in a logical way, the existence of God, which the Christian faith had received as an uncontested axiom.' In the writings of some of the fathers, both of the preceding and present periods, e. g., Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzum, we meet with what may be called the physico-theological argument, if we understand by it an argument drawn from the beauty and wisdom displayed in nature, which is always calculated to promote practical piety. But both these writers mistrusted a merely objective proof, and showed that a pure and pious mind would best find and know God. The cosmological proof propounded by Diodorus of Tarsus,' and the ontological argument of Augustine and Boëthius, lay claim to a higher degree of logical precision and objective certainty. The former argument was based upon the principle that there must be a sufficient ground for every thing. Augustine and Boëthius inferred the existence of God from the existence of general ideas-a proof which was more fully developed in the next period by Anselm.

Even Arnobius considered this belief to be an axiom, and thought it quite as dangerous to attempt to prove the existence of God as to deny it; Adv. Gent. i. c. 33: Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum principis notione diem nativitatis intraverit? cui non sit ingenitum, non affixum, imo ipsis pæne in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum, esse regem ac dominum cunctorum quæcunque sunt moderatorem ?

Athanasius, Adv. Gent. i. p. 3, ss. (like Theophilus of Antioch, comp. § 35, note 1), starts with the idea, that none but a pure and sinless soul can see God (Matt. v. 8). He too compares the heart of man to a mirror. But as it became sullied by sin, God revealed himself by means of his creation, and when this proved no longer sufficient, by the prophets, and, lastly, by the Logos.-Gregory of Nazianzum argues in a similar way; he infers the existence of the Creator from his works, as the sight of a lyre reminds us both of him who made it, and of him who plays it; Orat. xxviii. 6, p. 499 ; comp. Orat. xxviii. 16, p. 507, 508; Orat. xiv. 33, p. 281. He too appeals to Matth. v. 8. "Rise from thy low condition by thy conversation, by purity

of heart unite thyself to the pure. Wilt thou become a divine, and worthy of the Godhead? Then keep God's commandments, and walk according to his precepts, for the act is the first step to knowledge." Ullmann, p. 317.— Augustine also propounds in an eloquent manner, and in the form of a prayer, what is commonly called the physico-theological argument (Conf. x. 6): Sed et cœlum et terra et omnia, quæ in eis sunt, ecce undique mihi dicunt, ut te amem, nec cessant dicere omnibus, ut sint inexcusabiles, etc. Ambrose, Basil the Great, Chrysostom, and others, express themselves in much the same manner.

3

3 Diodorus Karà ɛiμapμévηs in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 223, p. 209, b. The world is subject to change. But this change presupposes something constant at its foundation; the variety of creatures points to a creative unity; for change itself is a condition which has had a commencement: El dé TIS ἀγένητον λέγοι αὐτῶν τὴν τροπὴν, τὸ πάντων ἀδυνατώτερον εισάγει· τροπὴ γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ἀρχόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι τροπὴν ἄναρχον· καὶ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν ζώων τε καὶ σωμάτ των ἡ πάνσοφος τροπὴ, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοτήτων ἡ ποικίλη διαφορά μονονοὐχὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησι μήτε ἀγέννητον μήτε αὐτόματον νομίζειν τὸν κόσμον, μήτ' αὖ ἀπρονόητον, θεὸν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι παρασχόμενον σαφῶς εἰδέναι καὶ ἀδιστάκτως ἐπίστασθαι.

4

August. De Lib. Arbitr. lib. ii. c. 3-15. There are general ideas, which have for every one the same objective validity, and are not (like the perceptions of sense) different and conditioned by the subjective apprehension. Among these are the mathematical truths, as 3+7=10; here, too, belongs the higher metaphysical truth-truth in itself, i. e., wisdom (veritas, sapientia). The absolute truth, however, which is necessarily demanded by the human mind, is God himself. [He asserts that man is composed of existence, life, and thinking, and shows that the last is the most excellent; hence he infers that that by which thinking is regulated, and which, therefore, must be superior to thinking itself, is the summum bonum. He finds this summum bonum in those general laws which every thinking person must acknowledge, and according to which he must form his opinion respecting thinking itself. The sum total of these laws or rules is called truth or wisdom (veritas, sapientia). The absolute is, therefore, equal to truth itself. God is truth. Illa veritatis et sapientiæ pulcritudo, tantum adsit perpetua voluntas fruendi, nec multitudine audientium constipate secludit venientes, nec peragitur tempore, nec migrat locis, nec nocte intercipitur, nec umbrâ intercluditur, nec sensibus corporis subjacet. De toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt eam omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna; nullo loco est, nusquam deest; foris admonit, inter docet; cernentes se commutat omnes in melius, a nullo in deterius commutatur; nullus de illa judicat, nullus sine illa judicat bene. Ac per hoc eam manifestum est mentibus nostris, quæ ab ipsa una fiant singulæ sapientes, et non de ipsa, sed per ipsam de ceteris judices, sine dubita-、 tione esse potiorem. Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est: si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est. Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum tamen esse negare non poteris. Comp. Ritter, Christl. Phil. i. 407-411.]-Boëthius

expresses himself still more definitely, De Consol. Phil. v. Prosa 10; he shows that empirical observation and the perception of the imperfect lead necessarily to the idea of perfection and its reality in God: Omne enim, quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibitur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud quod imperfectum perhibetur extiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque a diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens, in hæc extrema atque effoeta dilabitur. Quod si.... est quædam boni fragilis imperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non potest dubitari.... Deum rerum omnium principum bonum esse, communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil Deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est, bonum esse quis dubitet? ita vero bonum esse Deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse convincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit. .....Quare ne in infinitum ratio procedat, confitendum esse summum Deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum. Compare Schleiermacher Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 166: "Augustine is said to have given the first proof of the existence of God. But we are not to understand this in an objectionable manner, as though he would demonstrate this in an objective way; he only desires to show that the idea of God is at the foundation of all human thought."-Gregory the Great also reasons in a similar xv. c. 46; comp. Lau, p. 347.

way; Moral.

[Baur, Dogmengesch. 162: Augustine went into the most profound speculation about the nature of God. On the one hand he viewed God in such an abstract and negative way, that he must appear to be wholly indefinable, and we could only say what he is not (De Trin. v. 2); on the other hand, he held fast to the two most essential ideas about God, viz., that he is the essen tia (De Trin. v. 3), the immanent being of all being, and the bonum incom municabile. To remove all finite conceptions, he defines the knowledge of God as an absolute identity with itself, as the immediate vision of that which is eternally present (De Civ. Dei, xi. 10, 21; xii. 17).—The peculiarity of the Augustinian proof of the being of God consists in this, that he starts from thinking (thought) itself, not from thought with any definite contents, and not from the idea of God, but from thought as such. All subjective thought presupposes objective truth. Thought itself involves the idea of God. His argument is an analysis of thought itself, and not an inference from the imperfect to the perfect.]

§ 124

THE NATURE OF GOD.

The definitions of orthodox theologians respecting the Trinity had this peculiarity, that, on the one hand, they were based on the supposition that God may be known by means of his revelation, and, on

the other, implied that the contents of that same revelation, as unfolded by the church in definite conceptions, are a mystery. These theologians, therefore, took no offense at the contradiction involved in such definitions, but found it quite natural that the understanding should here come short. The Arians, on the contrary, in accordance with their more rationalistic system, particularly as carried out to all its logical consequences by Eunomius, demanded the possibility of a complete knowledge of God.'-Though the ideas concerning the divine Being, and the doctrinal definitions of the church, were still mixed up with much that savored of anthropomorphism," yet the speculative tendency of the most eminent theologians of the present period kept them on an elevation, where they avoided all gross representations of the Godhead. Thus Athanasius taught that God is above all essence; Augustine doubted whether it would be proper to call God a substance. Gregory of Nazianzum, on the other hand, showed that it is not sufficient merely to deny the sensuous. The gross and carnal notions of the Audians concerning God met with little approval," while the Monophysites, by blending the divine and the human, promoted anthropomorphism under the mask of Christian orthodoxy."

1

4

According to Socrat. iv. 7, Eunomius maintained that God knows no more about his nature than we do. It does not follow (he further maintained) that because the minds of some are impaired by sin, that the same is true in reference to all. The natural man indeed does not possess the knowledge in question; but what is the use of a revelation which reveals nothing? Christ has opened unto us a way to the perfect knowledge of God. He is the door, viz., to this knowledge. Eunomius attached the greatest importance to the theoretical, didactic part of Christianity, and supposed its very essence to consist in the ȧkpíßɛia т☎v doyμáтwv. Comp. the refutations of Gregory of Nazianzum, Gregory of Nyssa, and of Basil. The latter reminds. him (Ep. 16) of the impossibility of explaining the nature of God, since he can not explain the nature even of an ant! Accused on the orthodox side of transforming theology into technology, the Arian Philostorgius, on the contrary, thought it praiseworthy that Eunomius had abandoned the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God, which Arius himself defended. Hist. Eccles. x. 2, 3. This last statement also favors the conclusion, that the accusations of his opponents were something more than their own inferences from his doctrines, as Gieseler, Dogmengesch. p. 303, seems to assert. Comp. Neander, Hist. Dogm. 311, and his Chrysostom, i. 355. Klose, Gesch. d. Lehre des Eunomius, Kiel, 1833, p. 36 sq., Ullmann's Greg. p. 318 sq.

2

Examples are given by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 136. [Athanas. De Decret. Syn. Nic. c. 11. Cyril, Catech. iv. 5. August. Ep. 178. 14, 18, De Divers. Quæst. 20.] Comp. also Lact. Inst. vii. 21, where he calls the Holy Spirit purus ac liquidus, and in aquæ modum fluidus.

• Athan. Contra Gent. p. 3: Επέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, ὑπερούσιος. Aug. De Trin. v. 2, vii. 5, prefers the use of the word essentia to substantia, comp.