above Lateran synod (Agathonis Ep. ad Imperatores in Mansi, xi. 233-286), confessing belief in duæ naturales voluntates et duæ naturales operationes, non contrariæ, nec adversæ, nec separatæ, etc. This was followed by the decision of the council itself (see Mansi, xi. 631, ss. Münscher, von Cölln, ii. p. 80. Gieseler, 1. c. § 128, notes 14-17). 128, notes 14-17). Δύο φυσικὰς θελήσεις ἤτοι θελήματα ἐν Χριστῷ καὶ δύο φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀμερίστως, ἀσυγχύτως, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων διδασκαλίαν κηρύττομεν· και δύο φυσικὰ θελήματα οὐχ ὑπεναντία, μὴ γένοιτο, καθὼς οἱ ἀσεβεῖς ἔφησαν αἱρετικοί· ἀλλ ̓ ἑπόμενον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ θέλημα, καὶ μὴ ἀντιπίπτον, ἢ ἀντιπαλαῖον, μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ ὑποτασσόμενον τῷ θείῳ αὐτοῦ καὶ πανσθενεῖ θελήματι.-Respecting the insufficiency of these, and the indefiniteness of the other canons of the council, see Dorner, 1st ed. p. 90, ss.-The Reformers did not accept the decisions of this council The Monothelites (Pope Honorius included) were condemned. They continued to exist as a distinct sect in the mountains of Lebanon and Antilebanon under the name of Maronites (which was derived from their leader, the Syrian abbot Marun, who lived about the year 701). Comp. Neander, 1. c. p. 197. [Baur, Dogmengesch. 2te Aufl. p. 211, says of this controversy: Its elements on the side of the Monothelites were, the unity of the person or subject, from whose one will (the divine will of the incarnate Logos) all must proceed, since two wills also presuppose two personal subjects (the chief argument of bishop Theodore of Pharan, in Mansi, Tom. xi. p. 567); on the side of the Duothelites, the point was the fact of two natures, since two natures can not be conceived without two natural wills, and two natural modes of operation. How far now two wills can be without two persons willing, was the point from which they slipped away by mere suppositions.] § 105. PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTOLOGY Unedifying as is the spectacle of these manifold controversies, in which the person of the Redeemer is dragged down into the sphere of passionate conflicts, yet it is still cheering to see how the faith of Christians in those times was supported by that idea of the GodMan, which was above all such strife, and how it attributed to the doctrine of the one and undivided person of Christ its due import in the history of the world. "All the Fathers agreed, as it were with one mind, that to Christ belongs not merely the limited importance attached to every historical personage, but that his Person stands in an essential relation to the WHOLE HUMAN RACE; on this account alone could they make a SINGLE INDIVIDUAL the object of an article of faith, and ascribe to him a lasting and eternal significancy in relation to our race." Dorner, 1st ed. 1. c. p. 78; compare the passages from the fathers there cited. [They say, e. g., that Christ is the primitive type after which Adam and the whole of humanity were created; the principle, the ȧpxý, of the whole new creation, in which the old is first completed; the draрxý of the whole pvpaua of humanity, penetrating all; the eternal head of the race—a member of it indeed, but yet its plastic and organizing principle, in virtue of the union between divinity and humanity in him perfectly realized, etc.] SECOND DIVISION. DOCTRINES RESPECTING ANTHROPOLOGY. § 106. ON MAN IN GENERAL. The Platonic doctrine of the preexistence of the human soul, which none but Nemesius and Prudentius favored,' was almost unanimously rejected as Origenistic. Along with physical Traducianism (favorable as was this doctrine in certain aspects to the idea of original sin, see § 55), Creatianism was also able to obtain more authority. According to this view, every human soul was created as such, and at a certain moment of time united with the body, developing itself in the womb. Yet the most influential teachers of the church, as Augustine and Gregory the Great, expressed themselves with reserve on this point. In the West the threefold division of man (§ 54) gave way to the simpler division into body and soul, on the mutual relation of which different views obtained among the fathers of the present period. Nor did they agree in their opinions respecting the image of God, though most of them admitted that it consisted in reason imparted to man, in his capacity of knowing God, and in his dominion over the irrational creation. There were still some who imagined that the image of God was also reflected in the body of man; but, while the Audiani perverted this notion in support of gross anthropomorphism, others gave to it a more spiritual interpretation. The immortality of the soul was universally believed; Lactantius, however, did not regard it as the natural property of the soul, but as the reward of virtue." 6 1 The former did sò as a philosopher (Dé Humana Natura 2, p. 76, ss. of the Oxford edit.), the latter as a poet (Cathemerin. Hymn. x. v. 161-168). [Cf. Aur. Prudent. Carmina, ed. Alb. Dressel, Lips. 1860.] 2 Conc. Const. A. D. 540, see Mansi, ix. p. 396, ss.: 'H ¿kkλŋoía Toïs θείοις ἑπομένη λόγοις φάσκει τὴν ψυχὴν συνδημιουργηθῆναι τῷ σώματι· καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, κατὰ τὴν 'Ωριγένους φρενοβλάβειαν. * Lactantius maintains, Inst. iii. 18, that the soul is born with the body, and distinctly opposes Traducianism De Opif. Dei ad Demetr. c. 19: Illud quoque venire in quæstionem potest, utrum anima ex patre, an potius ex matre, an vero ex utroque generetur. Nihil enim ex his tribus verum est, quia neque ex utroque, neque ex alterutro seruntur animæ. Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis anima non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere. Itaque serendarum animarum ratio uni ac soli Deo subjacet: "Denique cœlesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, ut ait Lucretius; nam de mortalibus non potest quidquam nisi mortale generari. Nec putari pater debet, qui transfudisse aut inspirasse animam de suo nullo modo sentit; nec, si sentiat, quando tamen et quomodo id fiat, habet animo comprehensum. Ex quo apparet, non a parentibus dari animas, sed ab uno eodemque omnium Deo patre, qui legem rationemque nascendi tenet solus, siquidem solus efficit; nam terreni parentis nihil est, nisi ut humorem corporis, in quo est materia nascendi, cum sensu voluptatis emittat vel reci piat, et citra hoc opus homo resistit, nec quidquam amplius potest; ideo nasci sibi filios optant, quia non ipsi faciunt. Cetera jam Dei sunt omnia: scilicet conceptus ipse et corporis informatio et inspiratio animæ et partus incolumis et quæcunque deinceps ad hominem conservandum valent; illius munus est, quod spiramus, quod vivimus, quod vigemus.-In opposition to Traducianism, he appeals to the fact, that intelligent parents have sometimes stupid children, and vice versa, which could not well be ascribed to the influence of the stars!-In accordance with this opinion Hilary asserts Tract. in Ps. xci. § 3: Quotidie animarum origenes [et corporum figulationes] occulta et incognita nobis divinæ virtutis molitione procedunt. [See, also, Tract. in Psalm. cxviii. cap. i. Igitur vel quia in terræ hujus solo commoramur, vel quia ex terra instituti conformatique sumus, anima quæ alterius originis est, terræ corporis adhæsisse creditur.] Pelagius, and the Semipelagians, Cassian and Gennadius, adopted substantially the same view, see Wiggers, Augustin und Pelagius, i. p. 149, ii. p. 354. Pelagius taught (in Symb. quoted by Mansi, iv. p. 355): Animas a Deo dari credimus, quas ab ipso factas dicimus, anathematizantes eos, qui animas quasi partem divinæ dicunt esse substantiæ; Augustine agreed with him as far as the negative aspect of this proposition was concerned, Retract. i. 1: (Deus) animum non de se ipso genuit, sed de re nulla alia condidit, sicut condidit corpus e terra; he here refers, however, directly to the creation of our first parents. But Augustine does not expressly state, whether he thinks that the soul is newly created in every case; on the contrary, he declined to investigate this point: Nam quod attinet ad ejus (animi) originem, qua fit ut sit in corpore, utrum de illo uno sit, qui primum creatus est, quando factus est homo in animam vivam, an semper ita fiant singulis singuli, nec tunc sciebam (in his treatise Contra Academicos) nec adhuc scio. Comp. Ep. 140 (al. 120), ad Honorat. (T. ii. p. 320). When Jerome (Contra Error. Joann. Hierosolym. § 22) derives Creatianism from the words of Christ in John v., "My Father worketh hitherto," Augustine will not allow this argument to be valid, since the working of God is not excluded even upon the Traducian hypothesis; comp. Neander, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), 365. [The opinion of Augustine upon this point has been much debated: Bellarmine and Staudenmaier contend that he was for creation; Melancthon, Klee, and others reckon him among the Traducianists; Gangauf (u. s.), Wiggers, and Ritter say that he was undecided. Bellarmine cites for Creatianism, Epist. 190, ad Optat. cap. 14: Illi, qui animas ex una propagari asserunt, quam Deus primo homini dedit, atque ita eas ex parentibus trahi dicunt, si Tertulliani opinionem sequuntur, profecto eas, non spiritus, sed corpora esse contendunt, et corpulentis seminibus exoriri, quo perversius quod dici potest? But this applies strictly only to Tertullian's corpulenta semina. He recognizes the connection between Traducianism and original sin, De Lib. Arb. lib. iii. cp. 56: Deinde si una anima facta est, ex qua omnium hominum animæ trahuntur nascentium, quis potest dicere, non se pecasse, cum primus ille peccaoit. In his De Anima et ejus Orig. lib. 1. cp. 19, Num. 34, he says that he could accept Creatianism if four difficulties were removed; and in De Orig. Anim. cp. 28, he designates the chief of these difficulties, in connection with the doctrine of the salvation of children not baptized: Sed antequam sciam, quænam earum potius eligenda sit, hoc me non temere sentire profiteor, eam, quæ vera est, non adversari robustissimæ ac fundatissimæ fidei, qua Christi ecclesia nec parvulos homines recentissime natos a damnatione credit, nisi per græetiam nominis Christi, quam in suis sacramentis commendavit, posse liberari; comp. De Genesi ad Lit. Lib. x. cp. 23 Num. 39, and Epist. 169 ad Evodium, cp. 13. In Epist. 190 ad Optat. cp. 17, he says: Aliquid ergo certum de animæ origine nondum in scripturis canonicis comperi. And in Genes. ad Lit. x. 21, he says: Jam de ceterarum animarum adventu, utrum ex parentibus an desuper sit, vincant, qui poterunt; ego adhuc inter utrosque ambigo, et moveor aliquando sic, aliquando autem sic.]-The phrase mentioned before (note 2): Tǹv pv xìp συνδημιουργηθῆναι τῷ σώματι, which was used by the Greek church, and is also found in the works of Theodoret (Fab. Hær. v. 9, p. 414), implies the doctrine commonly called Creatianism. Yet Traducianism continued to be professed not only by heterodox writers, e. g., Eunomius and Apollinaris, but also by some orthodox theologians, such as Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. c. 29). The last directs our attention to the fact, that body and soul belong essentially together, and can not be possibly be imagined to be separated from each other: Αλλ' ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ διὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος συνεστηκότος, μίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοινὴν τὴς συστάσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ προγενέστερός τε καὶ νεώτερος γένοιτο, τοῦ μὲν σωματικοῦ προτερεύοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ἐφυστε píčovτos, etc., which he proves by analogies drawn from nature. The views of Anastasius Sinaïta on this point are very materializing (Hom. in Bandini Monum. Eccles. Gr. T. ii. p. 54, in Münscher von Cölln, i. p. 332): Td μὲν σῶνα ἐκ τῆς γυναικείας γῆς (Thiersch conjectures γονῆς, see the review in Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1841, p. 184) кaì aipaтos ovvioτaтar ʼn dè ψυχὴ διὰ τῆς σπορᾶς, ὥσπερ διά τινος ἐμφυσήματος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου åрpýτws μetaðídoτal. According to Jerome, Ep. 78, ad Marcellin. (Opp. T. iv. p. 642, ap. Erasm. ii. p. 318), even, maxima pars occidentalium (probably of earlier times?) held the opinion, ut quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima nascatur ex anima et simili cum brutis animantibus conditione subsistat. But Jerome himself rejects all other systems, and designates Creatianism as the |