Theodore of Mopsuestia in his confession of faith (quoted by Walch, Bibl. Symb. p. 204), combatted the opinion which represents the Spirit as dià Tou viov τǹv vñapživ eiλŋpóç. On the opinion of Theodoret comp. the IX. Anathematisma of Cyril, Opp. v. p. 47.

4

Cyril condemned all who denied that the Holy Spirit was the proprium of Christ. Theodoret in reply, observed, that this expression was not objectionable, if nothing more were understood by it than that the Holy Spirit is of the same essence (ouoovotos) with the Son, and proceeds from the Father; but that it ought to be rejected if it were meant to imply that he derives his existence from the Son, or through the Son, either of which would be contrary to what is said, John xv. 26; 1 Cor. ii. 12. Comp. Neander, ii. 422.

5

Augustine, Tract. 99, in Evang. Joh.: A quo autem habet filius, ut sit Deus (est enim de Deo Deus), ab illo habet utique, ut etiam de illo procedat Spir. S. Et per hoc Spir. S. ut etiam de filio procedat, sicut procedit de patre, ab ipso habet patre. Ibid: Spir. S. non de patre procedit in filium, et de filio procedit ad sanctificandam creaturam, sed simul de utroque procedit, quamvis hoc filio Pater dederit, ut quemadmodum de se, ita de illo quoque procedat. De Trin. 4. 20: Nec possumus dicere, quod Spir. S. et a filio non procedat, neque frustra idem Spir. et Patris et Filii Spir. dicitur. 5, 14: ...Sicunt Pater et Filius unus Deus et ad creaturam relative unus creator et unus Deus, sic relative ad Spiritum S. unum principium. (Comp. the whole section, c. 11 and 15.)

This additional clause made its appearance at the time when Recared, king of the Visigoths, passed over from the Arian to the catholic doctrine. The above synod pronounced an anathema against all who did not believe that the Spirit proceeded from both the Father and the Son. Comp. Mansi, .ix. p. 981.

§ 95.

FINAL STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

The more accurately the divinity both of the Holy Spirit and of the Son was defined, the more important it became to determine exactly the relation in which the different persons stood to each other, and to the divine essence itself, and then to settle the ecclesiastical terminology. Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzum, and Gregory of Nyssa in the Greek, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, and Leo the Great in the Latin church, exerted the greatest influence upon the formation of the said terminology. According to this usage the word ovoía (essentia, substantia) denotes what is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the word nóσтаOIS (persona) what is individual, distinguishing the one from the other.' Each person possesses some peculiarity (idiórns), by which it is distinguished from the other persons, notwithstanding the sameness of essence. Thus, underived existence (ayevvnoía) belongs to the Father,

§ 95. FINAL STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 265

generation (γέννησις) to the Son, and procession (ἐκπόρευσις, ἔκπεμψις) to the Holy Spirit.' When Augustine rejected all the distinctions which had been formerly made between the different persons, and referred to the triune Golhead what had been before predicated of the separate persons (particularly creation), he completely purified the dogma from the older vestiges of subordinationism; but, as he reduced the persons to the general idea of divine relations, he could not entirely avoid the appearance of Sabellianism. Boëthius and

others adopted his views on this point."

1

The writers of this period avoided the use of the term πрóσшлоν, which would have corresponded more exactly with the Latin word persona, while TóσTασiç means literally substantia, lest it might lead to Sabellian inferences; but they sometimes confounded úróσтaois with ovoía, and occasionally used ovoç instead of the latter. This was done e. g. by Gregory of Nazianzum, Orat. xxiii. 11, p. 431, xxxiii. 16, p. 614, xiii. 11, p. 431; Ep. 1, ad Cledonium, p. 739, ed. Lips. quoted by Ullmann, p. 355, note 1, and p. 356, note 1. Gregory also sometimes attaches the same meaning to vπóσтαois and to лрóσлоν, though he prefers the use of the latter; Orat. xx. 6, p. 379. Մmann, p. 356, note 3. This distinction is more accurately defined by Basil, Ep. 236, 6, (quoted by Münscher ed. by von Cölln, p. 242, 243): Ovoía dè καὶ ὑπόστασις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφοράν, ἣν ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· οἷον ὡς ἔχει τὸ ζῶον πρὸς τὸν δεῖνα ἄνθρωπον. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐσίαν μὲν μίαν ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὥστε τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον μὴ διαφόρως ἀποδιδόναι· ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδιάζουσαν, ἵν ̓ ἀσύγχυτος ἡμῖν καὶ τετρα. νωμένη ἡ περὶ Πατρὸς παὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἔννοια ἐνυπάρχῃ K. T. 2. Comp. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxix. 11, p. 530, in Ullmann, p. 355, note 3; and Orat. xlii. 16, p. 759, quoted by Ullmann, p. 356, note 3, where the distinction between ovσía and vπóσтaoiç is prominently brought forward. Jerome, moreover, had objections to the statement that there were three hypostases, because it seemed to lead to Arianism; but he submitted on this point to the judgment of the Roman See; comp. Ep. xv. and xvi. ad Damasum.

2

Greg. Naz. Orat. xli. 9: Πάντα ὅσα ὁ πατὴρ, τοῦ υἱοῦ, πλὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας· πάντα ὅσα ὁ υἱὸς, τοῦ πνεύματος, πλὴν τῆς γεννήσεως κ. τ. λ. Orat. xxv. 16: Ἴδιον δὲ πατρὸς μὲν ἡ ἀγεννησία, υἱοῦ δὲ ἡ γέννησις, πνεύματος δὲ ἡ ἔκπεμψις ; but the terms ιδιότης and ὑπόστασις were sometimes used synonymously, e. g., Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxiii. 16, p. 614. Ulmann, p. 357.

'Such vestiges are unquestionably to be found even in the most orthodox fathers, not only in the East, but also in the West. Thus, for instance, in Hilary, De Trin. iii. 12, and iv. 16. He designates the Father as the jubentem Deum, the Son as facientem. And when even Athanasius says, that the Son is at once greater than the Holy Spirit and equal to him (uɛíZwv Kai toos), and that the Holy Spirit, too, is related to the Son as is the Son to the Father (Cont. Arian Orat. ii.), "the idea of a subordination lies at the basis of such declarations;" Gieseler, Dogmengesch. p. 315.

4

⚫ Augustinus Contra serm. Arian. c. 2, no. 4, (Opp. T. viii.): Unus quippe

Deus et ipsa trinitas, et sic unus Deus, quomodo unus creator. He also referred the theophanies, which were formerly ascribed to the Logos alone, to the whole Trinity. Iu support of this view, he appeals to the three men who appeared to Abraham; De. Trin. ii. 18. He also thinks that the sending of the Son is not only a work of the Father, but of the whole Trinity. The Father alone is not sent, because he is unbegotten (comp. the passages quoted by Meier, i. p. 206, ss.) [Nec pater sine filio, nec filius sine patre misit Spirit. S., sed eum pariter ambo miserunt. Inseparabilis quippe sunt opera trinitatis. Solus pater non legitur missus, quia solus non habet auctorem, a quo genitus sit, vel a quo procedat. Contra serm. Arian. c. 2, n. 4. Opp. ed. Ant. 1700. Tom. viii.] The distinctions between the persons are, in his opinion, not distinctions of nature, but of relation. But he is aware that we have no appropriate language to denote those distinctions, De Trinit. v. 10: Quum quæritur, quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen: tres personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur. The persons are not to be regarded as species, for we do not say, tres equi are unum animal, but tria animalia. Better would be the comparison with three statues from one mass of gold, but this too limps, since we do not necessarily connect the conception of gold with that of statues, and the converse; ibid. vii. 11. He brings his views concerning the Trinity into connection with anthropology, but by comparing the three persons with the memoria, intellectus, and voluntas of man (1. c. ix. 11; x. 10, 18; xv. 7), he evidently borders upon Sabellianism; it has the appearance of mere relations, without personal shape. [Conf. 13, cap. 11.-Vellem ut hæc tria cogitarent homines in seipsis. Longe alia sunt ista tria quam illa Trinitas: sed dico ubi se exerceant et ibi probent, et sentiunt quam longe sunt. Dico autem hæc tria; esse, nosse, veile. Sum enim, et novi, et volo; sum sciens et volens; et scio esse me, et velle; et volo esse, et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita, et una vita, et una mens, et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio, et tamen distinctio, videat qui potest.] On the other hand, the practical and religious importance of the doctrine of the Trinity appears most worthily, where he reminds us that it is of the very nature of disinterested (unenvious) love to impart itself, De Trin. ix. 2: Cum aliquid amo, tria sunt; ego, et quod amo, et ipse amor. Non enim amo amorem, nisi amantem amem: nam non est amor, ubi nihil amatur. Tria ergo sunt: amans, et quod amatur, et (mutuus) amor. Quid si non amem nisi meipsum, nonne duo erunt, quod amo et amor? Amans enim et quod amatur, hoc idem est, quando se ipse amat. Sicut amare et amari eodem modo id ipsum est, cum se quisque amat. Eadem quippe res bis dicitur, cum dicitur: amat se et amatur a se. Tunc enim non est aliud atque aliud amare et amari, sicut non est alius atque alius amans et amatus. At vero amor et quod amatur etiam sic duo sunt. Non enim cum quisque se amat, amor est, nisi cum amatur ipse amor. Aliud est autem amare se, aliud est amare amorem suum. Non enim amatur amor, nisi jam aliquid amans, quia ubi nihil amatur, nullus est amor. Duo ergo sunt, cum se quisque amat, amor et quod amatur. Tunc enim amans et quod amatur unum est... Amans quippe ad amorem refertur et amor ad amantem. Amans enim aliquo amore amat, ct amor alicujus amantis est... Retracto amante nullus est amor, et retracto

amore nullus est amans. Ideoque quantam ad invicem referuntur, duo sunt. Quod autem ad se ipsa dicuntur, et singula spiritus, et simul utrumque unus spiritus, et singula mens et simul utrumque una mens. Cf. lib. xv.*

5

Boëthius, De Trin. (ad Symmach.)† c. 2: Nulla igitur in eo (Deo) diversitas, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo, atque idcirco nec numerus. Cap. 3: Deus vero a Deo nullo differt, nec vel accidentibus vel substantialibus differentiis in subjecto positis distat; ubi vero nulla est differentia, nulla est omnino pluralitas, quare nec numerus; igitur unitas tantum. Nam quod tertio repetitur, Deus; quum Pater et Filius et Spir. S. nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsæ sunt... Non igitur si de Patre et Filio et Spir. S. tertio prædicatur Deus, idcirco trina prædicatio numerum facit... Cap. 6: Facta quidem est trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est prædicatio relationis; servata vero unitas in eo quod est indifferentia vel substantiæ vel operationis vel omnino ejus, quæ secundum se dicitur, prædicationis. Ita igitur substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem, atque ideo sola sigillatim proferuntur atque separatim quæ relationis sunt; nam idem Pater qui Filius non est, nec idem uterque qui Spir. S. Idem tamen Deus est, Pater et Filius et Spir. S., idem justus, idem bonus, idem magnus, idem omnia, quæ secundum se poterunt prædicari. Boëthius falls into the most trivial Sabellianism, by drawing an illustration of the Trinity from the cases in which we have three names for the same thing, e. g., gladius, mucro, ensis; see Baur, Dreienigkeitsl. ii. p. 34.—The orthodox doctrine of the western church is already expressed in striking formulas by Leo the Great, e. g., Sermo LXXV. 3: Non alia sunt Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti, sed omnia quæcunque habet Pater, habet et Filius, habet et Spiritus S.; nec unquam in illa trinitate non fuit ista communio, quia hoc est ibi omnia habere, quod semper existere. LXXV. 1, 2: Sempiternum est Patri, coæterni sibi Filii sui esse genitorem. Sempiternum est Filio, intemporaliter a Patre esse progenitum. Sempiternum quoque est Spiritui Sancto Spiritum esse Patris et Filii. Ut nunquam Pater sine Filio, nunquam Filius sine Patre, nunquam Pater et Filius fuerint sine Spiritu Sancto, et, omnibus existentiæ gradibus exclusis, nulla ibi persona sit anterior, nulla posterior. Hujus enim beatæ trinitatis incommutabilis deitas una est in substantia, indivisa in opere, concors in voluntate, par in potentia, æqualis in gloria. Other passages are quoted by Perthel, Leo der Grosse, p. 138, ss.

§ 96.

TRITHEISM, TETRATHEISM.

In keeping the three persons of the Godhead distinct from each other, much care was needed, lest the idea of ovoía (essence), by which the unity was expressed, should be understood as the mere concept

* As to the mode in which Augustine made his doctrine of the Trinity intelligible to the congregation, in his sermons, see Bindemann, ii. 205 sq.

† It is doubtful whether the work De Trin. was really by Boëthius; we cite it under the customary name.

of a genus, and the vлóσтaois viewed as an individual (a species) falling under this generic conception; for this would necessarily call up the representation of three gods. Another misunderstanding was also to be obviated; for, in assigning to God himself (the avτóðɛoç) a logical superiority above Father, Son, and Spirit, it might appear as though there were four persons, or even four gods. Both of these opinions were held. John Ascusnages of Constantinople,' and John Philoponus of Alexandria, were the leaders of the Tritheites; while the monophysite patriarch of Alexandria, Damianus,' was accused of being the head of the Tetratheites (Tetradites), but probably by unjust inference.

'Ascusnages of Constantinople, when examined by the Emperor Justinian concerning his faith, is said to have acknowledged one nature of the incarnate Christ, but asserted three natures, essences, and deities in the Trinity. The tritheites, Conon and Eugenius, are said to have made the same statements to the Emperor.

The opinion of Philoponus can be seen from a fragment (Alainτýs) preserved by John Damascenus (De Hæresib. c. 83, p. 101, ss. Phot. Bibl. cod. 75. Niceph. xviii. 45-48, extracts from which are quoted by Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, i. 251). In his view the puois is the genus which comprehends individuals of the same nature. The terms essence and nature are identical; the term έñóσтασıç, or person, denotes the separate real existence of the nature, that which philosophers of the peripatetic school call aroμov, because there the separation of genus and species ceases. Comp. Scharfenberg, J. G., de Jo. Philopono, Tritheismi defensore, Lips. 1768 (Comm. Th. ed. Velthusen, etc. T. i.), and Trechsel, in the Studien und Kritiken 1835, part 1, p. 95, ss. Meier, 1. c. i. p. 195, ss. [Philoponus applied the ideas of Aristotle to the Trinity; he connected the two notions púoic and eidos-confounding the common divine essence with the notion of species. See Neander, Dog. Hist. p. 310. Baur, Dogmengesch. p. 170: Philoponus maintained that nature, in the church usage, signified the special as well as the general, and that we might as well speak of three natures as of three hypostases; but yet he did not say there were three gods.]

In his controversy with Peter of Callinico, patriarch of Antioch, Damianus maintained that the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another, but that no one of them is God as such; they only possess the subsisting divine nature in common, and each is God in so far as he inseparably participates in it. The Damianites were also called Angelites (from the city of Angelium). Comp. Niceph. xiii. 49. Schröckh, Schröckh, xviii. p 624. Münscher von. Cölln. p. 253. Baumgarten-Crusius, i. p. 364. Meier, Trin. Lehre, p. 198: "Such systems of dissolution are the signs of the life of these times; they exercised themselves upon dead forms, seeking help in them, instead of first trying to fill out the stiff definitions of the dogma with the living contents of the Christian ideas, which sustain the dogma."-Tritheism may be viewed as the extreme of Arianism, and Tetratheism as the extreme of Sabellianism; comp. Hasse, Anselm, 2 Thl. p. 289.