οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄψυχος· ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἑκουσίως καὶ προαιρετικῶς σπεύσει πρὸς σωτηρίαν· διὸ καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς ἔλαβεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἂν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμητικὸς πρὸς ὁπότερον ἂν καὶ βούλοιτο τῶν τε αἱρετῶν καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν κ. τ. λ.

Comp. the whole of the third book of the work De Princip. According to Origen, there is no accountability without liberty, De Princ. ii. 5, Red. p. 188: “ If men were corrupt by nature, and could not possibly do good, God would appear as the judge not of actions, but of natural capacities" (comp. what Minucius says on this point). Comp. De Princ. i. 5, 3, and Contra Cels. iv. 3 (Opp. i. p. 504): ̓Αρετῆς μὲν ἐὰν ἀνέλῃς τὸ ἑκούσιον, ἀνεῖλες αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Nevertheless, this liberty is only relative; every moral action is a mixture of free choice and divine aid. Comp. § 70, and the passages quoted by Redepenning, Orig. ii. p. 318.

*Iren. iv. 4, p. 231, 232 (Gr. 281): Sed frumentum quidem et paleæ, inanimalia et irrationabilia existentia, naturaliter talia facta sunt: homo vero, rationabilis et secundum hoc similis Deo, liber in arbitrio factus et suæ potestatis ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum, aliquando autem palea fiat; Irenæus then founds the accountability of man upon this argument. Comp. iv. 15, p. 245 (Gr. 318); iv. 37, p. 281, '82 (Gr. 374, '75): El φύσει οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν, οὔθ ̓ οὗτοι ἐπαινετοι, ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ κατεσκευάσθησαν· οὔτ ̓ ἐκεῖνοι μεμπτοὶ, οὕτως γεγονό τες. ̓Αλλ' ἐπειδὴ οἱ πάντες τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσι φύσεως, δυνάμενοί τε κατασχεῖν καὶ πρᾶξαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ δυνάμενοι πάλιν ἀποβάλεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι· δικαίως καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς εὐνομουμένοις, καὶ πολὺ πρότερον παρὰ Θεῷ οἱ μὲν ἐπαινοῦνται, καὶ ἀξίας τυγχάνουσι μαρτυρίας τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ καθόλου ἐκλογῆς καὶ ἐπιμονῆς· οἱ δὲ καταιτιῶνται καὶ ἀξίας τυγχάνουσι ζημίας τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποβολῆς. Comp. also iv. 39, p. 285 (Gr. 380); v. 27, p. 325 (Gr. 442). But, according to Irenæus, the freedom of man is not only seen in his works, but also in his faith, iv. 37, p. 282 (Gr. 376); comp. also the fragment of the sermon De Fide, p. 342 (Gr. 467). On Hippolytus and his view of freedom, see Neander, Hist. Dog. p. 183.

9

Tertullian defended the idea of liberty especially in opposition to Marcion: "How could man, who was destined to rule over the whole creation, be a slave in respect to himself, and not have the faculty of reigning over himself?" Advers. Marcion, ii. 8, 6, 9; comp. Neander, Antignost. p. 372–373.* 10 "According to the Gnostics, there is a fate which stands in intimate connection with the stars, and is brought about by their instrumentality," etc. Baur, Gnosis, p. 232. But the doctrine of human freedom is of importance in the opinion of the author of the Clementine Homilies, e. g., Hom. xv. 7 : Εκαστον δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐλεύθερον ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἑαυτὸν ἀπονέμειν ᾧ βούλεται, ἢ τῷ παρόντι κακῷ, ἢ τῷ μέλλοντι ἀγαθῷ, comp. also c. 8. Hom. ii. 15; iii. 69; viii. 16; xi. 8. Credner, 1. c. iii. p. 283, 290, 294. Schliemann, p. 182, ss., 235, ss., 241.

* Even the opponents of the doctrine of human liberty, as Calvin, are compelled to acknowledge this remarkable consensus Patrum of the first period, and in order to account for it, they are obliged to suppose a general illusion about this doctrine! "It is at any rate a remarkable phenomenon, that the very doctrines which afterward caused disruptions in the Christian church, are scarcely ever mentioned in the primitive church." Daniel, Tatian, p. 200.

1

$ 58.

b. IMMORTALITY.

* Olshausen, antiquissimorum ecclesiæ græcæ patrum de immortalitate sententiæ recensentur, Osterprogramm, 1827, reviewed by Ullmann in Studien und Kritiken, i. 2, p. 425.

The theologians of the primitive age did not so completely agree concerning the immortality of the soul. They were far from denying the doctrine itself, or doubting its possibility. But some of them, e. g., Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus,' on various grounds supposed that the soul, though mortal in itself, or at least indifferent in relation to mortality or immortality, either acquires immortality as a promised reward, by its union with the spirit and the right use of its liberty, or, in the opposite case, perishes with the body. They were led to this view, partly because they laid so much stress on freedom, and because they thought that likeness to God was to be obtained only by this freedom; and partly, too, because they supposed (according to the trichotomistic division of human nature) that the soul receives the seeds of immortal life only by union with the spirit, as the higher and free life of reason. And, lastly, other philosophical hypotheses concerning the nature of the soul doubtless had an influence. On the contrary, Tertullian and Origen, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon its immortality as essential to it.'

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On the question whether the view advocated by the aged man in Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. § 4, is the opinion of the author himself or not?—as well as on the meaning of the passage: ̓Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φημὶ πάσας Tàs pνxàs ¿yú, comp. his commentators, Olshausen, 1. c. Rössler, Bibl. i. p. 141; Möhler, Patrologie, i. p. 242: Daniel, Tatian, p. 224; Semisch, ii. 368. Tatian speaks more distinctly, Contra Græc. c. 13: Ovk έotiv åÐávatos † ψυχὴ καθ ̓ ἑαυτήν*, θνητὴ δὲ. ̓Αλλὰ δύναται ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν. θνήσκει μὲν γὰρ καὶ λύεται μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴ γινώσκουσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ̓Ανίσταται δὲ εἰς ὕστερον ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τοῦ κόσμου σὺν τῷ σώματι, θάνατον διὰ τιμωρίας ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ λαμβάνουσα. Πάλιν δὲ οὐ θνήσκει, κἂν πρὸς καιρὸν λυθῇ, τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ θεοῦ πεποιημένη. Καθ' ἑαυτὴν γὰρ σκότος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτῇ φωτεινόν . . . . (Joh. i.) Ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὴ τὸ πνεῦμα ἔσωσεν, ἐσώθη δὲ ὑπ ̓ αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. Συζυγίαν δὲ κεκτημένη τὴν τοῦ θείου πνεύματος, οὐκ ἐστιν ἀβοήθητος, ἀνέρχεται δὲ πρὸς ἅπερ αὐτὴν ὁδηγεῖ χωρία τὸ πνεῦμα. Theophilus (ad. Aut. ii. 27) starts the question: was Adam created with a mortal or immor

* Kať čavrỳv is wanting in the most recent manuscripts, vide Daniel, p. 228, on this passage.

tal nature and replies: neither the one nor the other, but he was fitted for both (dEKTIKOV ȧuporépov), in order that he might receive immortality as a reward, and become God (yévηraι Ocóc), if he aspired after it by obeying the divine commandments; but that he might become the author of his own ruin, if he did the works of the devil, and disobeyed God.* Irenæus also speaks only of an immortality which is given to man, see Adv. Hær. ii. 64 : Sine initio et sine fine, vere et semper idem et eodem modo se habens solus est Deus. . . . . Et de animalibus, de animabus et de spiritibus et omnino de omnibus his, quæ facta sunt, cogitans quis minime peccabit, quando omnia, quæ facta sunt, initium quidem facturæ suæ habeant, perseverant autem, quoadusque ea Deus et esse et perseverare voluerit. Non enim ex nobis, neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundem gratiam Dei datur. Sicut autem corpus animale ipsum quidem non est anima, participatur autem animam, quoadusque Deus vult, sic et anima ipsa quidem non est vita, participatur autem a Deo sibi præstitam vitam.

* The opposition which Tertullian raised to the above doctrine was connected with his twofold division of the soul, that of Origen with his views on preexistence. (For the latter could easily dispose of the objection that the soul must have an end, because it has had a beginning.) Comp., however, Tert. De Anima, xi. xiv. xv. Among other things, Tertullian appeals to the fact that the soul continues active even in dreams. According to Orig. Exhort. ad Mart. 47 (Opp. i. p. 307), De Princ. ii. 11; 4, p. 105, and iii. 1, 13, p. 122, it is both the inherent principle of life in the soul, and its natural relation to God, which secures its immortality. To this is to be added his view about self-determination, and the retribution based thereon. Comp. Thomasius, p. 159; Redepenning, ii. 111.

The whole question, however, had more of a philosophical than Christian bearing; as the idea of immortality itself is abstract negative. On the other hand, the believer by faith lays hold of eternal life in Christ as something real. The Christian doctrine of immortality can not therefore be considered apart from the person, work, and kingdom of Christ, and rests upon Christian views and promises; see, below, in the Eschatology.

§ 59.

SIN, THE FALL, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Walch, J. G. (Th. Ch. Lilienthal), De Pelagianismo ante Pelagium, Jen. 1738, 4. Ejusdem, Historia Doctrinæ de Peccato Originis; both in his Miscellanea Sacra, Amstel. 1744, 4. Horn, J., Commentatio de sententiis eorum patrum, quorum auctoritas ante Augustinum plurimum valuit, de peccato originali, Gött. 1801, 4 † Wörter [Landerer and Huber], u. s. § 57.

However much the primitive church was inclined, as we have already seen, to look with a free and clear vision at the bright side of man (his ideal nature), yet it did not endeavor to conceal the dark side, by a false idealism. Though it can not be said, that the con

* About the view of the Thnetopsychites (Arabici), compare below, on Eschatology, § 76, note 8.

sciousness of human depravity was the exclusive and fundamental principle upon which the entire theology of that time was founded, yet every Christian conscience was convinced of the opposition between the ideal and the real, and the effects of sin in destroying the harmony of life; and this, too, in proportion to the strictness of claims set up for human freedom.

Thus Justin M. complained of the universality of sin, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 95. The whole human race is under the curse; for cursed is every one who does not keep the law. The author of the Clementine Homilies also supposes that the propensity to sin is made stronger by its preponderance in human history, and calls men the slaves of sin (dovλevovтes ¿ñɩ0vμíα); Hom. iv. 23, x. 4, Schliemann, p. 183.-Clement of Alexander directs our attention, in particular, to the internal conflict which sin has introduced into the nature of man; it does not form a part of our nature, nevertheless it is spread through the whole human race. We come to sin without ourselves knowing how; comp. Strom. ii. p. 487. Origen also conceives of sin as a universal corruption, since the world is apostate, Contra Cels. iii. 66, p. 491: Lapwç yàp paívetαL, ὅτι πάντες μὲν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν πεφύκαμεν, ἔνιοι δὲ οὐ μόνον πεφύκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰθισμένοι εἰσὶν ἁμαρτάνειν. Comp. iii. 62, p. 488: Αδύνατον γάρ φαμεν εἶναί ἄνθρωπον μετ ̓ ἀρετῆς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἄνω βλέπειν· κακίαν γὰρ ὑφίστασθαι ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον ἐν ἀνθρώποις. Nevertheless the writers of the present period do not express as strong a sense of sin as those of the following. On the contrary, jubilant feelings preponderated in view of the finished work of the Saviour; counterbalanced by external contests and persecutions, rather than by internal penitential strug gles. It is as one-sided to expect in the first centuries the experience of later times, as it is to misconceive the necessity of the later developments.

§ 60.

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN IN GENERAL.

Suicer, Thesaurus, sub ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία, ἁμαρτωλός. Krabbe die Lehre von der Sünde und dem Tode, Hamburg, 1836 (dogmatico-exegetical). * Müller, Julius, die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, Breslau, 1844, 2 vols. [3d ed. 1849: transl. in Clark's Foreign Theol. Library.]

Though sin was recognized as a fact, yet definitions of its precise nature were to a great extent indefinite and unsettled during this period. The heretical sects of the Gnostics in general (and in this particular they were the forerunners of Manichæism), with their dualistic notions, either ascribed the origin of evil to the demiurge, or maintained that it was inherent in matter. On the other hand, the Christian theologians, generally speaking, agreed in seeking the

source of sin in the human will, and clearing God from all responsibility. Such a view easily led to the opinion of Origen, that moral evil is something negative.*

* A definition, allied to that of the Stoics, is given e. g. by Clement of Alexandria, Pæd. i. 13, p. 158, 159: Πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ὀρθὸν, τοῦτο ἁμάρτημά ἐστι. Virtue (αρετή), on the contrary, is διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. Hence sin is also disobedience to God, Αὐτίκα γοῦν ὅτε ἥμαρτεν ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ παρήκουσε τοῦ Θεοῦ. He further considers sin, urging its etymology, as error.... ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι τὸ πλημμελούμενον πᾶν διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου διαμαρτίαν γινόμενον καὶ εἰκότως καλεῖσθαι ἁμάρτημα. Comp. Strom. ii. p. 462: Τὸ δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν κρίνειν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν συνίσταται ἢ τοῦ ἀδυνατεῖν ποιεῖν. The different kinds of sin are, ἐπειθυμία, φόβος, and ἡδονή. One consequence of sin is the λήθη τῆς ἀληθείας, Coh. p. 88, and, lastly, eternal death, ib. p. 89. Tertullian puts sin in the impatience (inconstancy) of man, De Pat. 5 (p. 143): Nam ut compendio dictum sit, omne peccatum impatientiæ adscribendum. Comp. Cypr. De Bono Pat. p. 218. Orig. De Princ. ii. 9, 2 (Opp. T. i. p. 97; Redep. p. 216) also believes that laziness and aversion to efforts for preserving the good, as well as turning from the path of virtue (privative), are causes of sin; for going astray is nothing but becoming bad; to be bad only means not to be good, etc.; comp. Schnitzer, p. 140.

Now and then even orthodox theologians ascribe the origin of evil to the sensuous nature: thus Justin M. Apol. i. 10 (?); De Resurr. c. 3, see Semisch, p. 400, 401. On the other hand, comp. Clem. Strom. iv. 36, p. 638, 39 : Ούκουν εὐλόγως οἱ κατατρέχοντες τῆς πλάσεως καὶ κακίζοντες τὸ σῶμα· οὐ συνορῶντες τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὀρθήν πρὸς τὴν οὐρανοῦ θέαν γενομένην, καὶ τὴν τῶν αἰσθησέων ὀργανοποιίαν πρὸς γνῶσιν συντείνουσαν, τά τε μέλη καὶ μέρη πρὸς τὸ καλὸν, οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὴν εὔθετα. Οθεν ἐπιδεκτικὸν γίνεται τῆς τιμιωτάτης τῷ θεῷ ψυχῆς τὸ οἰκητήριον τοῦτο κ. τ. λ. . . . 'Αλλ' οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει, οὔδε αὖ κακὸν φύσει τὸ σῶμα, οὐδὲ μὴν, ὃ μή ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν, τοῦτο εὐθέως κακόν. Εἰσὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ μεσότητές τινες κ. τ. λ. Comp. Origen, Contr. Celsum, iv. 66 : Τόδε, τὴν ὕλην . . . . τοῖς θνητοῖς ἐμπολιτευομένην αἰτίαν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ ἑκάστου ἡγεμονικὸν αἴτιον τῆς ὑποστάσης ἐν αὐτῷ κακίας ἐστίν, ἥτις ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

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Clem. Strom. vii. 2, p. 835 : Κακίας δ' αὖ πάντη πάντως ἀναίτιος (ὁ Θεός). Orig. Contra Cels. vi. 55, p. 675 : Ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν, ὅτι κακὰ μὲν ἢ τὴν κακίαν καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς πράξεις ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐποίησε. Comp. iii. 69, p. 492. Nevertheless, he holds that evil is under God's providence; comp. De Princ. iii. 2, 7, Opp. i. p. 142.

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* Orig. De Princ. ii. 9, 2 (Opp. i. p. 97), and in Joh. T. ii. c. 7 (Opp. iv. p. 65, 66): Πᾶσα ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστιν (with reference to the word οὐδέν in John i. 3), ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐκ ὂν τυγχάνει. He terms evil ἀνυπόστατον, and the fall μείωσις (diminutio). J. Müller, i. 132 (first ed.); comp. Redepenning,

ii. 328.