Ἡ τῶν δαιμόνων ὑπόστασις οὐκ ἔχει μετανοίας τόπον. Comp. also Justin M. Dialog. c. Tryph. c. 141.-Origen himself did not very clearly propound his views; De Princ. iii. c. 6, 5 (Opp. i. p. 154): Propterea etiam novissimus inimicus, qui mors appellatur, destrui dicitur (1 Cor. xv. 26), ut neque ultra triste sit aliquid ubi mors non est, neque adversum sit ubi non est inimicus. Destrui sane novissimus inimicus ita intelligendus est, non ut substantia ejus, quæ a Deo facta est, pereat, sed ut propositum et voluntas inimica, quæ non a Deo sed ab ipso processit, intereat. Destructur ergo non ut non sit, sed ut inimicus non sit et mors. Nihil enim omnipotenti impossibile est, nec insanabile est aliquid factori suo. § 6. Omnia restituentur ut unum sint, et Deus fuerit omnia in omnibus (1 Cor. xv. 28). Quod tamen non ad subitum fieri, sed paulatim et per partes intelligendum est, infinitis et immensis labentibus sæculis, cum sensim et per singulos emendatio fuerit et correctio prosecuta, præcurrentibus aliis et velociori cursu ad summa tendentibus, aliis vero proximo quoque spatio insequentibus, tum deinde aliis longe posterius: et sic per multos et innumeros ordines proficientium ac Deo se ex inimicis reconciliantium pervenitur usque ad novissimum inimicum qui dicitur mors, et etiam ipse destratur ne ultra sit inimicus.] He here speaks of the last enemy, death, but it is evident, from the context, that he identifies death with the devil (this is signified, as cited, e. g., Münscher Handbuch. ii. p. 39, by the use of the parenthesis); he speaks of a substance which the Creator would not destroy, but heal. Comp. § 3, and Schnitzer in the passage; Thomasius, p. 187. On the possibility of the conversion of the other demons, comp. i. 6, 3 (Opp. i. p. 70): Jam vero si aliqui ex his ordinibus, qui sub principatu diaboli agunt, malitiæ ejus obtemperant, poterunt aliquando in futuris sæculis converti ad bonitatem, pro eo quod est in ipsis liberi facultas arbitrii ( ? ). . .

THIRD DIVISION.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

§ 53.

INTRODUCTION.

To bring man back to himself and to the knowledge of his own nature, was the essential object of Christianity, and the condition. of its further progress.' Hence the first office of Christian anthropology must be to determine, not what man is in his natural life in relation to the rest of the visible creation, but what he is as a spiritual and moral being in relation to God and divine things. But since the higher and spiritual nature of man is intimately connected with the organism of both body and soul, a system of theological anthropology could be constructed only on the basis of physical and psychical anthropology, which, in the first instance, belongs to natural science and philosophy, rather than to theology. The history of doctrines, therefore, must also consider the opinions held as to man in his natural relations.'

1

Comp. Clem. Pæd. iii. i. p. 250 : Ην ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντων μεγίστων μαθημάτων τὸ γνῶναι αὐτόν· ἑαυτὸν γάρ τις ἐὰν γνώη, θεὸν εἴσεται.

At first sight it might appear indifferent, so far as theology is concerned, whether man consists of two or three parts; and yet these distinctions are intimately connected with the theological definitions of liberty, immortality, etc. This is the case also with the doctrine of preëxistence, in opposition to traducianism and creatianism, in relation to original sin, etc. Thus it can be explained why. Tatian, on religious grounds, opposes the common defini tion, according to which man is a wov λoyikóv, Contra Græcos, c. 15: Ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὥσπερ κορακόφωνοι δογματίζουσιν, ζῶον λογικὸν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν δειχθήσεται γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἄλογα νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά. Μόνος δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ, λέγω δὲ ἄνθρώπον οὐχὶ τὸν ὅμοια τοῖς ζώοις πράττοντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πόῤῥω μὲν ἀνθρωπότητος, πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν κεχωρηκότα.

§ 54.

DIVISION OF HUMAN NATURE AND PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Keil, Opusc. Academ. p. 618–647. Duncker, Apologetarum secundi Sæculi de Essentialibus Naturæ humanæ Partibus Placita. P. I. 11, Gött. 1844-50, 4to. [Franz Delitzsch, System der biblischen Psychologie, Leipz. 1855. J. T. Beck, Umriss d. biblischen Seelenlehre, Stuttg. 1843.]

That man is made up of body and soul, is a fact which we know by experience previous to all speculation, and before we express it in precise scientific terms. But it is more difficult to define the relation between body and soul, and to assign to each its boundaries. Some regarded the yuxý as the medium by which the purely spiritual in man, the higher and ideal life of reason, is connected with the purely animal, the grosser and sensuous principle of the natural life. They also supposed that this human triad was supported by the language of Scripture.' Some of the earlier fathers," those of the Alexandrian school in particular, adopted this trichotomistic division, while others, like Tertullian, adhered to the opinion, that man consists only of body and soul. Some Gnostic sects, e. g., the Valentinians, so perverted the trichotomistic division, as to divide men themselves into three classes, the χοϊκοί, ψυχικοί, and TVενμаTIKоí, according as one or the other of the three constituents preponderated, to the apparent exclusion of the others. Thus they again sundered the bond of union with which Christ had encircled men as brethren.'

1

3

-τη, της, μη; σάρξ, ψυχή, πνεῦμα. Comp. the works on Bibl. Theol., and the commentaries on 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. iv. 12, etc., also Ackermann, Studien und Kritiken, 1839, part 4. [Beck and Delitzsch, u. s.]

* Justin M. fragm. de Resurr. § 10 : Οἶκος τὸ σῶμα ψυχῆς, πνεύματος δὲ ψυχὴ οἶκος. Τὰ τρία ταῦτα τοῖς ἐλπίδα εἰλικρινῆ καὶ πίστιν ἀδιάκριτον Ev T Dεw Exovoi owonoεтai. Comp. Dial. cum Tryph. § 4. Tatian, contra Græc. Or. c. 7, 12, 15, Irenæus, v. 9, 1: Tria sunt, ex quibus perfectus homo constat, carne, anima et spiritu, et altero quidem salvante et figurante, qui est spiritus, altero, quod unitur et formatur, quod est caro; id vero quod inter hæc est duo, quod est anima, quæ aliquando quidem subsequens spiritum elevatur ab eo, aliquando autem consentiens carni decidit in terrenas concupiscentias. Comp. v. 6, 1, 299: Anima autem et spiritus pars hominum esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam: perfectus autem homo commixtio et adunitio est animæ assumentis spiritum Patris et admixta ei carni, quæ est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei. Accordingly, not every man is by nature made up of three parts, but he only who has received the gift of the Holy Spirit, as the third. Concerning the distinction between Pnoë and Pnuema, comp. § 44, and Duncker, p. 97, 98.

3

' Clement (Strom. vii. 12, p. 880) makes a distinction between the yux λογικη and the ψυχὴ σωματική; he also mentions a tenfold division of man (analogous to the decalogue), ibid. vi. 16, p. 808: "Eorɩ dè kaì dɛkás Tis περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν· τά τε αἰσθητήρια πέντε καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικόν, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ὄγδοον τὸ κατὰ τὴν πλάσιν πνευματικόν, ἔννατον δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ δέκατον τὸ διὰ τῆς πίστεως προσγινόμενον ἁγίου πνεύματος χαρακτηριστικὸν ἰδίωμα κ. τ. λ. ; the more general division into body, soul, and spirit, forms, however, the basis of this. Clement, after the example of Plato (comp. Justin M. Coh. ad Gr. 6), divides the soul itself into these three faculties : τὸ λογιστικόν (νοερόν), τὸ θυμικόν, TÒ Éπiðvμηtikóv, Pæd. iii. 1, ab init. p. 250. The knowing faculty he subdivides into four functions : αἴσθησις, νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, ὑπόληψις, Strom. ii. 4, p. 435. Clement regards body and soul as diapopa, but not as έvavría, so that neither is the soul as such good, nor is the body as such evil. Comp. Strom. iv. 26, p. 639. For the psychology of Origen, see De Princ. iii. 3 (Opp. i. 145; Redepenn. p. 296-306). On the question whether Origen believed in the existence of two souls in man, see Schnitzer, p. 219, ss.; Thomasius, p. 190, 193-195; Redepenning, ii. p. 369, note 3. In the view of Origen the yvx as such, which he derives from púxɛola, is intermediate between body and spirit; "a defective, not fully developed power" (Redepen. ii. 368). He affirms that he has found no passage in the Sacred Scriptures in which the soul, as such, is spoken of with honor; while, on the contrary, it is frequently blamed, De Princ. ii. 8, 3-5 (Opp. i. p. 95, ss. Redep. p. 211, ss.). But this does not prevent him from comparing the soul to the Son, when he draws a comparison between the human and the divine triad, ibid. § 5. For the trichotomistic division, comp. also Comment. in Matth. T. xiii. 2 (Opp. iii. p. 570), and other passages in Münscher ed. by Von Cölln, i. p. 319, 320. Origen sometimes employs the simple term "man" to designate man's higher spiritual nature, so that man appears not so much to consist of body and soul, as to be the soul itself, which governs the body as a mere instrument; Contra Cels. vii. 38: "Аv@ршπOG, TOVTÉOTI 4vxn xpwμévη owuari (comp. Photius Cod. 234, Epiph. Hær. 64, 17). Consequently he calls the soul homo, homo homo interior, in Num. xxiv.; comp. Thomasius and Redepenning.

* De Anima c. 10, 11, 20, 21, 22: Anima dei flatu nata, immortalis, corporalis, effigiata, substantia simplex, de suo patiens varie precedens, libera arbitrii, accidentiis obnoxia, per ingenia mutabilis, rationalis, dominatrix, divinatrix, ea una redundans; Adv. Hermog. c. 11, and Neander, Antignosticus, p. 457. Concerning the value which, from his strong realistic position, he attached to the senses (the key to his theological opinions) comp. ibid. p. 452, ss.

Iren. i. 5, 5 (Münscher, edit. by Von Cölln, i. p. 316, 317); comp. also Neander's Gnostiche Systeme, p. 127, ss. Baur, Gnosis, 158, ss., 168, ss., 489, ss., 679, ss.

§ 55.

ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

J. Frohschammer, Ueber den Joh. Marcus, Lehrmeinungen

[Julius Müller, Lehre von der Sünde, 3te Ausg. ii. 495, sq. Ursprung d. menschlichen Seelen, München, 1854. über d. Ursprung d. menschl. Seelen in d. ersten Jahrh. d. Kirche. 1854. J. F. Bruch, Lehre der Preëistenz, Strasb. 1859. Edward Beecher, Conflict of Ages, Bost. 1853. Preexistence of the Soul, from Keil's Opuscula Acad. in Biblioth. Sacra, xii, 1855.]

The inquiry into the origin of the human soul, and the mode of its union with the body, seems to be purely metaphysical, and to have no bearing upon religion.' But, in a religious point of view, it is always of importance that the soul should be considered as a creature of God. This doctrine was maintained by the Catholic church in opposition to the Gnostic and heretical theory of emanations. Origen's hypothesis of the pre-existence of the soul is allied with Platonic views. On the other hand, Tertullian maintained the propagation of the soul per traducem in connection with his realistic and materializing conceptions of its corporeity (Traducianism).*

1

2

Thus, Origen says, De Princ. proœm. 5, Opp. i. p. 48: De anima vero utrum ex seminis traduce ducatur, ita ut ratio ipsius vel substantia inserta ipsis seminibus corporalibus habeatur, an vero aliud habeat initium, et hoc ipsum initium si genitum est aut non genitum, vel certe si extrinsecus corpori inditur, necne: non satis manifesta prædicatione distinguitur.

2

p.

Traces of the theory of emanation are found in the writings of some of the earlier Fathers. Justin M., fragm. de Resurr. 11: 'H μèv vvxý ¿OTIV ἄφθαρτος, μέρος οὖσα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐμφύσημα. (Whether this is Justin's own opinion, or a thesis of the Gnostics, which he combats ?-See Semisch, Just. Mart. p. 364.) Comp. the Clementine Homilies, Hom. xvi. 12. On the other hand, Clement of Alex. adheres to the idea of creation, in Coh. 78: Μόνος ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς ὁ ἀριστοτέχνας πατὴρ τοιοῦτον ἄγαλμα ἔμψυχον ἡμᾶς, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔπλασεν ; and Strom. ii. 16, p. 467, 468, where he rejects the phrase μépoç Oɛov, which some employed, in accordance with the principle: Θεὸς οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυσικὴν σχέσιν. Comp. Orig. in Joh. T. xiii. 25 (Opp. T. iv. p. 235): Σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀσεβὲς ὁμοούσιον τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ φύσει καὶ παμμακαρίᾳ εἶναι λέγειν τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας ἐν πνεύμаTI TO Oε. Comp. De Princ. i. 7, 1.

3 Clement, Coh. p. 6 : Πρὸ δὲ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου καταβολῆς ἡμεῖς οἱ τῷ δεῖν ἔσεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ πρότερον γεγεννημένοι τῷ θεῷ· τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου τὰ λογικὰ πλάσματα ἡμεῖς· δι ̓ ὃν ἀρχαίζομεν, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ; this perhaps should rather be understood in an ideal sense. [Clement rejects the view that the soul is generated, in Strom. lib. vi., c. 16 : . . . . où KATÀ TηV TOŇ OTÉPμATOS καταβολὴν γενώμενον, ὡς συνάγεσθαι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου τὸν δεκατὸν ἀριθμὸν,