• Clem. of Alex. Strom. v. 12, p. 695: Ναὶ μὴν ὁ δυσμεταχειριστότατος περὶ Θεοῦ λόγος οὗτός ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι κ. τ. λ. Ib. in calce et 696: 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωρι μωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει· λείπεται δὴ θείᾳ χάριτι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἄγνωστον νοεῖν. Strom. iv. 25, p. 635 : Ο μὲν οὖν Θεὸς ἀναπόδεικτος ὤν, οὐκ ἐστιν ἐπιστημονικός· ὁ δὲ υἱὸς σοφία τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη κ. τ. λ. Likewise Origen, Contra Cels. vii. 42 (Opp. T. 1, p. 725), maintains in reference to the saying of Plato, that it is difficult to find God : Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀποφαινόμεθα, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ὁπωσποτανοῦν ζητῆσαι τὸν θεὸν, καὶ εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν καθαρῶς, μὴ βοηθηθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ ζητουμένου· εὑρισκομένου τοῖς ὁμολογοῦσι μετὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅτι δέονται αὐτοῦ, ἐμφανίζοντος ἑαυτὸν οἷς ἂν κρίνη εὔλογον εἶναι ὀφθῆναι, ὡς πέφυκε θεὸς μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ γινώσκεσθαι, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴ ἔτι οὖσα ἐν σώματι γιγνώσκειν τὸν θεόν.

§ 36.

THE UNITY OF GOD.

Since Christianity adopted the doctrine of one God as taught in the Old Testament, it became necessary to defend it, not only against the polytheism of the heathen, but also against the dualistic doctrine (borrowed from heathenism), and the Gnostic theory of emanation. Some proved the necessity of one God,' though not in the most skillful manner, from the relations of space,' or even from analogies in the rational and also in the animal creation. The more profound thinkers, however, were well aware that it is not sufficient to demonstrate the mere numerical unity of the Divine Being, and tried to give expression to this feeling by transporting the transcendental unity into a sphere above the mathematical monas.*

* Both the hypothesis of a δημιουργός, ἄρχων, Jaldabaoth, etc., who is subordinate to the Supreme God (θεὸς ἀκατονόμαστος, βυθός), and that of the unfolding of the one God into manifold simple æons, or pairs of æons, is contrary to monotheism. On the more fully developed systems of Basilides and Valentinus, comp. Irenæus, Clem. of Alexandria, and the works quoted § 23 on the Gnostic systems. Against the Gnostic dualism especially, Irenæus (ii. 1); Origenes De Princ. ii, i.; Tert. Adv. Marcion. i. (As to the mode in which the orthodox church tried to unite the belief in the Trinity with monotheism, see below.)

1 Justin M. simply acknowledges this necessity, by considering the unity of God as an innate idea, which was afterward lost. In his opinion monotheism is the first true criterion of religious principles, Coh. ad Graec. c. 36 : Δυνατὸν μανθάνειν ὑμᾶς ἕνα καὶ μόνον εἶναι θεὸν, ὃ πρῶτόν ἐστι τῆς ἀληθοῦς θεοσεβείας γνώρισμα.

To this class belongs the proof adduced by Athenagoras, Legat. pro Christianis, c. 8: "If there had been two or several gods from the beginning, they would either be in one and the same place, or each would occupy a separate space. They cannot be in one and the same place, for if they be gods, they are not identical (consequently they exclude each other). Only the created is equal to its pattern, but not the uncreated, for it does not proceed from any thing, neither is it formed after any model. As the hand, the eye, and the foot are different members of one body, as they conjointly compose that body, so God is but one God. Socrates is a compound being, since he is created, and subject to change; but God, who is uncreated, and can neither be divided nor acted upon by another being, can not consist of parts. But if each god were supposed to occupy a separate space, what place could we assign to the other god, or the other gods, seeing that God is above the world, and around all things which he has made? For as the world is round, and God surrounds all beings, where would then be room for any of the other gods? For such a god can not be in the world, because it belongs to another; no more can he be around the world, for the Creator of the world, even God, surrounds it. But if he can be neither in the world, nor around it (for the first God occupies the whole space around it), where is he? Perhaps above the world, and above God? in another world? or around another world? But if he is in another world, and around another world, he does not exist for us, and does not govern our world, and his power, therefore, is not very great, for then he is confined within certain boundaries [after all, a concession!]. But as he exists neither in another world (for the former God fills the universe), nor around another world (for the above God holds all the universe), it follows that he does not exist at all, since there is nothing in which he can exist."

Minuc. Fel. c. 18: Quando unquam regni societas aut cum fide cœpit, aut sine cruore desiit? Omitto Persas de equorum hinnitu augurantes principatum, et Thebanorum præmortuam fabulam transeo; ob pastorum et casæ regnum de geminis memoria notissima est; generi et soceri bella toto orbe diffusa sunt, et tam magni imperii duos fortuna non cepit. Vide cetera: rex unus apibus, dux unus in gregibus, in armentis rector unus. summam potestatem dividi credas, et scindi veri illius ac divini imperii potestatem? quum palam sit, parentem omnium Deum nec principium habere nec terminum, etc. Comp. Cyprian, De Idolorum Vanitate, p. 14.

Tu in cœlo

Clem. Pæd. i. 8, p. 140 : Εν δὲ ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ avτìν μováða. Along with the idea of the unity of God, Origen speaks of the more metaphysical idea of his simplicity, De Princ. i. 1, 6 (Opp. T. i. p. 51, Redepenning, p. 100): Non ergo aut corpus aliquid, aut in corpore esse putandus est Deus (against this, compare Athenagoras), sed intellectualis natura simplex, nihil omnino adjunctionis admittens: uti ne majus aliquid et inferius in se habere credatur, sed ut sit ex omni parte μovás et ut ita dicam évás, et mens et fons, ex quo initium totius intellectualis naturæ vel mentis est.

Strauss, in his Glaubenslehre (i. 404 sq.), gives a compressed sketch of the attempts of the fathers to prove the unity of God. [Origen, Contra Cels. i. 23, in the a posteriori method; from the analogy of armies and states. Lactantius, Div. Inst. i. 3: Quod si in uno exercitu tot fuerint imperatores,

quot legiones, quot cohortes, quot cunei, quot alæ, etc. Cyprian, De Idol. Van. 5: Nec hoc tantum de homine mireris, quum in hoc omnis natura consentiat. Rex unus est apibus, et dux unus in gregibus, et in armentis rector unus multo magis mundi unus est rector, etc. They also derived an a priori argument from the infinitude and absolute perfection of the divine essence.]

§ 37.

WHETHER GOD CAN BE NAMED AND KNOWN.

The idea of a revealed religion implies that so much of the nature of God should be made manifest to man, as is necessary to the knowledge of salvation; the church, therefore, has always cultivated the λóуos περì Оcov (theology). On the other hand, the inadequacy of human conceptions has always been acknowledged (in opposition to the pride of speculation), and the unfathomable divine essence admitted to be past finding out; some even entertained doubts about the propriety of giving God any name. Much of what the church designated by the term mystery, is founded partly on a sense of the insufficiency of our ideas and the inaptitude of our language, and partly on the necessity of still employing certain ideas and expressions to communicate our religious opinions.

When the martyr Attalus, in the persecution of the Gallican Christians under Marcus Aurelius, was asked by his judges what was the name of God, he replied: 'O Oɛòç övoμa ovк ëxei ¿ç ävОрwñоç, Euseb. v. 1 (edit. Heinichen, t. ii. p. 29, comp. the note). Such was also the opinion of Justin M., Apology, ii. 6; whatever name may be given to God, he who has given a name to a thing must always be anterior to it. He, therefore, draws a distinction (with Philo, De Confus. Ling. p. 357) between appellatives (pooρήσεις) and names (ονόματα). The predicates πατήρ, θεός, κύριος, δεσπότης, are only appelatives. Therefore, he also calls God äppητos пατýр; other passages are given by Semisch, ii. p. 252, ss. When Justin further says (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 3) that God is not only above all names, but above all essence (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), it is to be remembered that he is there speaking as a heathen from the Platonic standpoint. But elsewhere he speaks of an ovoía of God, e. g., Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128, and even ascribes to him (in a certain sense) a μopon. Apol. i. 9; comp. Semisch, ii. p. 252. Theoph. ad Autol. i. 3 : Ακουε, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἄῤῥητον καὶ ἀνέκφραστον, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον ὀφθαλμοῖς σαρκίνοις ὁραθῆναι· δόξῃ γάρ ἐστιν ἀχώρητος, μεγέθει ἀκατάληπτος, ὕψει ἀπερινόητος, ἰσχύϊ ἀσύγκριτος, σοφίᾳ ἀσυμβί βαστος, ἀγαθοσύνῃ ἀμίμητος, καλοποιίᾳ ἀνεκδιήγητος· εἰ γὰρ φῶς αὐτὸν εἴπώ, ποίημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· εἰ λόγον εἴπω, ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω (comp. the note to this passage by Maran)· νοῦν ἐὰν εἴπω, φρόνησιν αὐτοῦ λέγω· πνεῦμα ἐὰν εἴπω, ἀναπνοὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω· σοφίαν ἐὰν εἴπω, γέννημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· ἰσχὺν ἐὰν εἴπω, κράτος αὐτοῦ λέγω· πρόνοιαν ἐὰν εἴπω, ἀγαθοσύνην αὐτοῦ λέγω·

βασιλείαν ἐὰν εἴπω, δόξαν αὐτοῦ λέγω· κύριον ἐὰν εἴπω, κριτὴν αὐτὸν λέγω κριτήν ἐὰν εἴπω, δίκαιον αὐτὸν λέγω· πατέρα ἐὰν εἴπω, τὰ πάντα αὐτὸν λέγω· πῦρ ἐὰν εἴπω, τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω κ. τ. λ. * Comp. i. 5 : Εἰ γὰρ 5: El τῷ ἡλίῳ ἐλαχίστῳ ὄντι στοιχείῳ οὐ δύναται ἄνθρωπος ἀτενίσαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν θέρμην καὶ δύναμιν, πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξῃ ἀνεκφράστῳ οὔσῃ ἄνθρωπος θνητὸς οὐ δύναται ἀντωπῆσαι [comp. Scherer, Le Ditheisme de Just. Rév. de Theol. 1856]. According to Iren. ii. 25, 4, God is indeterminabilis, nor can any one fully comprehend his nature by thinking; comp. Duncker, p. 11. Minuc. Fel. c. 18: Hic (Deus) nec videri potest, visu clarior est, nec comprehendi, tactu purior est, nec æstimari, sensibus, major est, infinitus, immensus et soli sibi tantus quantus est notus; nobis vero ad intellectum pectus angustum est, et ideo sic eum digne æstimamus, dum inestimabilem dicimus. Eloquar, quemadmodum sentio: magnitudinem Dei, que se putat nosse, minuit; qui non vult minuere, non novit. Nec nomen Deo quæras:, DEUS nomen est! Illic vocabulis opus est, quum per singulos propriis appellationum insignibus multitudo dirimenda est. Deo, qui solus est, Dei vocabulum totum est. Quem si patrem dixero, terrenum opineris; si regem, carnalem suspiceris; si dominum, intelliges utique mortalem. Aufer additamenta nominum, et perspicies ejus claritatem. Clement of Alexandria shows very distinctly, Strom. vii. p. 689, that we can attain to a clear perception of God only by laying aside, di' avaλvoewç, all finite ideas of the divine nature, till at last nothing but the abstract idea of unity remains. But lest we should content ourselves with the mere negation, we must throw ourselves (aπoppí þwμev έavтoús) into the greatness of Christ, in whom the glory of God was manifested, in order to obtain to some extent (åμŋуéлη) the knowledge of God (i. ç., in a practical and religious manner, not by speculation); for even then we learn only what God is not, not what he is (that is to say, if we speak of absolute knowledge). Comp. also the 12th and 13th chapters of the 5th book, from p. 692; in particular, p. 695, and c. i. p. 647: Δῆλον γὰρ μηδένα δύνασθαι παρὰ τὸν τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον τὸν θεὸν ἐναργῶς KаTaλaẞéσ0αι; he, therefore, gives the advice, ibid. p. 651: Tò de apa Sηtεiv περὶ θεοῦ ἂν μὴ εἰς ἔριν, ἀλλὰ εἰς εὕρεσιν τείνῃ, σωτήριόν ἐστι. Compare on this, Baur, Trinitätslehre, p. 191, sq., who remarks, that what is abstract in the idea of God is not declared by any of the older teachers of the church, Origen himself not excepted, more strongly and definitely than by Clement. But he by no means confined himself to the abstract. Origen, Contra Cels. vi. 65, Opp. i. p. 681, sq. shows that what is individual can not be described; for who in words could tell the difference between the sweetness of figs and the sweetness of dates? And De Princ. i. 1, 5, p. 50; Redepenning, p. 89, he says: Dicimus secundum veritatem, Deum incomprehensibilem esse atque inestimabilem. Si quid enim illud est, quod sentire vel intelligere de Deo potuerimus, multis longe modis eum meliorem esse ab eo quod sensimus necesse est credere. "As much as the brightness of the

*From these expressions we must not infer that the name of God was indifferent to Christians; on the contrary, the names given to God in the Scriptures were held to be most sacred: hence Origen contends against the position of Celsus, that one might call the highest being, Jupiter, or Zeus, or Sabaoth, or any Egyptian or Indian name: Contra Cels. vi. Opp. i. p. 320.

sun exceeds the dim light of a lantern, so much the glory of God surpasses our idea of it." Likewise Novatian says, De Trinit. c. 2: De hoc ergo ac de eis, quæ sunt ipsius et in eo sunt, nec mens hominis quæ sint, quanta sint et qualia sint, digne concipere potest, nec eloquentia sermonis humani æquabilem majestati ejus virtutem sermonis expromit. Ad cogitandam enim et ad eloquendam illius majestatem et eloquentia omnis merito muta est et mens omnis exigua est: major est enim mente ipsa, nec cogitari possit quantus sit: ne si potuerit cogitari, mente humana minor sit, qua concipi possit. Major est quoque omni sermone, nec edici possit: ne si potuerit edici, humana sermone minor sit, quo quum edicitur, et circumiri et colligi possit. Quidquid enim de illo cogitatum fuerit, minus ipso erit, et quidquid enuntiatum fuerit, minus illo comparatum circum ipsum erit. 'Sentire enim illum taciti aliquatenus possumus; ut autem ipse est, sermone explicare non possumus. Sive enim illum dixeris lucem, creaturam ipsius magis quam ipsum dixeris, etc. . . . . Quidquid omnino de illo retuleris, rem aliquam ipsius magis et virtutem quam ipsum explicaveris. Quid enim de eo condigne aut dicas aut sentias, qui omnibus et sermonibus major est? etc. This Christian scholasticism which pervades the first period, forms a striking contrast with the modern assurance of the old and new scholastic mode and style! Nevertheless, the fathers (and Origen in particular) also admit a spiritual vision of God, which is now mediated by Christ, but will at last be direct. Comp. infra, on Eschatology.

§ 38.

IDEALISM AND ANTHROPOMORPHISM. CORPOREITY OF GOD.

The educated mind desires to abstract from the nature of God every thing that reminds it of the finite or composite; sometimes it has even taken offense at the idea of the substantiality of God, out of a refined fear of reducing him to the level of created beings; but thus it runs into danger of dissipating the Deity into a mere abstract negation. In opposition to this idealizing tendency, the necessities of religion demand a real God for the world, for man, and for the human heart; and the bold and figurative language of pious emotion, as well as popular symbolical and anthropomorphitic expressions, compensated for what the idea of God lost in the way of negation. Both these tendencies, which have always advanced equal claims in the sphere of religious thought,' have their respective representatives in the first period of the History of Doctrines. On the one hand, the Alexandrian school, and Origen in particular, endeavored to remove from God every thing that seemed to draw him within the atmosphere of the earthly, or in any way to make him like men. On the other hand, Tertullian insisted so much on the idea of the substantiality of God, that he confounded it with his corporeity (though he by no means ascribed to him a gross, material body, like that of man)."