Obrazy na stronie
PDF
ePub

powers and faculties which designate a great mind, and that he has exhibited them in the plan which he formed for the general good. In it we shall discover a wisdom and penetration, a firmness and decision, a benevolence and goodness of heart, which will justify the conclusion, that he is unquestionably the greatest man that ever thought and acted upon earth. This will be our second consideration.

$88. Finally, if we can show, that the founder of Christianity lived in circumstances which would, in the natural way, have suppressed and suffocated all these faculties; if we can show that they were not developed according to the laws that usually regulate the formation of the mind; that, on the other hand, every thing appears to have been regulated by laws entirely new, and to be met with in the case of no other man; and that we cannot rationally and consistently account for the development of these extraordinary powers, without supposing an especial and unusual influence of the Deity himself; then we shall, as I think, be justified in looking upon the founder of Christianity as an extraordinary teacher, and honoring him as such. This will be the substance of our third consideration.

1. CHRIST'S PLAN NOT AN IMPRACTICABLE ONE.

89. The greatest and most benevolent project ceases to be the result of genuine wisdom and greatness of mind, as soon as it becomes a dazzling dream and it can be shown, that its author neither possessed human nature, nor had a proper knowledge of human circumstances and events, and hence, struck upon thoughts which the profound sage, under a conviction of the utter inutility of all his labor, would never dare to carry into execution. In this light some have endeavored to represent the plan of Jesus which has been described, and thus bring it into suspicion. Indeed, the idea, in itself considered, of acting in any way for the good of all, has been look

ed upon as a conceit rather splendid than practical. It has been alleged, that it is impossible even to express the religious notions, which it was Christ's object to make universal, in all languages, and bring them within the comprehension of all nations. It has been maintained, that a universal religion is as impossible a thing as a universal medicine, and that, considering the infinitely great differences necessarily prevalent among men in regard to thinking, judging, and perceiving, it is foolish to aim at producing the same convictions in all men, and warming their hearts with the same feelings; that, in general, diversities of judgement and opinion, are not so great evils as weak heads usually maintain; that, on the other hand, they quicken the spirit of investigation, and ultimately prove the means of leading to the discovery of truth; and hence, that he, who would take away this freedom of thought, and make all men harmonize in their decisions, not only betrays great ignorance of human nature, but would rob the human race of one of its most important and sacred prerogatives, and load it with the most horrible and insufferable chains; that it has been seen, that Jesus was quite unable to execute his plan; and that the Gospel did not effect that uniformity of conviction, that general peace, that exaltation of human nature, and that fraternal union among men, for which his plan was mainly intended; that, on the other hand, the wild extravagancies and the vices of every kind, together with the divisions, contentions, and endless disturbances, which always prevailed among Christians, and often proved highly destructive to their harmony, afford the clearest proof of the chimericalness of the idea of establishing universal peace among men, by uniting them in one religion, and educating them in conformity to the same principles and precepts.

These objections, which, in themselves considered, are indeed important, and, from experience, seem to acquire almost invincible strength, are very far from being new. They were early brought forward by Celsus, in his well known work against Christianity. In modern times, how

ever, they have often been repeated in a manner adapted to add to their force.* We will, therefore, reflect upon the subject, and see whether the idea of laboring for the good of all, generally speaking, contained in it any thing impracticable, and is to be reckoned among chimerical dreams; whether, in particular, the project of uniting all mankind in the same faith and religion, was a vain undertaking; and finally, whether Christianity, as taught by its founder and friends, was incapable of becoming a universal religion. From an illustration of these three points, the above objections will appear to be utterly futile.

$ 90. Is it therefore, generally speaking, possible for a man, by means of a benevolent project, to operate for the good of all ?-Were any one to think of forming a plan, the benevolent effects of which should be immediately perceptible to each individual, in order to make all mankind, without exception, happy in the same way, he would indeed engage in an impracticable thing, and give himself up to empty dreams. No one, however, who honestly uses words in their ordinary acceptation, understands plans of great universality, in so strict a sense. We should not say that a king acted in accordance with an empty plan, who resolved upon governing his subjects in such a manner, as to render them all happy, because it might be impossible for him to render each individual of them completely happy. On the other hand, every body would understand such a resolution as implying, that he labored with the greatest care and zeal to contribute to the welfare of his people, as far as the imperfection of human affairs would admit. If the majority of the subjects were rendered happy by the government of their prince, it would be all that could be expected, and no inference could be

Vid. Origen against Celsus, lib. III. p. 118, and lib. VIII. p. 425. [p. 454 and 795, Tom. I. Opp. de la Rue.] Those who have lately brought forward these objections anew, are sufficiently known. [The Wolfenbütt. Fragmentist, fragment second; "The impossibility of a revelation, to which all men can yield the assent of a well grounded faith;" Lessing's Beyträge zur Geschichte und litteratur, IV. 288-365; also printed in Doederlein's Fragmente und Antifragmente, II. 1—120, to which follows an answer, S. 121–304.]

drawn from the number of those who were either incapable of this happiness, or unwilling to enjoy it, to prove that his resolution to do good to all, was a chimera. To act by means of a benevolent plan therefore, for all, is to form a plan which may become useful to all, so far as human circumstances admit. It is to invent a plan of such general utility, that it can exert a greater or less influence upon the welfare of all, according as external circumstances favor its execution. In the formation of such a plan, therefore, respect is paid in the first place, to the imperfection of human affairs. He who projects such a plan never thinks of being able to exert as efficacious an influence upon every individual, and of doing every one as much good, as he would be glad to do.

As little can any one who contemplates the formation of a plan of benevolence for the benefit of all, think of rearing an institution, which shall in a manner accomplish the purpose at once. The greater the extent of a man's undertakings, the more difficulties will they involve, and the more time will they require for being carried into execution. This is especially the case with regard to those plans that have reference to enlightening and improving mankind. People do not readily relinquish those convictions and opinions which have once been adopted, and by various circumstances rendered dear and venerable. On the other hand, they usually adhere to them with an obstinate pertinacity, as well as to those customs and modes of action in which they were educated, and with which they are usually perfectly satisfied. It requires much time to reform a single man; how much more then will be necessary to renovate and regenerate a nation, or the whole human family? This view of the subject renders it perfectly evident, that he who delineates a plan of universal extent, cannot think of carrying it speedily into execution, but must fix upon a long series of years, or rather of centuries, for the gradual extension of his improvements. Such a plan, from the very fact of its great elevation and universality, can never be realized in the highest perfection to which the original con

ception must be carried, but there is a gradual and constant approximation in this respect. The question, therefore, whether it is possible for a man, by means of a benevolent plan, to operate for the good of all his race, accurately stated, is as follows: Is it possible for a man to invent a plan, the general utility of which shall be such, that, if gradually carried into execution, it shall, either directly or indirectly, exert an important and universal influence upon the welfare of the human race at large?

Now he who resolves to maintain the impracticability of forming and executing such a plan, undertakes to prove a great deal. He must either show, that no human mind can ever possess so much power, wisdom, and comprehensive benevolence, as a plan of this character presupposes; or he must be able to show, that the human race can never be thrown into those circumstances, and those relations to each other which will enable a benevolent plan to obtain a universal influence. It appears that neither of these positions can be proved in a convincing

manner.

The

For how can the first be proved? It is evident that we are not able before hand and from general principles, to determine with the requisite certainty, what is possible to the powers of the human mind and what not. human mind has invented things and performed acts, which would previously have been considered as altogether impossible. It cannot be denied that history presents us with very unexpected examples of the most disinterested attachment to duty, the most active benevolence, and the most magnanimous sacrifices for the public weal. Every rational being therefore possesses in kind, the fundamental powers, whether of a moral or physical character, requisite to the formation of such a plan, though in an endless variety of degrees. Now by what means can it be proved, that these powers will never be met with in the high degree, nor cultivated to the perfection, necessary to the formation of a plan of the above description? Who has explored all the depths of the human mind, and thoroughly examined all the circumstances and relations

« PoprzedniaDalej »