either what to expect or how to act. Rewards and punishments would ceafe to be fuch-would become accidents. Like the ftroke of a thunderbolt, or the difcovery of a mine, like a blank or benefit ticket in a lottery, they would occafion pain or pleafure wher they happened; but following in no known order, from any particular courfe of action, they could have no previous influence or effect upon the conduct.

An attention to general rules, therefore, is included in the very idea of reward and punishment. Confequently whatever reason there is to expect future reward and punishment at the hand of God, there is the fame reason to believe, that he will proceed in the diftribution of it by general rules.

Before we profecute the confideration of general confequences any farther, it may be proper to antic-ipate a reflection, which will be apt enough to fuggeft itself in the progrefs of our argument.

As the general confequence of an action, upon which fo much of the guilt of a bad action depends, confifts in the example; it fhould feem, that, if the action be done with perfect fecrecy, fo as to furnish no bad example, that part of the guilt drops off. In the cafe of fuicide, for inftance, if a man can fo manage matters, as to take away his own life, without being known or fufpected to have done fo, he is not chargeable with any mifchief from the example; nor does his punishment feem neceffary, in order to fave the authority of any general rule.

In the first place, those who reafon in this manner do not obferve that they are setting up a general rule, of all others the leaft to be endured; namely, that fecrecy, whenever fecrecy is practicable, will justify any action.

Were fuch a rule admitted, for inftance, in the cafe above produced, is there not reafon to fear that people would be disappearing perpetually ?..

In the next place, I would wish them to be well fatisfied about the points proposed in the following queries:

1. Whether the fcriptures do not teach us to expect that at the general judgment of the world, the moft fecret actions will be brought to light?*

2. For what purpose can this be, but to make them the objects of reward and punishment?

3. Whether being fo brought to light, they will not fall under the operation of thofe equal and impartial rules, by which God will deal with his creatures?

They will then become examples, whatever they be now; and require the fame treatment from the judge and governor of the moral world, as if they had been detected from the first.

Chapter VIII.

THE CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL CON SEQUENCES PURSUED.

THE general confequence of

any action may be estimated, by afking what would be the confequence, if the fame fort of actions were generally permitted. But fuppofe they were, and a thousand fuch actions perpetrated under this permiffion; is it juft to charge a fingle action with the collected guilt and mifchief of the whole thoufand? I anfwer, that the reafon for prohibiting and punishing an action (and this reafon may be called the guilt of the action, if you please) will always be in proportion to the whole mischief that would arife from the general

"In the day when God fhall judge the fecrets of men by Jefus Chrift." Rom. xi. 16—“Judge nothing before the time until the Lord come, who will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifeft the counfels of the heart." 1. Cor. iv. 5€

impunity and toleration of actions of the fame fort.

"Whatever is expedient is right." But then it must be expedient upon the whole, at the long run, in all its effects, collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious, that, in computing confequences, it makes no difference in what way or at what distance they ensue.

To impress this doctrine upon the minds of young readers, and to teach them to extend their views beyond the immediate mischief of a crime, I fhall here fubjoin a string of inftances, in which the particular confequence is comparatively infignificant; and where the malignity of the crime, and the feverity with which human laws purfue it, is almost entirely founded upon the general confequence.

The particular confequence of coining is, the lofs of a guinea, or of half a guinea, to the perfon who receives the counterfeit money; the general confequence (by which I mean the confequence that would enfue, if the fame practice were generally permitted) is to abolish the ufe of money.

The particular confequence of forgery is, a damage of twenty or thirty pounds to the man who accepts the forged bill; the general confequence is the ftoppage of paper currency.

The particular confequence of sheep-stealing, or horse-stealing is, a lofs to the owner, to the amount of the value of the sheep or horfe ftolen; the general confequence is, that the land could not be occupied, nor the market fupplied with this kind of stock.

The particular confequence of breaking into a house empty of inhabitants is, the lofs of a pair of filver candlesticks, or a few spoons; the general confequence is, that nobody could leave their house empty.

The particular confequence of smuggling may be a deduction from the national fund, too minute for

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computation: the general confequence is, the deftruction of one entire branch of public revenue; a proportionable increase of the burthen upon other branches; and the ruin of all fair and open trade in the article fmuggled.

The particular confequence of an officer's breaking his parole is, the lofs of a prifoner, who was poffibly not worth keeping; the general confequence is, that this mitigation of captivity would be refufed to all others.

And what proves inconteftibly the fuperior importance of general confequences is, that crimes are the fame, and treated in the fame manner, though the particular confequence be very different. The crime ånd fate of the house-breaker is the fame whether his booty be five pounds or fifty. And the reason is, that the general confequence is the fame

The want of this diftinction between particular and general confequences, or rather the not fufficiently attending to the latter, is the cause of that perplexity which we meet with in ancient moralifts. On the one hand, they were fenfible of the abfurdity of pronouncing actions good or evil, without regard to the good or evil they produced. On the other hand, they were startled at the conclusions to which a steady adherence to confequences feemed fometimes to conduct them. To relieve this difficulty, they contrived the To peor, or the honeftum, by which terms they meant to constitute a measure of right, diftinct from utility. Whilft the utile ferved them, that is, whilft it correfponded with their habitual notions of the rectitude of actions, they went by it. When they fell in with fuch cafes as thofe mentioned in the fixth Chapter, they took leave of their guide, and resorted to the boneftum. The only account they could give of the matter was, that these actions might be useful; but, because they were not at the fame time honefta, they were by no means to be deemed juft or right.

From the principles delivered in this and the twọ preceding Chapters, a maxim may be explained, which is in every man's mouth, and in moft men's without meaning, viz. " not to do evil that good may come :" that is, let us not violate a general rule for the fake of any particular good confequence we may expect. Which is for the most part a falutary caution, the advantage feldom compenfating for the violation of the rule. Strictly speaking, that cannot be "evil" from which "good comes;" but in this way, and with a view to the diftinction between particular and general confequences, it may.

We will conclude this fubject of confequences with the following reflection. A man may imagine, that any action of his, with respect to the public, must be inconfiderable: fo alfo is the agent. If his crime produce but a small effect upon the univerfal intereft, his punishment or deftruction bears a small proportion to the fum of happiness and mifery in the creation.

Chapter IX.

OF RIGHT.

RIGHT and obligation are reciprocal; that is,

wherever there is a right in one perfon, there is a correfponding obligation upon others. If one man has a "right" to an eftate, others are "obliged" to abftain from it: If parents have a "right" to reverence from their children, children are "obliged" to reverence their parents; and fo in all other inftances.

Nów, because moral obligation depends, as we have feen, upon the will of God, right, which is correlative to it, muft depend upon the fame. Right therefore fignifies, confiftency with the will of God.