is enough; for the question with the petitioner is not from which, out of many motives, God may grant his petition, or in what particular manner he is moved by the fupplications of his creatures; but whether it be confiftent with his nature to be moved at all, and whether there be any conceivable motives, which may difpofe the divine will to grant the petitioner what he wants, in confequence of his praying for it. It is fufficient for the petitioner that he gain his end. It is not neceffary to devotion, perhaps not very confiftent with it, that the circuit of causes, by which his prayers prevail, fhould be known to the petitioner, much less that they should be prefent to his imagination at the time. All that is neceffary is, that there be no impoffibility apprehended in the matter.

Thus much must be conceded to the objection: that prayer cannot reasonably be offered to God with all the fame views, with which we oftentimes addrefs our entreaties to men (views which are not commonly or eafily feparated from it) viz. to inform them of our wants or defires; to tease them out by importunity; to work upon their indolence or compaffion, in order to perfuade them to do what they ought to have done before, or ought not to do at all.

But fuppofe there exifted a prince, who was known by his fubjects to act, of his own accord, always and invariably for the best; the fituation of a petitioner, who folicited a favour or pardon from fuch a prince, would fufficiently resemble ours: and the queftion with him, as with us, would be, whether, the character of the prince being confidered, there remained any chance that he fhould obtain from him by prayer, what he would not have received without it. I do not conceive, that the character of fuch a prince would neceffarily exclude the effect of his fubjects' prayers; for when that prince reflected, that the earnestness and humility of the fupplication had generated in the fuppliant a frame of mind, upon which the pardon or favour afked would produce a permanent

and active sense of gratitude; that the granting of it to prayer would put others upon praying to him, and by that means preserve the love and fubmiffion of his fubjects, upon which love and fubmiffion, their own happiness, as well as his glory, depended; that, befide that the memory of the particular kindness would be heightened and prolonged by the anxiety with which it had been fued for, prayer had in other refpects fo difpofed and prepared the mind of the petitioner, as to render capable of future fervices him who before was unqualified for any: might not that prince, I fay, although he proceeded upon no other confiderations than the ftrict rectitude and expedi ency of the measure, grant a favour or pardon to this man, which he did not grant to another, who was too proud, too lazy, or too bufy, too indifferent whether he received it or not, or too infenfible of the fovereign's abfolute power to give or to withhold it, ever to afk for it; or even to the philofopher, who, from an opinion of the fruitleffnefs of all addreffes to a prince of the character which he had formed to himself, refused in his own example and difcouraged in others, all outward returns of gratitude, acknowledgements of duty, or application to the fovereign's mercy or bounty; the difufe of which (feeing affections do not long fubfift which are never expreffed) was followed by a decay of loyalty and zeal amongst his fubjects, and threatened to end in a forgetfulness of his rights, and a contempt of his authority? Thefe, together with other affignable confiderations, and fome perhaps infcrutable, and even inconceivable by the perfons upon whom his will was to be exercised, might pass in the mind of the prince, and move his counfels; whilft nothing in the mean time dwelt in the petitioner's thoughts, but a fenfe of his own grief and wants; of the power and goodnefs from which alone he was to look for relief; and of his obligation to endeavour, by future obedience, to render that perfon propitious to his happiness, in whofe

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hands, and at the difpofal of whose mercy, he found himfelf to be.

The objection to prayer fuppofes, that a perfectly wife being muft neceffarily be inexorable: but where is the proof, that inexorability is any part of perfect wisdom; efpecially of that wisdom, which is explained to confist in bringing about the moft beneficial ends by the wifeft means?

The objection likewise affumes another principle, which is attended with confiderable difficulty and obfcurity, namely, that upon every occafion there is one, and only one mode of acting for the best; and that the divine will is neceffarily determined and confined to that mode: both which pofitions prefume a knowledge of univerfal nature, much beyond what we are capable of attaining. Indeed when we apply to the divine nature fuch expreffions as these, "God must always do what is right,' ""God cannot, from the moral perfection and neceffity of his nature, act otherwise than for the best," we ought to apply them with much indeterminatenefs and referve; or rather, we ought to confefs, that there is fomething in the subject out of the reach of our apprehenfion: for in our apprehenfion, to be under a neceffity of acting according to any rule, is inconfiftent with free agency; and it makes no difference, which we can understand, whether the neceffity be internal or external, or that the rule is the rule of perfect rectitude.

But efficacy is afcribed to prayer without the proof, we are told, which can alone in fuch a fubject produce conviction, the confirmation of experience. Concerning the appeal to experience, I fhall content myfelf with this remark, that if prayer were fuffered to difturb the order of fecond caufes appointed in the universe too much, or to produce its effect with the fame regularity that they do, it would introduce a change into human affairs, which in fome important refpects would be evidently for the worfe. Who, for example, would labour, if his neceffities could be

fupplied with equal certainty by prayer? How few would contain within any bounds of moderation those paffions and pleasures, which at prefent are checked only by difeafe or the dread of it, if prayer would infallibly reftore health? In fhort, if the efficacy of prayer were fo conftant and obfervable as to be relied upon before-hand, it is cafy to forcfee that the conduct of mankind would, in proportion to that reliance, become careless and diforderly. It is poffible in the nature of things, that our prayers may, in many inftances, be efficacious, and yet our experience of their efficacy be dubious and obfcure. There fore, if the light of nature inftruct us by any other arguments to hope for effect from prayer; ftill more, if the fcriptures authorize these hopes by promises of acceptance; it seems not a fufficient reafon for calling in queftion the reality of fuch effects, that our obfervations of them are ambiguous: efpecially fince it appears probable, that this very ambiguity is neceffary to the happiness and safety of human life.

But fome, whofe objections do not exclude all prayer, are offended with the mode of prayer in use amongst us, and with many of the fubjects, which are almost universally introduced into public worship, and recommended to private devotion. To pray for particular favours by name, is to dictate, it has been faid, to divine wisdom and goodness: to intercede for others, especially for whole nations and empires, is ftill worfe; it is to prefume that we poffefs fuch an interest with the Deity, as to be able, by our applications, to bend the most important of his counfels; and that the happiness of others, and even the prof perity of communities, is to depend upon this intereft and upon our choice. Now how unequal foever our knowledge of the divine economy may be to the folution of this difficulty, which requires perhaps a comprehenfion of the entire plan, and of all the ends of God's moral government, to explain fatisfactorily, we can understand one thing concerning it, that it is after all nothing more than the making of one man

the inftrument of happiness and misery to another ; which is perfectly of a piece with the courfe and order that obtain, and which we must believe were intended to obtain, in human affairs. Why may we not be affifted by the prayers of other men, who are beholden for our fupport to their labour? Why may not our happiness be made in fome cafes to depend upon the interceffion, as it certainly does in many, upon the good offices of our neighbours? The happiness and mifery of great numbers we fee oftentimes at the difpofal of one man's choice, or liable to be much affected by his conduct: what greater difficulty is there in fuppofing, that the prayers of an individual may avert a calamity from multitudes, or be accepted to the benefit of whole communities?

Chapter III.

OF THE DUTY AND EFFICACY OF PRAYER, AS REPRESENTED IN SCRIPTURE.

THE reader will have obferved, that the reflections ftated in the preceding Chapter, whatever truth and weight they may be allowed to contain, rife many of them no higher, than to negative arguments in favour of the propriety of addreffing prayer to God. To prove that the efficacy of prayer is not inconfiftent with the attributes of the Deity, does not prove that prayers are actually efficacious; and in the want of that unequivocal teftimony which experience alone could afford to this point, (but which we do not poffefs, and have feen good reafon why we are not to expect) the light of nature leaves us to controverted probabilities, drawn from the impulfe by which all mankind have been almost univerfally prompted to devotion, and from fome beneficial purposes, which, it is conceived, may be better anfwered by the audience of prayer, than by any other mode of communicating the fame bleffings.