ing relief in a voluntary death. The following text, in particular, ftrongly combats all impatience of diftrefs, of which the greateft is that which prompts to acts of fuicide: "Confider him that endured fuch contradiction of finners against himself, left ye be wearied and faint in your minds." I would offer my comment upon this paffage in these two queries; 1ft, whether a Cliriftian convert, who had been impelled by the continuance and urgency of his fufferings, to deftroy his own life, would not have been thought by the author of this text, "to have been weary," "to have fainted in his mind," to have fallen off from that example, which is here propofed to the meditation of Chriftians in diftreis?" And yet, 2dly, whether fuch an act would not have been attended with all the circumftances of mitigation, which can excufe or extenuate fuicide at this day?

3. The conduct of the Apoftles, and of the Chriftians of the apoftolic age, affords no obfcure indication of their fentiments upon this point. They lived, we are fure, in a confirmed perfuafion of the existence, as well as of the happiness of a future ftate. They experienced in this world every extremity of external injury and diftrefs. To die was gain. The change which death brought with it was, in their expectation, infinitely beneficial. Yet it never, that we can find, entered into the intention of one of them, to haften this change by an act of fuicide: from which it is difficult to,fay what motive could have fo univerfally withheld them, except an apprehenfion of fome unlawfulness in the expedient.

Having ftated what we have been able to collect, in oppofition to the lawfulness of fuicide, by way of direct proof, it seems unneceffary to open a feparate controverfy with all the arguments which are made ufe of to defend it; which would only lead us into a repetition of what has been offered already. The following argument, however, being fomewhat more artificial and impofing than the reft, as well as diftinct from the general confideration of the subject, cannot fo properly be paffed over. If we deny to the individual a right over his own life, it feems impoffible, it is faid, to reconcile

with the law of nature that right which the ftate claims and exercises over the lives of its fubjects, when it ordains or inflicts capital punishments. For this right,like all other juft authority in the ftate, can only be derived from the compact and virtual consent of the citizens which compofe the ftate; and it seems self-evident, if any principle in morality be fo, that no one, by his confent, can transfer to another a right which he does not poffefs himself. It will be equally difficult to account for the power of the ftate to commit its fubjects to the dangers of war, and to expofe their lives without fcruple in the field of battle; efpecially in offenfive hoftilities, in which the privileges of self-defence cannot be pleaded with any appearance of truth; and ftill more difficult to explain, how in fuch, or in any circumftances, prodigality of life can be a virtue, if the prefervation of it be a duty of our nature.

This whole reasoning fets out from one error, namely, that the ftate acquires its right over the life of the fubject from the fubject's own confent, as a part of what originally and perfonally belonged to himself, and which he has made over to his governors. The truth is, the state derives this right, neither from the confent of the fubject, nor through the medium of that confent, but, as I may fay, immediately from the donation of the Deity. Finding that fuch a power in the fovereign of the community is expedient, if not neceffary for the community itself, it is juftly prefumed to be the will of God, that the fovereign fhould possess and exercise it. It is this prefumption which conftitutes the right; it is the fame indeed which constitutes every other; and if there were the like reafons to authorize the prefumption in the cafe of private perfons, fuicide would be as juftifiable as war, or capital executions. But, until it can be fhown, that the power over human life may be converted to the fame advantage in the hands of individuals over their own, as in those of the state over the lives of its fubjects, and that it may be entrusted with equal safety to both, there is no room for arguing from the exiftence of fuch a right in the latter, to the toleration of it in the former.

BOOK V.

Duties towards God.

Chapter I.

DIVISION OF THESE DUTIES.

IN one fenfe, every duty is a Duty towards

God, fince it is his will which makes it a duty: but there are fome duties, of which God is the object as well as the author: and these are peculiarly, and in a more appropriated fenfe, called Duties towards God.

That filent piety, which confifts in a habit of tracing out the Creator's wifdom and goodness in the objects around us, or in the hiftory of his difpenfations; of referring the bleffings we enjoy to his bounty, and of reforting in our diftreffes to his fuccour, may poffibly be more acceptable to the Deity, than any visible expreffions of devotion whatever. Yet thefe latter (which, although they may be excelled, are not fuperfeded by the former) compose the only part of the fubject which admits of direction or difquifition from a moralist.

Our duty towards God, fo far as it is external, is divided into worship and reverence. God is the immediate object of both: and the difference between them is, that the one confifts in action, the other in forbearance. When we go to church on the Lord's day, led thither by a fenfe of duty towards God, we perform an act of worship: when, from the fame motive, we reft in a journey upon that day, we difcharge a duty of reverence.

Divine worship is made up of adoration, thanksgiving and prayer. But, as what we have to offer concerning the two former, may be obferved of prayer, we fhall make that the title of the following Chapters, and the direct fubject of our confideration.

Chapter II.

OF THE DUTY AND OF THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, SO FAR AS THE SAME APPEAR FROM THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

WHEN one man defires to obtain any thing of another, he betakes himself to entreaty: and this may be obferved of mankind in all ages and countries of the world. Now what is univerfal, may be called natural; and it feems probable, that God, as our fupreme governor, fhould expect that towards himfelf, which, by a natural impulfe, or by the irresistible order of our conftitution, he has prompted us to pay to every other being on whom we depend.

The fame may be faid of thanksgiving.

Prayer likewife is neceffary to keep up in the minds of mankind a fenfe of God's agency in the universe, and of their own dependency upon him.

Yet after all, the duty of prayer depends upon its efficacy: for I confefs myfelf unable to conceive, how any man can pray, or be obliged to pray, who expects nothing from his prayers; but who is perfuaded at the time he utters his request, that it cannot poffibly produce the finalleft impreffion upon the Being to whom it is addreffed, or advantage to himself. Now the efficacy of prayer imports, that we obtain fomething in confequence of praying, which we fhould not have received without prayer; against all expectation of which, the following objection has been often and feriously alleged. "If it be moft

agreeable to perfect wifdom and juftice, that we fhould receive what we defire, God, as perfectly wife and juft, will give it to us without afking: if it be not agrecable to thefe attributes of his nature, our entreaties cannot move him to give it us; and it were impious to expect that they should." In fewer words, thus; "If what we request be fit for us, we fhall have it without praying; if it be not fit for us, we cannot obtain it by praying." This objection admits but of one anfwer, namely, that it may be agreeable to perfect wisdom, to grant that to our prayers, which it would not have been agreeable to the fame wifdom to have given us without praying for. But what virtue, you will afk, is there in prayer, which fhould make a favour confiftent with wifdom, which would not have been fo without it? To this queftion, which contains the whole difficulty attending the fubject, the following poffibilities are offered in reply.

1. A favour granted to prayer may be more apt, on that very account, to produce good effects upon the perfon obliged. It may hold in the divine bounty, what experience has raised into a proverb in the collation of human benefits, that what is obtained without afking, is oftentimes received without gratitude.

2. It may be confiftent with the wifdom of the Deity to withhold his favours till they be afked for, as an expedient to encourage devotion in his rational creation, in order thereby to keep up and circulate a knowledge and fenfe of their dependency up

on him.

3. Prayer has a natural tendency to amend the petitioner himself; and thus to bring him within the rules, which the wifdom of the Deity has prefcribed to the difpenfation of his favours.

If thefe, or any other affignable fuppofitions, ferve to remove the apparent repugnancy between the fuccefs of prayer and the character of the Deity, it