the vote is given; the wages of proftitution; the reward of any crime, after the crime is committed, ought, if promised, to be paid. For the fin and mif chief, by this fuppofition, are over, and will be nei ther more nor lefs for the performance of the promife. In like manner, a promise does not lofe its obliga tion, merely because it proceeded from an unlawful motive. A certain perfon, in the lifetime of his wife, who was then fick, had paid his addresses, and promifed marriage to another woman; the wife died, and the woman demands performance of the promife. The man, who, it feems, had changed his mind, either felt or pretended doubts concerning the obliga tion of fuch a promife, and referred his cafe to Bilb op SANDERSON, the most eminent in this kind of knowledge, of his time. Bishop SANDERSON, after writing a a differtation upon the queftion, adjudged the promife to be void. In which, however, upon our principles, he was wrong; for, however criminal the affection might be, which induced the prome, the performance, when it was demanded, was lawful, which is the only lawfulness required.

A promife cannot be deemed unlawful, where it produces, when performed, no effect, beyond what would have taken place, had the promise never been made. And this is the fingle cafe, in which the obligation of a promife will justify a conduct, which, unless it had been promifed, would be unjuft. A captive may lawfully recover his liberty, by a promife of neutrality; for his. conqueror takes nothing by the promife, which he might not have fecured by his death or confinement: and neutrality would be innocent in him, although criminal in another. It is manifeft, however, that promises which come into the place of coercion, can extend no farther than to paffive compliances; for coercion itfelf could compel no more. Upon the fame principle, promifes of fecrecy ought not to be violated, although the public would derive advantage from the discovery. Such promises contain no unlawfulness in them, to deftroy

their obligation; for, as information would not have been imparted upon any other condition, the public lofe nothing by the promise, which they would have gained without it.

3. Promises are not binding, where they contradict a former promise.

Because the performance is then unlawful, which refolves this cafe into the laft.

4. Promifes are not binding before acceptance; that is, before notice given to the promifee; for, where the promife is beneficial, if notice be given, acceptance may be prefumed. Until the promife be communicated to the promifee, it is the fame only as a refolution in the mind of the promifer, which may be altered at pleasure. For no expectation has been excited, therefore none can be difappointed.

But fuppofe I declare my intention to a third pérfon, who, without any authority from me, conveys my declaration to the promifee; is that fuch a notice as will be binding upon me? It certainly is not: for I have not done that which conftitutes the effence of a promise I have not voluntarily excited expectation. 5. Promifes are not binding which are released by the promisee.

This is evident; but it may be fometimes doubted who is the promifee. If I give a promise to A, of a place or vote for B; as to a father for his fon; to an uncle for his nephew; to a friend of mine, for a relation or friend of his; then A is the promifce, whose confent I must obtain, to be released from the engagement.

If I promise a place or vote to B by A, that is, if A be a mellenger to convey the promife, as if I fhould fay, "you may tell B, that he fhall have this place, or may depend upon my vote;" or if A be employed to introduce B's requeft, and I anfwer in any terms which amount to a compliance with it; then B is the promisec.

Promises to one perfon, for the benefit of another, are not released by the death of the promisee. For

his death neither makes the performance impracticable, nor implies any confent to release the promiser from it.

6. Erroneous promises are not binding in certain cafes; as,

First, Where the error proceeds from the mistake or misrepresentation of the promisee.

Because, a promifer evidently fuppofes the truth of the account which the promisee relates in order to obtain it. A beggar folicits your charity by a ftory of the most pitiable distress-you promise to relieve him, if he will call again; in the interval you discover his story to be made up of lies; this discovery, no doubt, releases you from your promife. One who wants your fervice, defcribes the business or office for which he would engage you; you promise to undertake it; when you come to enter upon it, you find the profits lefs, the labour more, or some material circumftance different from the account he gave you-In fuch cafe you are not bound by your promife.

Second, When the promise is understood by the promifee to proceed upon a certain fuppofition, or when the promifer apprehended he fo understood it, and that fuppofition turns out to be falfe; then the promise is not binding.

This intricate rule will be beft explained by an example. A father receives an account from abroad of the death of his only fon-foon after which he promifes his fortune to his nephew: The account turns out to be falfe-the father, we fay, is released from his promife; not merely because he never would have made it, had he known the truth of the cafe-for that alone will not do-but because the nephew also himself understood the promise to proceed upon the fuppofition of his coufin's death, or at leaft his uncle thought he fo understood it; and could not think otherwife. The promise proceeded upon this fuppofition in the promifer's own apprehenfion, and as he believed, in the apprehenfion of

both parties; and this belief of his is the precife cir. cumftance which fets him free. The foundation of the rule is plainly this; a man is bound only to fatisfy the expectation which he intended to excite; whatever condition, therefore, he intended to fub. ject that expectation to, becomes an effential condition of the promise.

Errors, which come not within this description, do not annul the obligation of a promife. I promise a candidate my vote; prefently another candidate appears, for whom I certainly would have referved it, had I been acquainted with his defign. Here, therefore, as before, my promise proceeded from an error; and I never fhould have given such a promife, had I been aware of the truth of the cafe, as it has turned out; but the promifee did not know thishe did not receive the promise fubject to any fuch condition, or as proceeding from any fuch fuppofition; nor did I at the time imagine he fo received it. This error, therefore, of mine, muft fall upon my own head, and the promise be obferved notwithstanding. A father promises a certain fortune with his daughter, fuppofing himself to be worth fo much; his circumftances turn out, upon examination, worse than he was aware of. Here again the promife was erroneous, but, for the reason affigned in the laft cafe, will nevertheless be obligatory.

The cafe of erroneous promifes is attended with fome difficulty; for to allow every mistake, or change of circumftances to diffolve the obligation of a promife, would be to allow a latitude, which might evacuate the force of almost all promises; and, on the other hand, to gird the obligation fo tight, as to make no allowances for manifeft and fundamental errors, would, in many inftances, be productive of great hardship and abfurdity.

It has long been controverted amongst moralifts, whether promises be binding, which are extorted by violence or fear. The obligation of all promises re

sults, we have seen, from the neceffity or the use of that confidence which mankind repofe in them. The queftion, therefore, whether these promises are binding, will depend upon this, whether mankind, upon the whole, are benefited by the confidence placed in fuch promises? A highwayman attacks you-and, being difappointed of his booty, threatens or prepares to murder you; you promife, with many folemn affeverations, that, if he will fpare your life, he shall find a purse of money left for him at a place appointed. Upon the faith of this promife he forbears from farther violence. Now, your life was faved by the confidence reposed in a promise extorted by fear; and the lives of many others may be faved by the fame. This is a good confequence. On the other hand, confidence in promifes like thefe, greatly facilitates the perpetration of robberies. They may be made the inftruments of almoft unlimited extortion. This is a bad confequence; and in the queftion between the importance of these oppofite confequences refides the doubt concerning the obligation of fuch promises.

There are other cafes which are plainer; as where a magiftrate confines a disturber of the public peace in jail, till he promise to behave better; or a prisoner of war promises, if fet at liberty, to return within a certain time. Thefe promifes, fay moralifts, are binding, because the violence or durefs is juft; but, the truth is, because there is the fame ufe of confidence in these promifes, as of confidence in the promifes of a perfon at perfect liberty. `

Vows are promises to God. The obligation cannot be made out upon the fame principle as that of other promises. The violation of them, nevertheless, implies a want of reverence to the Supreme Being; which is enough to make it finful.

There appears no command or encouragement in the Christian fcriptures to make vows; much less any authority to break through them, when they are