TAIT'S

EDINBURGH MAGAZINE.

JANUARY, 1849.

ENGLISH AND DUTCH IN THE INDIAN ARCHIPELAGO.*

To explain and illustrate the position we at present occupy in the Oriental Archipelago, it may be useful to glance over that series of negotiations which arose out of the treaty of 1824, between Great Britain and the Netherlands. In what circumstances the treaty itself originated, most persons will remember. We need scarcely, therefore, recapitulate the historical facts that may be said to fill up the interval between the conquest of the Dutch colonies by the arms of England, and the conclusion of that convention the principal effects and consequences of which it is the object of the present article to describe.

consequently took place which it was foreseen would inevitably lead to hostilities, unless some step were taken to check the aggressive policy of the Dutch authorities on the one hand, and the indignant and resentful spirit generated in the old English residents and merchants on the other.

It was for the accomplishment of this purpose that the two Governments invested their representatives with full powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty which should thenceforward determine the relative situations of the English and Dutch in the Indian Archipelago, regulate their commercial intercourse, and prescribe the limits within which the colonising energies of the contracting parties should be confined. The statesmen entrusted with the framing of this treaty were persons of remarkable abilities. Experienced in diplomacy, and sincerely desirous of putting an end to the differences between the two countries, they, on the completion, congratulated each other on having made everything clear for the future, and, as an expression of this feeling, exchanged notes, half complimentary, half explanatory, which may be regarded as a supplement to the convention.

When, on the establishment of the general peace, Holland recovered her possessions in the Indian Archipelago, the merchants of this country flattered themselves that, owing to the generous policy pursued by our Cabinet, they would be suffered to enjoy more than ordinary privileges and respect. Indeed, the development of the resources of the islands, and the general advancement of civilization, depended greatly on their capital and energy. Extraordinary progress had been made by the natives during our occupation of Java, Borneo, Celebes, and the Moluccas; and they still, through inclination and preference, desired the But, as has long been painfully felt by diplomatists, co-operation of our countrymen in all those social un- there is no congeries of articles, no armadillo cuirass of dertakings which could be carried on without the in-language through which the golden point of interest tervention of Government.

will not find or make an opening. The bloody PandeJealousies almost necessarily arose out of this state monium of war and conquest is paved with treaties. of things between the new and the old masters of the There may, up to a certain point, be honesty in their country, between those whom an equivocal sense of negotiators-that is, they may be sincere in their enequity had invested with supreme authority, and the deavours to prevent a hostile collision between their too liberal victors who voluntarily consented to re-respective Governments; but because each party seeks linquish the advantageous position they had won for to gain as much, and concede as little, as possible, the themselves by arms. Besides, the unpleasant conscious- spirit of selfishness insensibly infuses itself into the ness was ever present to the minds of the Nether-document, and prevents the real completion of that landers, that they owed the restoration of their colonies structure of amity which is the mark presumed to be entirely to the moderation of an all-powerful State, aimed at. Treaties may consequently be regarded as which, from several positions it had taken up in their the stratagems of peace. To secure advantages for neighbourhood, small, but not insignificant, seemed their own country is the object of diplomatists as well perpetually to watch their proceedings. The treaty as generals; and greater and more solid victories have of 1817, designed to put an end to these jealousies, sometimes been gained by the pen than by the sword. only augmented them, and the accidental establishment Here, however, nearly all men are disciples of Machiaof one settlement at Singapore completed, in the eyes velli. The Government which has the power to enforce of Holland, the cycle of our delinquencies. Events "its will is distinct and explicit, because it does not fear

* I. Coup d'œil Général sur les Possessions Neerlandaise dans l'Inde Archipelagique. Par C. J. Temminck. 1816.

II. Le Monition des Indes Orientales et Occidentales. Publier sous les Auspices de S.A.R. Monseigneur Prince Henri dès Fays Bas, avec le co-operation de plusieurs Membres de la Société des Arts et des Sciences à Batavia. Par le Baron Melvill,

VOL. XVI,-NO. CLXXXI.

A

to make known what it aims at. On the other hand, || ment from the duty of twenty-five per cent., which

the weaker State courts obscurity, labours to provide itself with concealed loopholes, and, while professing submissiveness and probity, secretly lays snares for the feet of its bolder though less wary ally. For this reason, when time and circumstances have let in light upon their interior organization, it is exceedingly curious to observe what a network of fraud and duplicity most treaties are. Nothing in them is what it seems. In the first place, the friendly princes in whose names they are concluded, often cordially detest each other; and secondly, the countries represented by the diplomatists would some time rejoice at nothing so much as at the downfall of the rival whom they are compelled to treat ostensibly as a friend.

Consequently, the history of treaties is too frequently the history of the most flagrant delusions and insults which mankind have ever put upon each other. We all know that among the worst imperfections of language is its inadequacy to paint ideas so as to guard against involuntary misconceptions; but in diplomacy language usually lies less open to blame than the deceitfulness with which it is employed. Nevertheless, the greatest source of evil is the perverse ingenuity of men who, having entered into an agreement, immediately exercise their utmost ingenuity to invent interpretations by which they may twist the meaning of the instrument to their own advantage.

they had been previously accustomed to levy. Finding, therefore, that the new treaty in no way diminished the vexations which had long harassed our trade, the English captain proceeded to Singapore and other ports, where he disposed of his merchandise in the best way he could. In the October following, a second attempt, with the same result, was made by Captain Popham, in the Hero, which, like the Hope, sailed under Dutch colours. He was, morcover, informed that, had his colours been English, the duty charged might have been fifty instead of twenty-five per cent.

When news of these first infractions of the treaty arrived in England, complaints were immediately addressed to Ministers; and, in the month of February, 1825, Mr. Canning, in a very mild and temperate note, represented the injustice of the proceeding to Mr. Falck, then Dutch ambassador in London. The reply of this gentleman, likewise intended to be polite and conciliatory, is highly characteristic of the manner of Dutch diplomatists. It treats the formal convention entered into as a mere nullity, and supposes the two Governments to be still invested with the power of independent action. The affectation of manliness likewise betrays the writer into a tone highly unbecoming, and which would be considered insolent, but that it appears to proceed from an infirmity inherent in the statesmen of the Netherlands. At least it pervades all their communications in the correspondence on the affairs of the Indian Archipelago, while the amenity and moderation of power breathe through the English notes. Our statesmen are evidently possessed by extreme solicitude not to wound the susceptibility of a friendly Government, sufficiently powerful to command respect, but too weak to awaken jealousy. On the other hand, the Dutch diplomatists, apprehensive that extreme suavity might be misinterpreted, are spirited at the expense of decorum, especially as often as the task devolved on them of defending proceedings which it would be impossible to characterize without em

No remarkable ability was required to discover flaws in the treaty of 1824. Though submitted in all its details to Canning, if not virtually drawn up by him, it contains several articles so doubtfully expressed, that, without understanding more than is set down, and putting a liberal construction on the context, it is impossible to ascertain what the meaning of the document really is. With regard, however, to the amount of duties to be respectively levied in the colonial possessions of each country-which constituted the first subject of dispute-the words of the treaty seem to us scarcely susceptible of two interpretations. To enable the reader to judge for himself we introduce article 1:-ploying strong language. "The subjects and vessels of one nation shall not pay, upon importation or exportation at the ports of the other in the eastern seas, any duty at a rate beyond the double of that at which the subjects of the nation to which the port belongs are charged.

"No duties paid as exports or imports at a British port, on the continent of India, or in Ceylon, as the Dutch bottoms, shall be arranged so as in no case to be charged at more than double the amount of the duties paid by British subjects, and as British

bottoms.

From various causes, the complaints of our traders were neglected for several years, and the Netherlands authorities in Java, imagining that our Government acquiesced in the propriety of their exactions, continued rigidly to enforce, and even increased them. Our trade appeared, therefore, in that part of the world, to be wholly without protection. English merchants and residents were subjected to the most iniquitous regulations, and the action of their capital, by which internal prosperity had been created in Java, was systematically paralyzed. The persistence of the Dutch in levying the iniquitous duties, is thus described in a memorandum forwarded to Lord Palmerston by the Board of Trade :

The treaty containing this article, the language of which, as we have said, is clear and definite, was concluded on the 17th March, 1824; and the mercantile "Nothing short of exclusion would afford their own manufacclasses of this country persuaded themselves that an turers a chance, and they aimed the last blow at this object in a end would now be put to all the vexations to which proclamation, dated Batavia, 14th of February, 1824. It was they had, for more than nine years, been subjected in resolved that all cotton and woollen goods manufactured in foreign countries to the westward of the Cape of Good Hope, the Indian Archipelago. It soon appeared, however, whether imported in foreign or Netherlands bottoms, shall, after that Holland had no intention to act in conformity with date of this publication, pay an ad valorem duty of twenty-five the stipulations of the convention; for when Captain per cent. when imported, and direct from any place situated to Swete arrived in the Hope, at Batavia, with the treaty the westward of the Cape of Good Hope, and ten per cent. more, in his hands, and a cargo expressly assorted for the or thirty-four per cent., when imported from any of the foreign settlements to the eastward of the Cape. This regulation to apply Java market, the authorities refused to recognize the equally to such of the above-mentioned goods as may now be acts of their own Government, or to make any abate-lying in entrepôt, and of which the holder may hereafter desire

the importation. The British woollen and cotton goods, which had been imported under the fiat of the old scale of duties were

at once subjected to twenty-five per cent. instead of sixteen per cent, without the slightest notice or warning, as the proclamation even included all goods already lodged in entrepôt. It must not be supposed that this increase of duty to twenty-five per cent. was confined to and levied on the amount of invoice at prime cost; but on an ad valorem duty or tariff rate corresponding with the market price of the day, and which makes the duties on Bri

tish cottons and woollens, according to circumstances, from thirty

five to forty-two per cent."

ignorance of these proceedings, by omitting, contrary to the article above cited, to communicate to us copics of the agreements into which they had entered; and when they ultimately made a show of yielding to our representations, only laid before us a copy of their treaty with the Sultan of Jamba, with the remark that all the others were based on that.

The inhabitants of that

been withheld eight years from the knowledge of the In the treaty with the Sultan of Jamba, which had It would answer no useful purpose to enter into mi- British Government, the Dutch inserted three articles nute details on this part of the subject. The complaints in direct contravention of the treaty of 1821; and as of our merchants in the Foreign Office were incessantly all their agreements with native princes were, according repeated, representations through our envoy at the to their own showing, but a repetition of this, they Hague were almost as frequently made to the Nether- obviously, every one of them, intended to strike a heavy lands Government; but the battle of diplomacy had blow at British commerce. to be fought obstinately for ten years before anything part of Asia, though not destitute of natural shrewdlike a settlement could be arrived at. Even then, ness, are unequal to contend with the artifices of however, it was far from being satisfactory; for in- European diplomacy. With them a treaty of comstead of leaving British cotton and woollen goods in merce means a treaty of commerce, and nothing more. the category in which they had hitherto stood, and But the agents of the Netherlands Government, poscharging them according to treaty with a duty of sessing a greater reach of thought, and animated by an six per cent., a duty of twelve-and-a-half per cent. was undying spirit of rivalry, not to say of hatred towards imposed on similar articles, the produce of HollandEngland, have contrived, under the veil of encouragethus fixing permanently upon our manufacturers the ment for trade, to mask at once designs of territorial almost prohibitive duty of which we had complained. aggrandizement, and the mischievous exclusion of comThere was good reason, moreover, to believe that through mercial competitors. The princes of the Archipelago, a system of premiums or drawbacks, the Dutch Go-looking solely to their own profit, and that of their vernment would make up to the native manufacturer subjects, readily enter into arrangements which, accordand merchant for the duty of twelve-and-a-half ing to their views, merely ensure to their visitors from cent., and thus leave our countrymen exposed to all the West a free entrance into their ports. It never the disadvantages from which the efforts of the Foreign occurs to them to imagine that, by granting the foreignOffice seemed to have relieved them. This, however, ers this privilege, they are taking upon themselves the is a point not yet cleared up, though there appears to yoke of their authority. Yet experience shows the be good ground for suspecting that the apprehensions Dutch always reckon the conclusion of a commercial treaty as a conquest, and set down as their subject every prince who has once consented to trade with them. No one has yet been at the pains to examine the Malay translations of the Dutch treaties; but whenever that necessary task shall be undertaken, we strongly suspect that very considerable discrepancies will be discovered between the European and the Oriental versions.

of our merchants were not without foundation.

per

The infraction of Article III. by the Netherlands authorities in the Archipelago, constituted the next ground of dispute between the two Governments. The text of this article is as follows:

"The high contracting parties engage, that no treaty hereafter made by either with any native powers in the Eastern seas, shall contain any article tending, either expressly or by the imposition of unequal duties, to exclude the trade of the other party from the ports of such native power: and that if in any treaty now exist ing on either part, any article to that effect has been admitted, such article shall be abrogated upon the conclusion of the present treaty. It is understood that before the conclusion of the present treaty, communication has been made by each of the contracting parties to the other of all treaties or engagements subsisting between each of them respectively, and any native power in the Eastern seas, and that the like communication shall be made of all such treaties concluded by them respectively hereafter."

But, whether the case be so or not, no doubt can be entertained that every written agreement entered into by the Dutch with native princes, contains a flagrant infraction of the treaty of 1824. Lord Palmerston, in his instructions to Sir E. Disbrowe, distinctly makes this statement:

the Netherlands and the Sultan of Jamba, which Baron Vustolk "With respect," he says, "to the treaty concluded between de Læler communicated in his note of the 16th ultimo, as the model on which all other treaties with native princes have been

at variance with the 3rd Article of the treaty of 1824, inasmuch as by those articles the Netherlands Government imposes on the Sultan of Jamba the obligation to levy within his ports the un

Here, though the attempt at extreme precision pro-framed, you will express to Baron Vustolk the great regret of duces some confusion of language, the real meaning of should so fully confirm the complaints made by the British subher Majesty's Government that the provisions of that treaty the treaty may certainly be ascertained by any who jects of the proceedings of the Dutch authorities in the Eastern sincerely desire to possess themselves of it. But in seas; and you will inform Baron Vustolk that her Majesty's Goconcluding treaties with native authorities, as in levy-vernment considers Articles VI., VIII., and IX., as being directly ing duties, the Dutch have acted with as much independence as though they had never entered into any stipulations at all with us. The only object which occupies their thoughts is how to extend their own power and trade, and how to exclude ours. They have entered into numerous stipulations with native princes, and into every one of these have introduced articles hostile to the English, and in direct contravention of the treaty of 1824. For a considerable time, moreover, they have endeavoured to keep us in

equal duties as regards British and Dutch commerce respectively, which are established by the Netherlands tariff, instead of the equal duties formerly levied in Jamba on the trade of both nations; and thereby manifest injury is occasioned to British

trade."

It is to be feared that in this country sufficient importance will scarcely be attached to the exclusion of our shipping from ports and places the names of which

quainted with its true meaning. To comprehend the
iniquitous spirit of this regulation, it would be neces-
sary to consider a map of the Archipelago-not that
defective map which accompanies Mr. Crawfurd's His-
tory, itself more defective and confused-but a map
on which places are set down with some reference to
their true positions. From this examination, it will
appear that a vessel proceeding to Penang with cottons
or woollens for one of the pepper ports, on the northern
part of Sumatra, will have to perform a voyage of nearly
two thousand miles to reach a place within comparatively
few hours' sail. It is almost as if a vessel bound from
Southampton to Havre were, by the laws of France,
compelled to proceed first to Toulon or Marseilles. In
other words, it is a prohibition of all trade between
our Straits settlements and all the ports of Banca,
Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes. It is true that, within
the last few years, Macassar has been made a free
port, in the Dutch acceptation of the term. But this
is a very questionable advantage to the British trader;
for, while he is permitted to enter Macassar with all
such articles as are not prohibited, he is at the same
time excluded from every other port in Celebes which
was previously open to him. But the commercial en-
franchisement of Macassar was not owing to a volun-
tary departure from the principle of monopoly on the
part of Holland, but of jealousy of the movements of
Great Britain in that part of the world. This, ap-
parent from many circumstances, is placed beyond doubt
from the fact that small Dutch vessels of war have been
sent northward to intercept the native prahus on their
way to Singapore, and compel them by force to enter
Macassar. This we state on authority which we con-
sider superior to any that could be opposed to it-Mr.
Bonham, formerly Governor of the Straits settlements,
and now of Hong Kong, a man remarkable for his ex-
perience and reserve, found himself compelled to re-
mark, in a communication to Government, that unless
some efficacious measures were taken to counteract the
policy of Holland, she would go on multiplying her set-
tlements throughout the Archipelago, and thus deprive
the British of all participation in the trade of this
quarter of the globe, which, perhaps, at present affords
a brighter and larger field than any other for the dis-
posal of British goods.

are little known. But all are familiar with the great
Island of Sumatra, the principal products of which,
pepper, camphor, coffee, and benzoin, were formerly
transported to our Straits settlements through Ba-
roos, Tapoos, Sinkel, Immon, and Siak. With the
Sultan of this last place Great Britain concluded a
treaty in 1818—that is, six years prior to our famous
convention with the Netherlands. But this circum-
stance the Dutch Government overlook, affecting to
believe that by our engagement entered into with it
in 1824, we abandoned the Sultan of Siak to his fate.
It accordingly set at once about reducing him under
its power. But Lord Palmerston interposed; and, hav-
ing interpreted to it the law of nations, which says that
no engagement entered into by two States can be abro-
gated by a treaty afterwards concluded with a third
power, preserved the independence of Siak, and at the
same time our trade with that part of Sumatra. As
an illustration of the spirit by which the Dutch officers
in Sumatra were actuated, we ought, perhaps, to men-
tion the summary manner in which a native trader
from Penang was treated at Pannah on the east coast.
A vessel, commanded and manned entirely by natives,
arriving at the above port, the nakodah, or captain,
suspecting no evil, went on shore, where he soon found
good reason to repent of his temerity; for, being seized ||
by the Dutch commandant, he was immediately hung,
without even the semblance of a trial, or ceremony of
any kind; upon learning which, the crew fled during
the night to Batn-Bunah, and afterwards returning to
Penang, made their deposition before the magistrates
of that settlement. When complaints of this act of
barbarity were made by the English, the Dutch con-
tented themselves with throwing out suspicions of
piracy against the nakodah. The object, of course,
was to strike terror into the native merchants, and
thus, as far as possible, to deter them from the attempt
to keep alive the trade between Sumatra and our
settlement in the Straits. This was rendered still
more manifest by their treatment of other natives of
the East. Chinese merchants, for example, sailing in
junks of their own from Penang, Malacca, or Singapore,
but with English colours, are subjected to the high pro-
tective duties levied upon foreigners in Dutch ports.
But, if the same merchants pass over to Siam, and sail to
Sumatra under Siamese colours, they are placed on the
same level with the Dutch themselves; which is a fresh
infraction of the treaty of 1824, which ensures to
Great Britain the privileges of the most favoured na
tion. The object of this measure is twofold-first,
to induce the natives of all the neighbouring countries
to resort directly to Dutch ports; secondly, to ensure
to the Dutch equivalent privileges in the ports of
Siam. From what has been said, it will be obvious ||
that we by no means put a harsh construction on the
proceedings of Holland, when we say that she aims
directly at the destruction of our commerce with the
Archipelago. Look at the number of her settlements
in that part of the world-in Sumatra, Banca, Borneo,
and Celebes-and then consider the effect of a regula-
tion made in 1834, stringently excluding British
cottons and woollens from every port in the Dutch||
possessions, with the exception of Batavia, Samarang,
and Sambaya. This, it will be observed, was ten
years after the conclusion of the treaty, by which time
the authorities may be supposed to have become ac-

It was the united force of the facts above stated which led the British Government to form the recent settlement in Labuan. In 1824, Holland distinctly relinquished all claim to supremacy in the Archipelago; but, by the course of its proceedings from that date forward, it proved that its relinquishment was meant to be merely verbal, and that its policy not only aimed at supremacy, but at the absolute exclusion of all other powers. Its activity knew no bounds. Under pretence of putting down the padries, it had obtained a permanent influence in Sumatra, which it used unsparingly for the destruction of British trade. Java was entirely its own; in Borneo it had insinuated itself into the important provinces of Sambas, Pontiana, and Banjermassin; over Celebes it exercised the most mischievous influence; it had attempted to seize upon Bali, and, in a word, wherever, throughout the islands, it saw an opening, there it publicly obtruded its influence, one of the first effects of which was to oppose a check to British trade. But as out of evil good frequently proceeds, so out of this headlong attempt at