cause disposition of the organs of a human body should a substance to become thinking, that never thought before. All that the disposition of these organs can do, is confined to local motion variously modified, as in a clock, all the difference being only from more to less; but as the ranging of the several wheels which compose a clock, would signify nothing to produce the effects of that machine, if each wheel before it was placed after a certain method, had not actually an impenetrable extension, the necessary cause of motion, as soon as it was pushed forward with a certain degree of force; so I say also the ranging of the organs of a man's body would be of no service to produce thought, if each organ before it was fixed in its place, had not actually the faculty of thinking. Now this faculty is quite another thing from impenetrable extension, for all you can do to this extension by pulling, striking, or pushing it all manner of ways, is a change of situation, the whole nature and essence of which you can fully conceive without having recourse to any sensation, and even when you deny there is any sensation in it. There have been some men of great genius who have showed themselves a little too slow of heart to believe the distinction of the soul of man from the body, but nobody that I know of, ever dared hitherto to say that he clearly conceived that in order to make a substance pass from the privation of all thought to actual thinking, it was sufficient to put it into motion, so that this change of situation was, for instance, a sense of joy, an affirmation, an idea of moral virtue, &c.; and though some should boast that they had a clear conception of it, they would not deserve to be credited, and we might apply to them a passage of Aristotle that I have quoted in another place. What an absurdity would it be to maintain that there are two species of colour, one which is the object of sight and no more, and the other the object both of sight and smell. It is yet more absurd to maintain that there are two species of roundness, one which consists merely in the parts of the circumference of a body being equally distant from the centre, the other, which together with that is also an act by which the round body perceives that it exists, and sees round about it several other bodies. It is the same absurdity to assert that there are two kinds of circular motion, one which is nothing else but the change of situation upon a line, the parts of which are equally distant from the centre; the other which together with this, is an act of love to God, of fear, hope, &c. What I have said of roundness with respect to vision, may be applied to all sorts of figures with respect to all kinds of thought; and what I have said of circular motion is equally strong with respect to all other lines in which a body can move slowly or swiftly; and therefore we ought to conclude that thought is distinct from all the modifications of body that are come to our knowledge, since it is distinct from all figure and from all change of situation but this not being the question here, I shall content myself with concluding that Dicæarchus in order to argue consistently, ought to have admitted that every system of matter is endued with the faculty of thinking, for without that, it was absurd to pretend that provided several veins, arteries, &c. were placed one by another as the different parts of a machine, it would produce the sensations of colour, taste, sound, smell, cold, heat, love, hatred, affirmation, negation, &c. Methinks, if I had even plainly and absolutely affirmed, that nobody had hitherto boasted of having a clear idea of a modification of matter, which is an act of sensation, I should not have proceeded with rashness; for I see in the "News from the Republic of Letters," that Mr Locke, one of the profoundest metaphysicians in the world, confesses ingenuously, that a body endowed with thought is an incompre hensible thing: and observe, he makes this confession in answer to an objection founded upon this incomprehensibility. It was therefore very much his interest to deny the foundation of this objection, whence it must be concluded that this confession was very sincere, and an effect of the power of truth, and a proof that all his utmost endeavours to comprehend the union of thought with a material substance, were fruitless. Now since so great a man confesses this, is it not probable that never any person durst boast to comprehend the union? This would be too general, if I added nothing more to it. Let it be observed then, that the question whether the soul of man is distinct from matter, is part of the famous dispute between Dr Stillingfleet and Mr Locke: the former maintained, that matter is incapable of thinking, and thereby became the defender of a fundamental article of philosophical orthodoxy. Among other arguments, he makes use of this; "that it cannot be conceived how matter can think." Mr Locke confesses the truth of this principle, and contents himself with denying the consequence; for he pretends that God can do things which are incomprehensible to human understanding, and therefore, because man cannot comprehend that a portion of matter cannot acquire the faculty of thinking, it does not follow that God, who is Almighty, cannot give if he please some degree of sense, perception, and thought, to certain collections of created matter, combined together as he thinks proper. All the difficulties that are raised," says he, 66 66 against the possibility of there being thinking matter, derived from our ignorance, or the narrow limits of our conceptions, do not in the least affect the power of God, if he please to communicate to matter the faculty of thinking, and they do not prove that he has not actually communicated such a faculty to certain parts of matter, disposed as he thought fit, till it can be made out that it is a contradiction to suppose such a thing." This is a formal confession of the incomprehensibility of the thing, and a recourse to the almighty power of God, for effects which are beyond the limits of our understandings. It is much after the same manner that the schoolmen suppose an obediential power in the creatures, whereby God might, if he would, raise them to any state whatsoever. A stone might become capable of the beatific vision, and a drop of water capable of washing away all the pollution of original sin. In order to confute this obediential power of matter with respect to knowledge, we might make use of an argument which it does not appear that Dr Stillingfleet has used. That argument always seemed to me very proper to show the impossibility of joining thought, and the three dimensions, together in the same subject. You will find the particulars of this proof in the book I quote.* A passionate divine, arguing against the abbot de Dangeau, who had urged this argument, criticised him as well as he could; but he only talked impertinently. Consider well my expression of philosophical orthodoxy; for I do not pretend that, with respect to theological, evangelical, or christian orthodoxy, Dr Stillingfleet is superior to Mr Locke. To affirm that, because the soul of man thinks, it is therefore immaterial, is I think right reasoning, and is also establishing a most solid foundation of the immortality of our souls, a doctrine which ought to be considered as one of the most important articles of true philosophy; but this truth, as it is grounded upon such a principle, does not belong to christian theology. A christian divine, every christian in general, as a christian, believes the immortality of the soul, heaven, hell, &c. because these are truths which God has revealed to us. It is upon this account only, that his faith is a true act of religion, a meritorious act, acceptable to God, the * Nouvelles de la Repub. des Lettres, August, 1684. Art. state of a child of God, and of a disciple of Jesus Christ; and those who should believe the immortality of the soul, purely upon those philosophical ideas with which their reason furnishes them, would be no farther advanced in the kingdom of God, than those who believe that the whole is greater than its part. Therefore, since Mr Locke founds his belief of the immortality of the soul upon the scripture, he has as much Christian, evangelical, and theological orthodoxy as he can have. What he says upon this subject is admirable; I shall probably cite it in some other place.--Art. DICEARCHUS. TRAJAN. (Fate of his soul.) Most learned men of the Romish communion now refute the story which was so much cried up, that the soul of the emperor Trajan was delivered from hell, by the prayers of pope Gregory. Paul and John Diaconus, who wrote the life of St Gregory, give the following account of that affair, which is moreover asserted by St John of Damascus: "St. Gregory, passing Trajan's square, which that prince caused to be adorned with stately edifices, where the principal actions of his life were represented, stopped particularly to consider a basso relievo, which described the favour he did to a poor widow. This emperor, marching at the head of his army, and being obliged to use great dispatch, a very old and poor widow came to beseech him, with tears in her eyes, to revenge the death of her son, who had been murdered. Trajan promised her that when he returned from his expedition, he would do her justice. 'But sir,' said the widow, if you should be killed in the battle, of whom may I expect it afterwards?' 'Of my successor,' answered Trajan. What will it signify to you, great emperor,' replied the woman, 'that any other than yourself render me justice? Is it not 6 |