expedition. That noble lord had stated in his evidence at the bar that his opinion was never given formally as an officer. Was it then to be supposed that Lord Chatham was never consulted on the expedition? or that he did not approve of the expedition? No. It was be cause his Majesty's government had the advantage of Lord Chatham's opinion in a better and more satisfactory mode. Lord Castlereagh rested very much on the opinions of General Brownrigg, who had expressed his regret that the whole of the armament destined for Santvliet, was not at once carried to the entrance of the West Scheldt, instead of being directed to rendezvous at the Stone-Deep. There was, however, one instance in which Lord Castlereagh did not agree in opinion with General Brownrigg. The General had certainly stated that ten days might possibly have been required to reduce Liefkenshoek. Was it probable, however, that a work not casemated would have resisted so long? But upon the point immediately under consideration, General Brownrigg had distinctly declared that he was, previously to the sailing of the expedition, and SHIP continued to be of opinion, that there was a "fait prospect of sircess hád the army arrived at Santvliet Heatly in August. In what page of our history had Lord Porchester convinced himself that the interests of the empire would be 'best consulted by banishing enterprize in war from the service, and chilling the martial spirit of the country by the rigid principles of cold precaution and mathematical calculation? Had it been by the observance of such a principle 1 VOL. LII.

that our naval power had been raised to its present pre-eminence? or that the triumphs of our army had been brought to rival those of our navy? He was not contending for rash and improvident exposures of the public force. What he contended against was the principle that nothing should be undertaken unless every circumstance bearing on the operation could be previously ascertained, and that nothing should be risked unless success could be demonstrated to be inevitable.

Lord Castlereagh bad the house, if they wished to know what prospect of success ministers really had, in the enemy's judgment at least, to look at the measures of precaution he had ordered to be adopted for securing Antwerp, since the attempt on that city was abandoned.- What, Lord Castlereagh asked, would have been the verdict of their opposers if ministers bad brought forward such a defence as might have been framed out of the materials upon which they were now inculpated. Could they have justified themselves from the speculative difficulties of the attempt for having left an ally unsupported, and a naval arsenal of such magnitude, and so situated, unassailed? The claims of Austria alone would have justified the attempt. Its naval policy rendered it a paramount duty. But, when both considerations were combined, hesitation would have been criminal. He was conscious that, in common with the other servants of the crown, he had done his duty. And, however they might have failed in securing for the country all the advantages for which they contended, he should always pride himself

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himself on the share he had borne in that important transactionThe house now resounded with cries of adjourn. Mr. Ponsonby had spoken for some time in answer to Lord Castlereagh, when the house became again clamorous for an adjournment. It was then moved that the house do adjourn : which it did at two o'clock.

The adjourned debate on the expedition to the Scheldt was contitinued till three o'clock on the morning of the 28th of March. It was resumed on the 29th, and continued till about the same hour in the morning of the 30th of March. Towards the evening of that day it was again resumed, and continued till half-past eleven on Saturday morning, 31st of March.

It will be readily and rightly conceived that, in the discussions of such an assembly, on a subject so complicated as well as important, and connected by so many relations with other important subjects, there was, amidst much tiresome repetition, not a little entertainment in the way of argumentation and eloquence, with some wit too. But it is not permitted, in such a design as ours, nor is it at all necessary for the information of our readers, respecting any essential points, to follow the course of reasoning, or even the series of the speakers, in what may be styled a renewed debate, continued for four days, or rather nights, on a question that had been already much agitated on sundry occasions. In the sitting of March 21st, General Craufurd, in a speech of uncommon length, contended that the expedition to the Scheldt was a measure of great political wisdom; that the utmost attention had been

paid to the wants of the army, both by government and the commander in chief, and that the attempt to retain the island of Walcheren was not only justifiable, but an indispensable obligation. He, therefore, heartily concurred in the conduct of the army and navy. To the resolutions of fact he should propose the previous question, becouse they were unnecessary; and to the resolutions of censure a decided negative; and he should beg leave to conclude with moving resolutions of an opposite tendency.

In the sitting of the 29th, General Tarleton replied to the speech delivered on a former night by General Crawfurd. He said, in conclusion, that the whole transaction of the Scheldt expedition for absurdity of design, and profligacy of expenditure, among all the hollow notions of ministers stood preeminent for ignorance and folly.Mr. Rose maintained, that even stripping the affair of its merits as a diversion, the taking of Flushing alone, could it have been retained, was worth the whole expense of the expedition.-Mr. Grattan asked how it was that if 17,000 men could succeed against the fortified town of Flushing, containing a garrison of near 10,000 men, an army exceeding 20,000 men, could fail in their attempt upon Antwerp without a garrison, with guns dismounted, and perfectly unaware, as ministers said, of the invasion of an enemy? Was it to be understood that local difficulties were to swell into importance, when they were to justify the retreat of an army, but to dwindle into trifles when brought forward to exonerate the minister? Upon what fair presumption sumption then could the minister call upon that house to regulate its decision on evidence which it knew to be false, and to neglect evidence which it felt to be true? In every part of the proposed arrangement the result falsified the intelligence on which the attempt was made. But whilst it cut away the ground on which the minister rested, it realized every prediction of the men who, foreseeing the failure, had foretold the fatal result. With what consistency could ministers defend that diversion which, they said, afforded to Austria the chance of recovery from her misfortunes, in the same breath that they argued against the propriety of sending a force into the North of Germany, with a view to assisting the numerous_insurgents in that quarter? Why, said they, encourage those insurgents to an ineffectual resistance to the power of France, only to subject them to more aggravated oppression? Why then endeavour to allure Austria, after her fall, to a renewal of a struggle which would have for ever sealed her subjugation?-Mr. Grattan said, in conclusion, " in my conception of public delinquency, thore can be no conduct more reprehensible than that of his Majesty's ministers, except indeed the conduct of this House, if it should be so forgetful of its duties as not to condemn them. This house has lately censured Lord Chatham for an attempt to set aside the responsibility of ministers. Let it then take care that its conduct, on this occasion, does not tend to establish ministerial impunity." - Mr. Canning, in the course of a long and elaborate speech, endeavoured to prove the practicability of carrying

such a place as Antwerp by a coup de main, by an enumeration of instances in which stronger places had been so taken. In justification of the policy of the expedition, he said that the continued occupation of Walcheren would have been as great a blow to the maritime power and pride of Buonaparte, as that of the Isle of Wight by France to the power and pride of Great Britain. In that view, in the contemplation of its moral effect on the minds of the people of France, as much as in respect to its solid advantages, he, as one of his Majesty's ministers, had concurred in the destination of the expedition to the Scheldt. It would have been of incalculable benefit that the people of France should have seen that its ruler could not strip his coasts and country of troops without subjecting his own territories to insult and invasion. Though he certainly should vote against the second resolution of Lord Porchester, he would move or suggest an amendment to the counter resolutions of General Crawford, namely, to omit the specific grounds of justification arising from the circumstances of Austria, and the destruction of the basin at Flushing, and to leave the justification of having forborne to have kept possession of Walcheren on the obvious ground of the necessity of collecting the materials for an opinion, and the danger of deciding precipitately ou so great and important a question. He was ready to cor cur in the conclusion, that no blame was imputable to government, but not in the honourable general's statement of the premises from which that conclusion was to be drawn. -Mr.Whit bread,

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bread, in the course of an animated speech, in Teasoning with ministry, on their own grounds, observed that it had been asserted both by Lord Castlereagh and Gen. Crawfurd, not only that the North of Germany was ripe for insurrection, but that Buonaparte had lost 50,000 men at the battle of As pern. Could it then be doubted, if this statement was true, that an army of 40,000 British troops, landed in the North of Germany, would have turned the fortune of the campaign?-Mr. Whitbread took an opportunity of stinging Mr. Canning for his inconsistency in pronouncing Lord Chatham guilty for making an official communication to his Majesty with a request of secrecy, while he him self had made communications to his Majesty which he concealed from bis colleagues. He stung him also by contrasting the duplicity of his conduct with the candour and manliness exhibited by Lord Castlereagh through the whole progress of the present question. Lord Castlereagh had declared that he did not shrink from responsibility, and had therefore consistently voted for inquiry. Mr. Canning had always pretended that he sought investigation, but voted steady and staunch against inquiry. He badgered him yet farther on another point. How could he commit so flagrant a breach of his public duty as to al low his incompetent colleague (as he conceived him to be) to remain in office?

five generals of the first respectability, who considered the risk to be encountered too great for the advantages that might possibly accrue, and without consulting the Earl of Chatham, the commander in chief, or even asking a question of Sir Eyre Coote, the second in command, dispatched the expedition without a plan; whilst the superior officers were destitute of that confidence which was the soul of energy, and the only basis on which the hope of success could rest.

It was the common course of an individual, accused of a breach of privilege, to go out of the house, and leave the question to the discussion of those who had to judge of the charge. He asked his Majesty's ministers whether, if they were acquitted by a majority equal to their own number, they would call that a justification? Was it not a sufficient reason that there were so many others in the house who were, in some measure, bound to support their patrons, without themselves lending their aid, and not only assisting to acquit, but actually approving their own conduct? He would put it to their own honour whether they ought not to retire? The ministerial benches laughed.

Sir Francis Burdett said, the defence made by or for ministers, amounted to no more than this, that because it was an object of vital importance to destrov Antwerp, it was right to undertake it without the neccessary information, and without means adequate to its execution.

Among a number of pretences to preposterous management throughout, Sir Francis took particular no