} that excellent officer, proved clearly and demonstrably the manner in which he had been treated by ministers. Yet these ministers were they who attempted to throw all the blame upon Sir John Moore, which, upon the fullest investigation, was found to rest entirely with themselves. Their lordships, therefore, ought not to countenance any public outcry against the officers employed in those expeditions, and the disastrous results of which such loud and general complaints were so justly made, but to point public indignation where alone it ought to rest; to those ministers who sent out expeditions either to at chieve objects impracticable in themselves, or without atchieving any object useful or honourable to the country. If any circumstance should arise out of the inquiry, during its progress, tending to impeach the conduct of any officer employed, that would be a subject for future investigation. But there were blameable and disgraceful circumstances in the conduct of ministers, which were matters of publicity and notoriety, and which no inquiry could render plainer and clearer than they were at present. These circumstances Lord Grenville proceeded to point out in a review of their conduct respecting the war in Spain, Germany, and Holland. In Spain, their promise of co-operation with Sir John Moore were found to be altogether silly, vain, and fruitless. They had not afforded that relief and aid to the brave Austrians in different ways in which it might have been afforded; and, as to the attempt of making a diver sion in favour of Austria on the Scheldt, instead of the vicinity of Trieste, or in the north of Germany, it was known to ministers that a war was likely to take place between France and Austria in September 1808, and yet the immense armatment to the Scheldt did not sail until the latter end of July 1809. Before it sailed the armistice was signed, which led to the fatal treaty that prostrated the Austrian monarchy: and not only had this event taken place, but intelligence of the signature of that armistice had actually arrived in this country. But if by events not to be controuled, it was impossible to send this armament sooner, why send it all? The expedition sailed for this reason only - because his majesty's ministers were afraid to avow, that after all the expence which had been incurred, it had not actually sailed till its object was defeated, and success was impossible. Lord Grenville concluded with moving the introduction in the second paragraph of the address, the following amendment : 1 "That we have seen with the utmost sorrow and indignation the accumulated failures and disasters of the campaign, the unavailing waste of our national resources, and the loss of many thousands of our brave troops, whose distinguished and heroic valour has been unprofitably sacrificed in enterprises productive not of advantage, but of lasting injury to the coun try: in enterprises marked only by a repetition of former errors ; tardy and uncombined; incapable in their success of aiding our ally, but exposing in their failure his majesty's B3 majesty's councils to the scorn and derision of the enemy. That we therefore feel ourselves bound, with a view to the only atonement that can now be made to an injured people, to institute, without delay, such rigorous and effectual inquiries and proceedings, as duty impels us to adopt, in a case where our country has been subjected to unexampled calamity and disgrace." Lord Harrowby observed, that the amendment went not only to determine that there should be an inquiry, but to induce their lordships now to come to a vote of indiscriminate censure, of absolute condemnation, previous to any inquiry. Such a mode of proceed. ing was surely unusual and unprecedented in the practice of parliament. His noble friend, Lord Grenville's policy rested on the principle of abstaining from making ourselves parties in a warfare which had long ceased to afford any hope of what had been so emphatically called the deliverance of Europe. But he might remind his noble friend, that such a principle had not been exactly conformable to his sentiments on all occasions. Even in the course of the last session he had joined in the general enthusiasm in favour of the Spanish cause, and in the anxiety prompted by that enthusiasm, to afford it every aid in our power. Government did not stimulate and give birth to the exertions on the part of the Spaniards, but they felt it to be their duty, and conceived it to be the interest of this country, to encourage and assist them. Neither had they incited other powers on the continent to embark anew in hostilities with France. Austria was inclined to appeal to the chances of war, to the decision of the sword; but she had been warned by his majesty's ministers of the perils of the attempt, and of the inability of this country to lend her any effec tual support. As to the points where, in the judgment of Lord Grenville, powerful diversions in favour of Austria might have been effected by a large British army, what would have been the expence and difficulty of transporting 100,000 men, supposing it possi. ble to have found and collected them, to the Mediterranean or Adriatic? Not less impracticable and unpromising would have been the plan of sending them to the north of Germany. There might have been men in different districts of Germany who were anxious to rescue themselves from the op pression and tyranny of the French, but they had neither arms nor uniforms. Even if they had given greater demonstrations of their determination and power to resist, it would have been impossible for the British government to send such a force as had been mentioned, and aş indeed would have been necessary to their assistance; and even if such a force had been at our disposal, how could government have found the means of subsisting and paying them in the north of Germany? After the armament had been prepared, intelligence was, received of the armistice between France and Austria; yet it was still uncertain whether that armistice would end in a definitive peace. The contrary, for a while, appeared the more probable. Looking at all the i ble for their lordships to decide upon the subject, or to institute a fair inquiry. The other points very much insisted upon, and reprobated by his friend, Lord Grenville, was the expedition to Spain and Portugal. But that expedition had atchieved great and important objects. It had rescued Portugal from the French-it had covered the character of the British army with glory; and, by the position which that army afterwards occupied and maintained, it rendered infinite service to the Spanish armies. It covered them in several points-it secured the defence of Estramadura, and in a great measure that of La Mancha. To this expedition was also owing the deliverance of Gallicia and the securing of the ships at Ferrol. the points within our reach, and where our means might be effectually exerted, there was no one which promised so favourable a result as an attack upon Flushing and Antwerp. There the enemy had for years been expending immense sums in erecting a naval arsenal and depôt, and in rearing up a navy, by which he might be enabled to menace the most vulnerable points of these realms. Accordingly it was resolved to make a well-directed effort to destroy both the navy and arsenal. The design, on account of unforeseen difficulties, had not been wholly accomplished, yet the hos tile design of invading this country, from the Low Countries, had been frustrated, by the demolition of the harbour and arsenal of Flushing. Whatever disastrous ef-The Earl of Moira maintained, fects had arisen from the operations' necessary to its attainment, were indeed to be lamented: but they were not, in the first instance, to have been apprehended. The design promised to be executed in a short time, and before the season set in, whose pestilential influence was particularly to be dreaded, and most necessary to be guarded against. The expedition was ready to sail about the middle of July; but it was detained nine or ten days by contrary winds; and other unforeseen and uncontrouled obstacles occurred afterwards, to protract the operations till the unhealthy period of the year. But all these obstructions could not possibly have been forescen, or guarded against. This would be shewn by the information which his majesty had ordered to be laid before their lordships: before which it would be impossi that the proofs demanding not only inquiry but condemnation, stood before them. The whole conviction of his mind, and the conviction of every one who considered the subject, called for judgment upon the face of the case. He would go the full length of the amendment, although it only pledged their lordships to inquiry at present. The noble carl had not stated the case of Austria, as put by his noble friend Lord Grenville, fairly. As no specific promise of aid had been given to Austria, none was broken: but if that aid which our interests required was not granted, ministers had equally neglected their duty. But although we were not pledged to Austria, it would not be contended that we were not pledged to Spain. The pledge to Spain was not only given by parliament, but confirmed by the universal and and enthusiastic voice of the country. The case of Spain afforded the best opportunity of terminating the war with glory. The enthusiasm existing in that country could not be doubted: for nothing but enthusiasm could have kept armies together after so many defeats and disasters. And how had our pledge to Spain been fulfilled? Ministers sent an army to Portugal, with instructions to deliver that country, and to consider Spain only as a secondary object. Sir Arthur Wellesley's army, however, did advance into Spain, and gained a victory; but, although the stronger and the victorious army, it immediately retreated. And two great Spanish armies, left to themselves, had been successively cut to pieces, while a British army remained idle and inactive in their vicinity. Either the instructions of that gallant general, Sir Arthur Wellesley, had been erroneous, or he wanted means to carry his victorious army forward. After such scenes of calamity, their lordships would disgrace themselves, if they did not adopt the course recommended by the noble lord who moved the amendment. Lord Sidmouth could not but acknowledge that there was much to regret, and perhaps to reprehend, in the expedition to Spain, and especially in that to WalcheHe wished an early day to be fixed for going into the inquiry proposed, and he wished the inquiry to be full and vigorous. But he was not for prejudging the conduct of his majesty's government, which would be the case, if the amendment of his friend, Lord Grenville, were adopted without any alteration. Lord Mulgrave also reprobated condemnation without inquiry. With regard to the conduct of the war, he could safely declare that no one was to blame: neither the ministers who planned the mensures, nor the officers chosen to execute them. The Earl of Grey, in answer to certain sarcasms that had been made by the Earl of Harrowby, on the late administration, said, he was fully satisfied that the conduct of those with whom he had the honour to act at the period alludedto, was best calculated to promote the interest and welfare of the country, viz. to husband* the resources of the state, in order that, at a time when they should be most wanted, they might be adequately and advantageously employed for the public security. But this was not the question now before their lordships. The question was, whether his majesty's ministers, having determined on war, and a system of offensive warfare, had pursued this scheme of their vigorous policy by the best means. Were the objects attainable, and if attainable, were they material to the final result of the conflict, in which we were engaged? When: he held the seals of the foreign department, an expedition to the: Scheldt had been frequently pressed: upon him. But, after making every due inquiry, he was convinced, that to destroy the arsenals at Antwerp, and the shipping in the Scheldt, was not an attainable object. The force of the country had been frittered into divisions: whereas, to effect any great purpose, it ought to have been made to act in a body, one and indivisible. To the project of operations in the north of Germany, it had been objected, that it would have been attended with great expence, and serious difficulties in the transportation of the troops. Was it to be endured, that after the prodigality of which the servants of the crown had been guilty, they should boggle at the expence of such enterprises? Then, as to the transport of troops to Piedmont, and from the Thames to the Weser: could the ruler of France send a powerful army to Egypt, and would Great Britain, the mistress of the ocean, with 100 ships of the line, and 1000 ships of war of various proportions, and an incalculable commercial marine, be disappointed in such a purpose? It had been asked how 100,000 men could have been provided for such enterprises? Were not 40,000 employed in Walcheren, 15,000 in Sicily, and 45,000 in Spain and Portugal? How much, then, was the deficiency of 100,000 men? Whether engaged in one, two, or three divisions, the difficulty of raising and paying such a force was nearly the same. - Lord Grey also observed, that so far back as September 1808, ministers had received proposals from the north of Germany for a rising in that country; and he farther believed, from what followed, that encourage ren. • This argument of husbanding our resources was much insisted on, and, indeed, the great sheet anchor in questions of foreign relations, of the Lords Grey and Grenville. Moncy may be saved, but military spirit, skill, and valour, the main bulwark of a state, are promoted not by husbanding, but by exercising them. upon ment had been given to such a scheme. This enterprise, might have been undertaken in May or June. With all this appearance of advantage, it might indeed have been unsuccessful: but the measures pursued by ministers had not a chance in their favour. Lord Grey next took a review of the campaign in Spain. He disapproved of the residence of Mr. Frère, as minister of the junta, so long after it had been announced that he was to be recall. ed. A great deal was to be done by the Marquis of Wellesley. That noble marquis, however, whether from a negociation with his majesty's ministers, or some other cause, had, after his appointment, instead of proceeding to his post at Seville, remained for months in London. He saw much to blame in the conduct of Lord Welling. ton, in a military point of view. With regard to the battle of Talavera, he condemned that uncandid calculation, which represented it as a victory gained over an enemy double our force. When the Spanish army was taken into the account, the superiority was greatly on our side. He appealed to the honour, wisdom, and humanity of the house, while he urged it, by many considerations, to relieve the country, if possible, by supporting the amendment. The Earl of Liverpool, after reprobating condemnation without inquiry, insisted that our operations in Spain had been most wise and beneficial to the country; which he pledged himself to prove whenever the details came to be enquired into. He instanced as a proof of this, that the provinces of Gallicia, Asturias, and Estramadura, |