of driving the enemy's troops before him, and obtaining possession of the capital, Madrid. The French troops, in Spain, at that time, occupied a defensive line of positions, from Toledo to Salamanca. On the advance of Lord Wellington into Spain, they left their positions, and concentrated their forces to oppose him.* Lord Wellington marched, in the direction of Madrid, as far as Talavera; where he was obliged to stop for want of provisions, and the means of transport. The bat-. tle was fought, and the enemy for the moment repulsed. But the general object of the advance into Spain was lost. The enemy retained possession of the capital, and the British troops were obliged to retreat. It had been said that Lord Wellington had displayed great skill in the dispositions he made for battle. Lord Grey would not agree in that opinion. The position on the left had not been sufficiently secured or taken advantage of-there was much also to blame in the conduct of Lord Wellington, with respect to the Spanish troops; though certainly the dispatch of the Spanish general, gave a very different account of the conduct of those troops, from that given in the dispatch of Lord Wellington. But if Lord Wellington believed the Spanish troops to be of such a description that they could not be trusted to meet the enemy in a situation of such imminent peril at Talavera; if Lord Wellington held such an opinion of the Spanish troops, why did he give the Spanish general the option, either of defending the passes against the advance of the French army, under the Duke of Dalmatia, which threatened the flank and rear of the British, or taking care of our sick and wounded at Talavera? Why, also, had not Lord Wellington better information respecting the defence of the passes? Why trust to the intelligence he received from the Spaniards, neglecting even the ordinary precaution of sending an officer of his own to ascertain whether the passes were properly defended? His Majesty's ministers, at the time that they trumpeted forth the battle as a splendid and decisive victory, were in the possession of Lord Wellington's dispatches, in which he stated the unfortunate situation of his army, the necessity of retreating, and the difficulties he had to encounter-in effecting a retreat. The Marquis of Wellesley, after expressing his private feelings on the present occasion, when he was called on to perform a public duty, by vindicating the character and conduct of so near and dear a relation as a brother, begged leave, in the outset, to observe, that the noble earl (Grey) did not seem very clearly to understand the objects of Lord Wellington's operations. On the arrival of his brother in Portugal, he found that the enemy was not only in possession of its northern provinces, but that a plan had been concerted, by which Victor and Soult were to advance from different points, into the south. The first object, therefore, was the deliverance of Portugal. The operation by which he expelled Soult was as able, as rapid, * See Vol. LI. 1809. History of Europe, p. 176. and and conclusive, as any recorded in lington and General Cuesta, was briefly this: Lord Wellington, supported by General Cuesta, was to move against Victor's corps. In the mean time Venegas, by a circuitous march, was to threaten Madrid, in order, by this demonstration, to draw off the attention of the French corps, under Sebastiani and King Joseph, and prevent them from forming a junction with Victor. From this plan, if duly executed, Lord Wellington was justified in expecting every success. Accordingly, he advanced against Victor at Talavera, on the 22d of July, and soon came in sight of the enemy, whom he proposed to attack on the following morning. Victor's corps was then unsupported by any other, and consisted of no more than 28,000 men. If, therefore, the attack upon Victor had been made on the 23d, as proposed by Lord Wellington, must not the result have been most glorious and complete? General Cuesta, however, refused to attack the enemy on that day; for what reason had not been explained. But the consequence was, that Victor retreated, and made his escape on the very night of the 23d, and effected a junction between Sebastiani and King Joseph. At the same time General Venegas, who ought to have been at Argonda on the 22d, perplexed with orders, and counter-orders, from the Junta, did not arrive there till the 29th. Against such strange mismanagement what human prudence could provide? Lord Wellesley perfectly agreed with the noble lords on the other side of the house, as to the neces sity of a radical change in the gó vernment of Spain; and his opi nions 1 nions on that head, he believed, were tinctions, or who sat there by de not unknown. But that change, scent from his illustrious anhowever, could not be the work of a day. But were we, therefore, to abandon the Spaniards to the mercy of their cruel invaders? to desert them in the crisis of their fortunes? As to the battle of Talavera, nothing more could be said of that battle in a military point of view, than that the British troops had succeeded in repulsing the attack of a French army almost double their numbers, the efforts of which had been directed chiefly against the British. And, with respect to its consequences, he would boldly maintain, that the defeat of the enemy at Talavera had essentially contributed to the main objects of the campaign. For, unless that blow had been struck against Victor, it would have been impossible to prevent the enemy from over-running the south of Spain, or from making a fresh irruption into Portugal. It saved the south of Spain from absolute destruction. It had afforded time to Portugal to organize her army, and to strengthen her military ports. It also enabled Lord Wellington to take a position, where he might derive supplies from Spain, at the same time that he drew nearer to his own magazines -upon the whole, he did not hesitate to say, that his brother was as justly entitled to every distinction that his sovereign had conferred on him, and to every honour and reward which it was in the power of that house to bestow, as any noble lord, who, for his personal services, had obtained the same dis cestors. Lord Grenville observed, that the propriety of giving the information relative to the campaign, and especially the calamitous march into Spain, required on a former occasion by his friend Lord Grey, had been supported by the manner, in which his noble friend, the Marquis of Wellesley, had discussed the subject. He had very properly taken a comprehensive view of the causes and consequences of that battle. The events of twenty-four hours might he sufficient to prove the merits of the soldier; but the case of a general was widely different. The present question was, whether a British army ought to have been risked in an enterprize which depended so much on Spanish cooperation. This question was none of his seeking; but he must say, that even a victory, if attended with calamitous consequences, did not deserve the thanks of that house. He believed that Lord Wellington was fettered by the nature of the service on which he had been sent, and by his instructions, and that the plan and its calamitous circumstances, ought to be attributed to ministers. The vote of thanks to Lord Wellington was carried without a division. The motions for thanks to the inferior officers and army were carried unanimously. Thanks to Lord Wellington and the army at Talavera were moved in the House of Commons, February 1. * See various Extracts, from the Correspondence of the Marquis of Wellesley, with Mr. C. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Vol. LI. 1809. History of Europe, Chap. X. pp. 182-195. The The arguments pro and con were, as might well be supposed, the same in substance as those that had been urged in the House of Lords. The motion was made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Lord Milton observed, that their votes of thanks, from their frequency, lost their value, and ceased to be an honour. They had got so much into the habit of voting thanks, that it was now almost an insult not to vote them. It was not sufficient to say, that Sir Arthur Wellesley had got out of the danger into which he had run, with great skill. He should have shewn his skill in avoiding it. What thanks would the house bestow on an admiral, who first ran his fleet among rocks and shoals, and then evinced great ability in getting it off again? The ambition of Sir Arthur Wellesley was conspicuous in both the battles of Talavera and Vimeira. In both he seemed to have fought merely for a peerage; certainly more with such a view, than was consistent with the conduct of a good and prudent commander. The whole campaign was wrapped in mystery, and he was determined to have information before he voted honours. Lord Milton concluded with moving, as an amendment to the motion before them, "That the thanks of the house should be given to the officers and troops who served under Lord Wellington, for their undaunted courage and gallantry, on the 27th and 28th of July, in the battle of Talavera. But while the house gave this praise to the officers and men, for their undaunted courage and gallantry, they had to lament, that the army, since that period, had been unable VOL. LII. to resume offensive operations. They had also to lament, that after the battle, they had suffered the enemy to pass two days in inactivity, without attacking them, and also, for having allowed themselves to be cut off at the bridge of Arzobispo." Mr. Vernon, in a maiden speech, seconded the amendment. In proportion as he admired the firmness and bravery of the army, he régretted that it should have been not only unprofitably employed, but unnecessarily exposed. Lord Wellington might have learned more discretion from the experience of Sir John Moore's incursion into Spain. Lord Wellington had not the same excuse, nor the same incitement as Sir John Moore to penetrate into Spain. He was invested with large limits of discretion, which that admirable officer, Sir John Moore, was not, and had no officious and impertinent interference to encounter. He had not to contend against the arrogant dictates of a rash and presumptuous diplomatist; of blind but obtrusive zeal, seeking, by the display of devotion to the cause of the Junta, to establish a claim to a Spanish marquisate. It was stated, that if two things had occurred, we should have suc ceeded better. If the Spanish Junta had not acted as they did, and if the Spanish general had done his duty, the success would have been more complete. All this might have been foreseen. But if the object of the march into Spain, was to fall on General Victor single-handed, as soon as Cuesta refused the co-operation, which was promised, it was the duty of Lord Wellington to have retired, D retired. On what grounds, Mr. Vernon asked, did Lord Wellington calculate, that his 25,000 men would be able to contend with 100,000 Frenchmen, in the heart of the peninsula? It had been said, that the French armies had been checked by this battle; but the real result of the battle of Talavera was, that our army was checked-checked in its proposed march to Madrid, for which important service Joseph Buonaparte had thanked his troops. The resources of Spain were stated to consist in her loyalty and religion. There were systems of religion, such as those which inculcate predestination, that inspire an extraordinary contempt of danger. He did not know that such was the character of the religion to which the Spaniards were bigoted; neither did he calculate much on their loyalty to such a sovereign as Ferdinand VII. who had voluntarily thrown himself into the hands of the enemy, and might be said to have resigned his crown. If he saw the crown and the altar surrounded with equal laws, and the spirit of liberty, the animating principle and bond of union among the Spaniards, then he should not despair of that country. This he believed to have been the principle which dictated the heroic resistance of Saragossa and Gerona. He was not, however, for desert-. ing the Spaniards altogether. He would wish to lend them every assistance except a British army. Lord Castlereagh supported the motion for thanks to Lord Wellington, not only by a description of the battle of Talavera, but by 1 a brief review of the whole cam paign, in the same manner as had been done by the Marquis of Wellesley in the House of Peers. Mr. Whitbread observed, that while Lord Wellington, accused General Cuesta of delay, he ought to have stated the grounds of it; and in not doing it he did that general injustice. The Spaniards, whom he represented as taking no part in the action, he was, nevertheless, necessitated to mention no less than five times in his dispatch; and it was rather too much to say that he had contended with double his numbers. He had even mentioned a Spanish general, who was wounded in bringing up his inactive infantry to assist in the battle. Mr. Windham, too, was sorry that such a letter as had been sent by Lord Wellington had ever been. written. It proclaimed glory which did not belong to him. As in a sea engagement, it could not be contended that the hull of a vessel had nothing to do with the guns, which gained the victory. So with the Spanish army; they did all that was required of them. They kept their position.* But the victory itself must have been of use to the Spanish cause, as it shewed them that a British army was invincible. And the victory well deserved the honour of the rewardmoved to be bestowed on it by the house. Many other members spoke on. the opposite side of the question. The vote of thanks to Lord Wellington was carried without a division. Thanks to the other officers. unanimously; and also, umanimously, acknowledgments to the Compare list, of Europe, Vol. LI. [1309] pp. 185. 186. non |