assent of Alexander, and no sooner did he arrive at Milan than he assisted the pope in his enterprise in Romagna, who obtained instant possession of it in consequence of the reputation he derived from his alliance with the king.

"The duke having thus acquired Romagna and defeated the Colonni, two things impeded his future, and even rendered his present, conquests insecure; the one the little faith he could repose in his army, the other the uncertainty of the French; that is, he feared lest the arms of Ursini, of which he had availed himself, not only should refuse to acquire him any more dominions, but that they should even deprive him of what he had already acquired, and he had similar ground of apprehension with respect to the king of France. Of the disposition of the Ursini he already possessed evidence in the coldness with which they attacked Bologna after the capture of Faenza. Of the disposition of Louis he was not less certain, having been compelled by him, after conquering the duchy of Urbino, to desist from any attempt on Tuscany. For these reasons the duke was determined not to depend any longer on the fortune or arms of others.

"The first step he took after this resolution was to weaken the party of the Ursini and Colonni in Rome by gaining over all their powerful adherents. Some of them he appointed to offices about his person, others he bribed by pensions, among others he distributed titles and honours with a lavish hand; and to others he gave commands and governments, so that in a few months all affection to their party was extinguished, and they became wholly attached to the duke. After this he waited for an opportunity to destroy the Ursini (having already disabled the Colonni) which soon presented itself and of which he made good use: for the Ursini perceiving, though late, that the aggrandisement of the duke and of the church was ruinous to them, convened an assembly of their friends at Magione in the territory of Perugia. The consequence of this was the rebellion of Urbino and commotions in Romagna, which the duke with infinite risk and peril at length quelled through the assistance of the French. The duke having thus established his reputation was still doubtful of the French: and in order not to be obliged to put their fidelity to the proof, he had recourse to artifice, and knew so well how to dissemble that a reconciliation took place between him and the Ursini through the medium of Paolo one of that family. When this was done he took care to lull them into a fatal security by presents of robes, money and horses, and so great was his address, and so profound their security, that they trusted themselves in his hands at Sinigalia, where they were all put to death. The heads of the party being thus destroyed, and the inferior partisans having transferred their attachment to him, the duke had laid a tolerably good foundation for future power, being in possession of Romagna and the duchy of Urbino, and

having gained the hearts of the inhabitants, who already tasted the good effects of his government. I shall dwell particularly on this part, as I think it well worth the attention and imitation of others.

"When the duke took possession of Romagna he found that it had been hitherto governed by petty lords who had employed themselves more in robbing than in governing their subjects, and had sown among them discord rather than union, so that the whole country teemed with robbers, feuds, and every species of anarchy necessarily consequent on a weak administration. In order to restore peace to this distracted country and to render it obedient to the arms of the monarch, he thought it necessary to constitute a good government; he therefore appointed Remiro d'Orco, a man, severe but full of energy, and gave him the most ample power: this man in a short time, and with great reputation to himself, restored the blessings of peace and union to the country. When this was done the duke took away this excessive power, lest it should become odious to his new subjects; he established a civil tribunal in the centre of the country headed by a worthy magistrate, and at which every town had its own proper advocate; being aware that the severities which had already taken place had generated odium against him, in order to destroy this impression and entirely gain their hearts, he determined to show them that if cruelties had been committed they proceeded not from his orders but from the savage nature of his minister. Having arrested him therefore on this account, he one morning caused him to be cut in two in the public square of Cesena, and to be exposed with part of a gibbet and a bloody knife at his side. The ferocity of which spectacle gave the people a joy mixed with dread, and satisfaction mingled with stupor.

"But to return where we broke off. The duke finding himself very powerful, and in part secure from present danger, by having arms in his own hands, and by having, in a great measure, destroyed those of the neighbouring powers who could hurt him, saw that France was the only obstacle to his future conquests, for he well knew that Louis, perceiving though late, his error, would no longer render him assistance. For this reason he began to seek new assistance, and to waver with respect to France, which he manifested when the French advanced into the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards, who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention wholly to have secured himself against the French, and this he would have easily done if Alexander had lived. Such were his arrangements in the present state of affairs, but with respect to future circumstances he had great cause for doubt and anxiety. In the first place be had reason to fear lest the next successor to the papal throne should not be his friend, and should resume such of the ecclesiastical possessions as Alexander had given him. This he strove to obviate in four different

ways: first, by exterminating the whole race of those princes whose dominions he had seized, in order that the future pope might have no appeal made for his interference. Secondly, by gaining over all the principal men of Rome, that by their assistance he might keep the future pope in check. Thirdly, by acquiring as much interest as possible in the College of Cardinals. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power during the life of the present pope, that he might be able of himself to withstand the first attack at least of the future pope.

"Of these four things he had brought three to bear at the time of Alexander's death, and even the fourth he had nearly accomplished; for he caused the assassination of as many as possible of the dethroned princes, very few of their race escaping; he gained over the chief men of Rome, and he acquired great influence in the conclave. With respect to the acquisition of fresh power, he formed the design of becoming master of Tuscany, was actually in possession of Perugia and Piombino, and had become protector of Pisa. And when he had no longer occasion to keep terms with the French, that is, when they were driven out of Naples by the Spaniards, and when both parties needed his assistance, he threw of the mask and became sovereign of Pisa. After this Lucca and Sienna soon yielded, partly through envy of the Florentines and partly through fear. The case of the Florentines seemed desperate, and had he succeeded against them, even if his success had been deferred till the last year of Alexander's life, he would have acquired so much additional strength and so much renown, that he might have rested secure in his own strength without at all depending on the assistance of others.

"But Alexander died five years after his son had drawn the sword, and left him firmly established in Romagna alone, in insecure possession of his other conquests, placed between two powerful hostile armies, and attacked by a singular and dangerous distemper. Yet so great was the energy of the duke, so well was he acquainted with the arts of gaining the affections of some and ruining others, and so massy were the foundations he had laid in such a short space of time, that if he had not had these armies to contend with, if he had not been paralized by illness, he would have surmounted every difficulty. That he laid a good foundation is clear from these circumstances: Romagna waited more than a month for his arrival; in Rome, though half dead, he remained secure, and though the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Ursini came to that city, they could form no party against him. Though he could not place the tiara where he pleased, he prevented it from decking the brow of an enemy. If at the death of Alexander he himself had not been enervated by disease, all would have been well. He himself told me the very day Julius II. was elected, that he had long foreseen and guarded against every event to which the death

of his father might give rise, except that he might at such a juncture be himself at the point of death.

"When therefore all these actions of the duke are investigated, I know not how to accuse him of want of policy, but on the contrary think him worthy of being held forth as an example to those who have usurped SOVEREIGNTY. With his lofty mind and his ambitious spirit he could not act otherwise than he did; the shortness of Alexander's life and his own illness were the only obstacles to his designs. Whoever therefore, in newly acquired dominions, thinks it necessary to make sure of enemies, to gain friends, to conquer either by force or fraud, to make himself loved and feared by the people, followed and revered by the soldiery, to destroy those from whom injury is dreaded, to substitute new in the place of old customs, to be severe and grateful, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a faithless soldiery and in its stead create a new military establishment, to maintain the friendship of kings and princes in such a manner that they may receive pleasure in being friends and may dread to be enemies, cannot have a more striking or a more recent model than the conduct of Cæsar Borgia. His only error was in suffering Julius II. to be elected pope: for it having been in some degree in his power to direct the choice of the conclave, he ought by no means to have consented to the elevation of any one of those cardinals whom he had injured, or who when elevated to the papal throne might have reason to dread his resentment, for men are enemies not only to those they hate, but to those they fear. Among those whom he had injured were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. All the other candidates for the tiara had reason to fear him, except the cardinal of Rouen and the Spanish cardinals. The latter were attached to him by alliances and obligations, and the former was exempted from fear by the powerful protection of the king of France. The game the duke had to play, was to make the election fall on a Spaniard, and if he could not accomplish this, on the cardinal of Rouen rather than on San Pietro ad Vincula; for whoever thinks that acts of kindness obliterate the remembrance of former injuries in great personages is grossly deceived. The duke, therefore, erred in this choice, and this error was ultimately the cause of his ruin."

SECTION VI.

"Ut nemo doceat fraudis et scelerum vias regnum docebit."

By the extract from The Prince of Machiavel, given in the last section, the reader has no doubt seen the real drift of the whole work. To accuse its author of seriously recommending tyranny, would be as absurd as to say that Swift was serious in his advice to servants. The fact is, that Machiavel says, what princes do, not what they ought to do; he does not teach them dangerous politics, but they have taught him what he has written. If he ironically recommends them to be dissemblers, it is because the actions of princes long before the time of Machiavel had already proved, that qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare. If there was a tribunal at which authors were obliged to answer for the contents of their works, I can conceive Machiavel pleading in his defence in terms something like the following:

"Far be it from me to defend the precepts contained in my publication of The Prince.' I here publicly declare them to be wicked and detestable. But whence did I derive, where did I discover them? Are these wicked precepts new, was this detestable doctrine invented by me? Examine the history of the reign of kings, and if the most execrable of my ironical instructions have not been put in practice by the most illustrious of them, condemn me to eternal infamy. But if my writings contain only a fair portrait of the actions of men, called illustrious, why adore the original, yet execrate the copy? Did not the great Cosimo de Medici say that princes cannot govern their states with their beads in their hands!‡ that is to say, that princes must occasionally violate the holy laws of reli

* ( " By the bare exercise of royalty the most innocent will learn to be guilty without any other tutor." Seneca in Thyeste: act. 2. v. 313. Again, v. 217. “Sanctitas pietas fides privata bona sunt; qua juvat reges eant."

"The very name of a politician has connected with it the ideas of fraud, treachery, cruelty and tyranny; and those masters who have faithfully unveiled the mysteries of state freemasonry, have ever been held in general detestation. The case of Machiavel seems at first sight something hard in that respect. He is obliged to bear the iniquities of those whose maxims and rules of government he published. His speculation is more abhorred than their practice." Burke on Natural Society.

Che gli stati non si tenevano con pater-nostri. Mach. Hist. 7.