ligitur angelorum, profecto facti sunt participes lucis æternæ, quod [quæ est ipsa incommutabilis sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quem dicimus unigenitum Dei filium, ut ea luce illuminati, qua creati, fierent lux, et vocarentur dies participatione incommutabilis lucis et diei, quod est verbum Dei, per quod et ipsi et omnia facta sunt. Lumen quippe verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem in hunc mundum venientem, hoc illuminat et omnem angelum mundum, ut sit lux non in se ipso, sed in Deo: a quo si avertitur angelus, fit immundus.

(8) Some of the earlier theologians, e. g. Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nazianzum, founded different orders of angels on the various names given to them in Scripture. Bas. de Spir. S. c. 16. Greg. Orat. xxviii. 31, p. 521, mentions ȧyyśλous sivaç xai ἀρχαγγέλους, θρόνους, κυριότητας, ἀρχὰς, ἐξουσίας, λαμπρότητας, ἀναβάσεις, vosgas duvajsrs. vous. He does not, however, distinctly state by what these different classes are distinguished, since he thinks these internal relations of the world of spirits beyond the reach of human apprehension; Ullmann, p. 494. Comp. Augustine Enchirid. ad Laur. 58: Quomodo autem se habeat beatissima illa et superna societas, quæ ibi sint differentiæ personarum, ut cum omnes tamquam generali nomine angeli nuncupentur...... ego me ista ignorare confiteor. Sed nec illud quidem certum habeo, utrum ad eandem societatem pertineant sol et luna et cuncta sidera etc. But Pseudo-Dionysius, who lived nearly a century after Augustine, seems to have understood the subject much better; in his Hierarchia cœlestis (Ed. Lansselii, Par. 1615 fol.) c. 6, he divided the whole number of angels into three classes (hierarchies), and subdivided each class into three orders (τάγματα): i. 1. Θρόνοι, 2. Χερουβίμ, 3. Σεραφίμ, ii. 4. κυριότη τες. 5. ἐξουσίαι, 6. δυνάμεις. iii. 7. ἀρχαί, 8. ἀρχάγγελοι, 9. ἄγγελοι. He nevertheless observed, that the last term, as well as duváμers ougával, was common to all (c. 11.) Gregory the Great followed him (Hom. in Ezekiel, xxxiv. 7. Opp. Tom. i. p. 1603, al. ii. p. 477.), and mentioned the following nine classes: Angeli, Archangeli, Virtutes, Potestates, Principatus, Dominationes,

a Pseudo-Dionysius, however, cap. 1, and 2,) endeavoured to remove the gross and sensuous ideas of the body of the angels, and designated the common terminology as ἀπότομον τῶν ἀγγελικῶν ὀνομάτων σκευήν durum angeliorum nominum apparatum), con.p. his mystical interpretation of the images of angels in cap. 15.

Throni, Cherubim atque Seraphim, which he brought into connection with the nine precious stones spoken of in Ezek. xxviii.

13.

§ 132.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

Metaphysical definitions of the nature of Angels were of less importance in the religious-moral, consequently dogmatic point of view, than the question whether angels, like men, possessed a free will, and were capable of sinning? It was generally admitted that this had been the case prior to the fall of the evil angels. But theologians did not agree in their opinions respecting another point, viz. whether the good angels who at first resisted temptation, will never yield to it, or whether it is possible that they too should fall into sin? Gregory of Nazianzum, and still more decidedly Cyrill of Jerusalem, pronounced in favour of the latter view,(1) Augustine adopted the former.(2)

(1) Gregory thought that the angels were not axívnro, but duaxívnro to evil (Orat. xxviii. 31, p. 521), and imagined that this would necessarily follow from the fact that Lucifer once fell, Orat. xxxviii. 9, p. 668. Orat. xlv. 5, p. 849. Ullmann, p. 496. Comp. also Basil the Great de Spir. S. c. 16.) But Cyrill of Jerusalem (Cat. ii. 10.) insisted that the predicate "sinless" should be applied to none but Christ, and maintained that the angels too stood in need of pardon. Comp. Lactantius Inst. vii. 20 Angeli Deum metuunt, quia castigari ab eo possunt inenarrabili quodam modo.

(2) Aug. de ver. rel. i. 13: Fatendum est enim, et angelos natura esse mutabiles, si solus Deus est incommutabilis; sed ea voluntate, qua magis Deum quam se diligunt, firmi et stabiles manent in illo et fruuntur majestate ipsius, ei uni libentissime subditi. According to the Enchiridion, c. 28. the good angels received after the fall of the evil ones what they had not had before, viz. certam scientiam, qua essent de sua sempiterna et nunquam casura stabilitate securi; this idea is evidently in accordance with his anthropological views on the donum perseve

rantiæ, and is more prominently brought forward de civ. Dei xi, 13: Quis enim catholicus christianus ignorat nullum novum diabolum ex bonis angelis ulterius futurum: sicut nec istum in societatem bonorum angelorum ulterius rediturum? Veritas quippe in Evangelio sanctis fidelibusque promittit, quod erunt æquales Angelis Dei? quibus etiam promittitur, quod ibunt in vitam æternam. Porro autem si nos certi sumus nunquam nos ex illa immortali felicitate casuros, illi vero certi non sunt: jam potiores, non æquales eis erimus: sed quia nequaquam Veritas fallit, et æquales eis erimus, profecto etiam ipsi certi sunt suæ felicitatis æternæ, Comp. Pseudo-Dionys. c. 7. Gregory the Great also asserted that the good angels have obtained the confirmatio in bono as a Divine gift, Ezech. lib. i. hom. 7. Mor. v. c. 38, and xxxvi. c. 7. Lau, p. 362.

§ 133.

DEVIL AND DEMONS.

According to the prevailing opinion of the age pride was the true cause of the fall of the evil spirits.(1) Almost all the theologians of this period, with the exception of Lactantius, whose notions resembled those of the dualistic Manichæans, (2) regarded the devil as a being of limited power,(3 whose seductions Christian believers might at any time resist. (4) Didymus of Alexandria, and Gregory of Nyssa ventured-though with great caution to revive the notion of Origen, that there was still hope of the final conversion of the devil.) Cyrill of Jerusalem, Jerome, and Augustine combated this opinion, which was condemned in the sixth century by the Emperor Justinian, together with the other errors of Origen.(6) moreover supposed, that demonaical powers were still brought into operation,(7) but were most effectually resisted by the name of Christ, and the sign of the cross.(8)

(1) Eus. demonstr. evang. iv. 9. Aug. de vera rel. i. 13: Ille autem angelus magis se ipsum, quam Deum diligendo subditus ei esse noluit et intumuit per superbiam, et a summa essentia

defecit et lapsus est, et ob hoc minus est quam fuit, quia co quod minus erat frui voluit, quum magis voluit sua potentia frui, quam Dei. De catechiz. rudibus § 30: superbiendo deseruit obedientiam Dei et Diabolus factus est. De civ. D. xii. c. 6: Cum vero causa miseriæ malorum angelorum quæritur, ea merito occurrit, quod ab illo qui summe est aversi ad se ipsos conversi sunt, qui non summe sunt: et hoc vitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupatur? Initium quippe omnis peccati superbia. Comp. Enchirid. ad Laurent. c. 28. Envy was added to pride, comp. Gregory of Nazianz. Orat. xxxvi. 5, p. 637, and vi. 13, p. 187. Ullmann, p. 499. Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. catech. c. 6: Taura de [viz. the excellence of the first man] rộ ảviκειμένῳ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν φθόνον πάθους ὑπεκκαύματα ἦν. Cassian, Collat. viii. 6, makes mention of both superbia and invidia. The idea of lasciviousness was put more and more into the background. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Cyrill of Alexandria, Augustine, and Cassian, gave also a more correct interpretation of the passage in Gen. vi. 2, which was misunderstood by earlier theologians; we may, however observe, that Eusebius (præp. ev. v.4), Ambrose de Noë et arca, c. 4), and Sulpicius Severus, (Hist. sacra, i. 3,) explained it in a sense similar to that which was formerly attached to it (§ 52, note 3.) Comp. Chrys. hom. in Gen. xxii. Opp. T. ii. p. 216. Theodoret in Gen. quæst. 47. Opp. T. i. p. 58: Εμβρόντητοι ὄντες καὶ ἄγαν ἠλίθιοι, ἀγγέλους τούτους ἀπέλαβον, and fab. her. ep. v. 7. Opp. iv. p. 402: Παραπληξίας γὰρ ἐσχάτης τὸ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις προσάψαι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀκολασίαν. Cyrill Al. contra Anthropomorphitas, c. 17, (Opp. T. vi. p. 384,) contra Julian lib. ix. p. 296. 97. Aug. de civ. Dei xv. 23, quæst. 3, in Gen. Cassian Coll. viii. c. 20, 21. [Comp. Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 90-92.] Hilary (in Ps. cxxxii. p. 403,) mentions the earlier interpretation, but without approval. Philastrius, on the contrary, numbers it among the heresies, hær. 107, (de gigantibus tempore Noë.)

(2) Inst. ii. 8. Previous to the creation of the world God created a spirit like unto himself (the Logos), who possessed the attributes of the Father; but after that he created another spirit, in whom the Divine seed did not remain (in quo indoles divinæ stirpis non permansit.) Moved by envy he apostatized, and changed his name (contrarium sibi nomen ascivit.) The Greek writers call him draßokos, the Latin criminator, quod crimina, in quæ ipse illicit, ad Deum deferat (hence the appellation

obtrectator.) He envies especially his predecessor (the firstborn), because he continued to enjoy the favour of God.-Lactantius thus agrees with the other theologians in supposing that envy had been the cause of the fall. But his peculiar manner of representing Satan, as it were, as the second Son of God, and of drawing a parallel between him and the first-born, certainly reminds us of Gnostico-Manichæan notions. In another passage (which, though now wanting in many MSS., was probably at an early period omitted to save the reputation of Lactantius) he calls the Logos the right, and Satan the left hand of God. If the passage in question were genuine, it would go to prove very clearly, that the views of Lactantius on this subject were essentially Manichæan, though the unity of the Father would be still preserved above the contrast of Logos and Satan; but the notion last mentioned would justly expose its author to the charge of Arianism. This seems to have been felt by those critics who omitted the above passage. Comp. the note of Cellarius in the edition of Bünemann, i. p. 218. Comp. Cap. ix. where the term Antitheus occurs, (Arnob. contra gent. iv. 12, and Orelli on that passage.) Augustine opposed the Manichæan notion, c. Faust. 21. 1. and 2.

(3) Gregory the Great calls him a stupid animal; for he entertains hopes respecting heaven without being able to obtain it, and is caught in his own net, Mor. xxxiii. c. 15. Lau, p. 364.

(4) Gregory of Nazianz. Orat. xl. 10, p. 697, makes special mention of the water of baptism, and the Spirit as the means, by which to quench the arrows of the wicked. Satan had no power over Christ; deceived by his human appearance, he took him for a mere man. But the Christian who is united to Christ by faith, can likewise resist him, Orat. xxiv. 10, p. 443 : Παχύτεραι γὰρ αἱ καθαραι ψυχαι καὶ θεοειδεῖς πρὸς θήραν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος, κὰν ὅτι μάλιστα σοφιστικὸς ᾗ και ποικίλος τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. The assertion of Hilary in Ps. cxli. p. 541: quidquid inquinatum homines gerunt, a Diabolo suggeritur, met with opposition on the part of Gennadius de eccles. dogm. c. 48: Non omnes malæ cogitationes nostræ semper Diaboli instinctu excitantur, sed aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt. Comp. also Chrys. de

a The sense of the very appropriate passage quoted by Baumgarten-Crusius, p. 987: Diabolus non simpliciter Deus est, sed illis Deus existit, qui illum Christo anteponunt (according to 2 Cor. iv. 4,) is the same, but not the words.