passages will be found in Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 375, ss. Comp. Wiggers, p. 91, ss. Augustine himself protested against the expression peccatum naturæ, or peccatum naturale, which the Pelagians imputed to him, and always returned to the use of the phrase peccatum originale. The Pelagians considered bodily death not as the effect of the first sin, but as a physical necessity, though Pelagius himself conceded at the synod of Diospolis, that the death of Adam was a punishment inflicted upon him, but only upon him. Aug. de nat. et gr. 21, (c. 19.) Op. imp. i. 67; vi. 27, 30.

(2) A list of the works in which Augustine combated the Pelagians, will be found in Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, p. 373. The passages bearing on this question, which can be understood, however, only in their own connection, are also given there, p. 377, ss. (Comp. de Pecc. mer. i. 2, 4, 21; opus imp. vi. 30; de pecc. mer. i. 10; de nupt. et concup. i. 27, ii. 57–59; op. imp. i. 47; de nupt. et concup. i. 26; de pecc. orig. 36; de con. et grat. 28. In support of his views he appealed to infant baptism: de pecc. mer. i. 39, iii. 7; contra Jul. vi. 6; de pecc. mer. i. 21; enchirid. 93; to the formulas of exorcism: de pecc. orig. 45; and principally to Rom. v. 12.) Wiggers, p. 99, ss. On Augustine's interpretation of Rom. v. 12, (in quo omnes peccaverunt, Vulg.) see Op. imp. ii. 47, ss., 66, contra duas Epp. Pel. iv. 7, (c. 4 :) Julian, on the other hand, gives the following explanation: in quo omnes peccaverunt nihil aliud indicat, quam: quia omnes peccaverunt. Augustine's exposition was confirmed by the synod of Carthage (A. D. 418.) Comp. Münscher von Cölln, p. 381, 382. But it would be a great mistake to ascribe the whole theory of Augustine to this exegetical error: very different causes gave rise to that theory, viz. 1. His own disposition, moulded by the remarkable events in the history of his external and internal life; 2. Perhaps some remnants of his former Manichæan notions, of which he might be unconscious himself, e. g. that of the defiling element of the concupiscentia, libido in the act of generation; 3. His realistic mode of thinking, which led him to confound the abstract with the concrete, and to consider the individual as a transitory and perishing part of the whole (massa perditionis.) In connection with this mode of thinking another cause might be, 4. his notions of the church as a living organism, and of the effects of infant baptism; 5. the opposition which he was compelled to make to Pelagianism, which threat

ened to destroy the true nature of Christianity. Thus, according to Augustine, not only was physical death a punishment inflicted upon Adam and all his posterity, but he looked upon original sin itself as being in some sense a punishment of the first transgression, though it was also a real sin (God punishes sin by sin), and can therefore be imputed to every individual. But it is on this very point, viz. the imputation of original sin, that his views differed from all former opinions, however strict they were. He endeavoured to clear himself from the charge of Manichæism (in opposition to Julian) by designating sin not a substance, but a vitium, a languor; he even charged his opponent with Manichæism.- Respecting his views of the insignificant remnant (lineamenta extrema) of the Divine image left in man, and of the virtues of pagans, see Wiggers, p. 119, note.

§ 112.

SECOND POINT OF CONTROVERSY.

Liberty and Grace.

Pelagius admitted, that man in his moral efforts stands in need of the Divine aid, and therefore spoke of the grace of God as assisting the imperfections of man by a variety of means.(1) He supposed, however, that this grace of God is something external, and added to the efforts put forth by the free will of man; it must even be deserved by virtuous inclinations.(2) Augustine, on

the other hand, looked upon it as the creative principle of life, which produces out of itself the liberty of the will, which is entirely lost in the natural man. In the power of the natural man to choose between good and evil, to which great importance was attached by Pelagius, as well as by the earlier church, he saw only a liberty to do evil, since the regenerate man alone can will good.(3)

(1) Concerning this point Pelagius expresses himself as follows (in August. de grat. c. 5): Primo loco posse statuimus, secundo velle, tertio esse. Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, esse in effectu locamus. Primum illud, i. e. posse, ad Deum proprie

pertinet, qui illud creaturæ suæ contulit; duo vero reliqua, h. e. velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt. Ergo in voluntate et opere laus hominis est, immo et hominis et Dei, qui ipsius voluntatis et operis possibilitatem dedit, quique ipsam possibilitatem gratiæ suæ adjuvat semper annilio. Quod vero potest homo velle bonum atque perficere, solius Dei est. Hence man also owes to God, that he can will, c. 18: Habemus autem possibilitatem a Deo insitam, velut quandam, ut ita dicam, radicem fructiferam atque fecundum, etc. The freedom of the will is common to Jews, Gentiles, and Christians; grace, according to Pelagius himself, belongs exclusively to Christianity. Pelagius also rejected the proposition of Celestius," gratiam Dei non ad singulos actus dari.” [Münscher von Cölln, i. p. 386.]

(2) Pelagius considered as means of grace especially the doctrine (as the manifestation of the Divine will), the promises, and trials (to which belong the wiles of Satan); but Julian strongly denied, that the will of man is thus created by them (fabricetur, condatur); he sees in them nothing but an adjutorium of the undisturbed free will. Comp. Aug. de grat. Chr. c. 8. Op. imp. i. 94, 95. [Münscher, 1. c. p. 387, 88.]

(3) Augustine, on the contrary, maintains : Non lege atque doctrina insonante forinsecus, sed interna et occulta, mirabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum non solum veras revelationes, sed bonas etiam voluntates (de grat. Chr. 24.) He recognizes in the grace of God an inspiratio dilectionis, and considers it as the source of every thing. Nolentem prævenit, ut velit, volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit (Enchir. c. 32.)— He understands by freedom to be free from sin, that state of mind in which it is no longer necessary to choose between good and evil. The same view is expressed in his treatise de civit. Dei xiv. 11, which was not a controversial writing: Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum vitiis peccatisque non servit. Tale datum est a Deo : quod amissum proprio vitio, nisi a quo pari potuit, reddi non potest. Unde Veritas dicit: Si vos Filius liberavit, tunc vere liberi eritis. Idque ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: si vos Filius salvos fecerit, tunc vere salvi eritis. Inde quippe liberator, unde salvator. Comp. contra duas epp. Pel. i. 2. The freedom of the will is greater in proportion as the will itself is in a state of health; its state of health depends on its subjection to the Divine mercy and grace. Contra

Jul. c. 8, he calls the human will servum propriæ voluntatis arbitrium. Such expressions were so much misused by the monks of Adrumetum (about the year 426), that Augustine himself was compelled to oppose them (especially in his treatise de correptione de gratia); on the whole, he himself frequently appealed from a practical point of view to the will of man (see the next §) [For a more detailed statement of Augustine's views respecting grace and the freedom of the will, see Münscher ed. by von Cölln, i. § 93, and p. 388-398, where further passages are quoted.]

§ 113.

THIRD POINT OF CONTROVERSY.

Predestination.

We have already seen that Augustine held the doctrine of hereditary depravity, the guilt of which man has himself incurred, and from which no human power, nor human volition can deliver, but those alone will be saved to whom the grace of God is imparted. From these premises it would necessarily follow, that God, in consequence of an eternal decree, and without any reference to the future conduct of man, has elected some out of the corrupt mass to become vessels of his mercy (vasa misericordiæ,) and left the rest as vessels of his wrath (vasa iræ,) to bear the just consequences of their sins. Augustine called the former predestinatio, the latter reprobatio, and thus evaded the necessity of directly asserting the doctrine of a predestination to evil (prædestinatio duplex.) (1) On the whole, he endeavoured to soften the harshness of his theory by practical cautions. (2) But the doctrine in question became to many a stone of stumbling, which orthodox theologians themselves (especially those of the Greek church) endeavoured by every possible means to remove.(3) This prepared the way for those vague and unfounded schemes to which Semipelagianism (see the following section) gave rise.

(1) De Præd. Sanctorum 37 (c. 18): Elegit nos Deus in Christo ante mundi constitutionem, prædestinans nos in adoptionem filiorum non quia per nos sancti et immaculati futuri eramus, sed elegit prædestinavitque, ut essemus. Fecit autem hoc secundum placitum voluntatis suæ, ut nemo de sua, sed de illius erga se voluntate glorietur, etc. In support of his views he appealed to Eph. i. 4. 11. and Rom. ix., and spoke of a certus numerus electorum, neque augendus, neque minuendus, de corrept. et gr. 39, (c. 13.)-He refutes the objections of the understanding by quoting Rom. ix. 20, and adducing examples from sacred history. Even in this life worldly goods, health, beauty, physical and intellectual powers, are distributed unequally, and not always in accordance with our views of merit, ibid. 19, c. 8. Christ himself was predestinated to be the Son of God, de pred. 31, (c. 15.)

(2) De dono persev. 57, (c. 22): Prædestinatio non ita populis prædicanda est, ut apud imperitam vel tardioris intelligentiæ multitudinem redargui quodammodo ipsa sua prædicatione videatur; sicut redargui videtur et præscientia Dei (quam certe negare non possunt) si dicatur hominibus: "Sive curatis, sive dormiatis, quod vos præscivit qui falli non potest, hoc eritis." Dolosi autem vel imperiti medici est, etiam utile medicamentum sic alligare, ut aut non prosit, aut obsit. Sed dicendum est: Sic currite, ut comprehendatis, atque ut ipso cursu vestro ita vos esse præcognitos noveritis, ut legitime curreretis." et si quo alio modo Dei præscientia prædicari potest, ut hominis segnitia repellatur. 59 :...de ipso autem cursu vestro bono rectoque condiscite vos ad prædestinationem divinæ gratiæ pertinere.

66

(3) Notwithstanding the condemnation of Pelagius at the synod of Ephesus, the system of Augustine did not exert any influence upon the theology of the eastern church. Theodore of Mopsuestia wrote (against the advocates of Augustinism): λέγοντας φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ πταίειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους 5 books (Photii Bibl. Cod. 177, some Latin fragments of which are preserved by Mar. Mercator ed. Baluz.) Fritzsche, p. 107, ss. (on the question whether it was directed against Jerome, or against Augustine? see Fritzsche, 1. c. p. 109, and Neander, Kirchengeschichte, ii. p. 1360, 61.) Theodoret, Chrysostom, Isidore of Pelusium, and others continued to follow the earlier course of dogmatic theology. See the passages in Münscher von Cölln, i. p. 408-10. and comp. § 108.