nisi volenti....Quæcunque ista causa est voluntatis: si non ei potest resisti, sine peccato ei ceditur; si autem potest, non ei cedatur et non peccabitur. An forte fallit incautum ? Ergo caveat ne fallatur. An tanta fallacia est ut caveri omnino non possit? si ita est, nulla peccata sunt: quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest? Peccatur autem; caveri igitur potest. Comp. de duab. animab. contra Manich. 12, and with it the retractationes of the different passages; also de nat. et grat. 80, (c. 67.) § 110. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. Wiggers, G. F., Versuch einer pragmatischen Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, Berlin 1821. Hamburgh, 1833, ii. 8. †Lentzen, J. A., de Pelagianorum doctrinæ principiis, Colon. ad Rhen. 1833. 8. J. L. Jacobi, die Lehre des Pelagius, Lpz. 1842. Towards the commencement of the fifth century Celestius and Pelagius (Brito, Morgan?) made their appearance in the West.(1) The views by which they were induced to deny the natural depravity of man, were partly in accordance with the opinions hitherto entertained by the theologians of the Greek church, but partly carried to a much greater length. Some of the propositions on the ground of which the presbyter Paulinus accused Celestius at the synod of Carthage (A. D. 412), had been previously defended by orthodox theologians; others were directly opposed both to the doctrine of Scripture (and especially that of Paul), and the general belief of the church, and thus threatened the fundamental doctrines of the gospel.(2) It is, however, difficult to decide how far the views of Pelagius accorded with these assertions, since he expressed himself very cautiously. (3) But it is certain that what is commonly called Pelagianism does not so much represent single notions of a single individual, as a complete moral and religious system, which formed a decided contrast to Augustinism. The former was in so far overcome by the latter, as in consequence of the turn which the controversy took, and of the great authority of Augustine in the West, his doctrine gained the victory over that of Pelagius. (4) The followers of Pelagius formed not a sect properly so called. But Pelagianism, though condemned, lost none of its advocates, especially as but few could fully enter into all the consequences of the Augustinian system, and find in them real inward satisfaction. It will be necessary, in order to examine more fully the subject before us, to divide the subject matter of controversy into three leading sections, viz. 1. Sin; 2. Grace and Liberty; and, 3. Predestination. (1) On the personal character and history of Celestius and Pelagius, see Wiggers, p. 33, ss. (2) The 6 or 7 capitula (the numbers vary according as the several propositions are separated, or joined together) are preserved by Augustine de gestis Pelagii, cap. 11, (comp. de peccato originali, 2, 3, 4, 11, c. 2-10), as well as in the two commonitoria of Marius Mercator, [comp. Gieseler, § 87, note 4.] They are the following (comp. Wiggers, i. p. 60): 1. Adam was created mortal, so that he would have died, whether he had sinned or not; 2. Adam's sin has only affected himself, and not the human race; 3. New-born infants are in the same condition in which Adam was previous to the fall (ante prævaricationem); 4. The whole human race dies neither in consequence of Adam's death, nor of his transgression; nor does it rise from the dead in consequence of Christ's resurrection ; 5. Infants obtain eternal life, though they should not be baptized; 6. The law is as good a means of salvation (lex sic mittit ad regnum cœlorum), as the gospel; 7. There were some men, even before the appearance of Christ, who did not commit sin. If we compare these propositions with the doctrines of the earlier theologians, we find, that the third was held by some of the Greek Fathers (e. g. Theophilus of Antioch, and Clement of Alexandria, see above, § 62, note 1); that the fifth was substantially the same with that defended by Gregory of Nazianzum and others, viz. that unbaptized children are not condemned on account of their not being baptized (comp. § 72); and that even the seventh, however heterodox it may appear, does not stand quite alone, inasmuch as the father of orthodoxy himself made a similar assertion (§ 108, note 3.) On the other hand, the first two and the fourth propositions, in which all connection betwen the sin of Adam and that of his posterity, and its effects even in relation to the mortality of the body, are denied, would have been condemned by the earlier theologians. But none appears so heretical, so much opposed to the doctrine of Paul and the Gospel, as the sixth. And, lastly, the denial of the connection subsisting between the resurrection of Christ and ours (in the fourth proposition), must have offended those who believed in the union of Christians with Christ; it may, however, be asked, whether some of these extreme views are more than the consequences which Celestius was compelled to infer from his premises by the opposition he met with? See Neander, Kirchengeschichte, ii. 3, p. 1219. (3) Augustine perceives no other difference between Pelagius and Celestius (de pecc. orig. c. 12.) than that the latter was more open, the former more guarded, the latter more obstinate, the former more deceitful, or, to say the least, that the latter was more straight-forward (liberior) the former more cunning (astutior.) Prosper of Aquitania calls him therefore coluber Britannus (in his poem de ingratis, append. 67.-comp. Wiggers, p. 40.)—Neander, (Chrysostomus, vol. ii. p. 134.) judges more mildly of him: " Pelagius is deserving of our esteem on account of his honest zeal for the promotion of morality; his object was to combat the same perverse antichristian tendency which Augustine opposed. But he was wrong in the manner in which he sought to attain his object," etc. Comp. Kirchengeschichte, ii. 3, p. 1195, ss. "For aught we know from his writings, he was a clear-headed, intelligent man, who possessed far more of a serious and moral turn of mind, than of that disposition which finds itself compelled to dive into the depths of the mind and of the spirit, and to bring to light hidden things," p. 1199. (4) THE PRINCIPAL POINTS IN THE EXTERNAL HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY ARE: The condemnation of the doctrine of Pela Y gius at Carthage A. D. 412. He repairs to Palestine, where Jerome becomes one of his most zealous opponents, and, conjointly with Paulus Orosius, a disciple of Augustine, accuses him at a synod held at Jerusalem (A. D. 415.) under John, bishop of Jerusalem. John, however, did not pronounce his condemnation, but reported the whole matter to Innocent, bishop of Rome.-Synod at Diospolis (Lydda), under Eulogius of Caesarea. The plaintiffs were Heros of Arles, and Lazarus of Aix. Acquittal of Pelagius. Dissatisfaction of Jerome with the decisions of this synod (Synodus miserabilis !)-Under Zosimus, the successor of Innocent, Pelagius and Celestius entertain new hopes.-Synod of the North-African bishops at Carthage A. D. 418, and condemnation of Pelagius.-The Emperor Honorius decides the controversy. Zosimus is induced to change his views, and publishes his Epistola tractoria, in which the Pelagian doctrine is condemned. Julian, bishop of Eclanum in Apulia, undertakes to defend Pelagianism (respecting him see Wiggers, i. p. 43, ss.) -He was anathematized at the synod of Ephesus (A. D. 431.), in connection with Nestorius (was it merely accidental that they were condemned in common?) Still the system of Augustine was not recognized in the East. § 111. FIRST POINT OF CONTROVERSY. Sin.-Original Sin and its Consequences. [Payne, G., The doctrine of Original Sin. Lond. 1846. Lect. V. Pelagius, from a speculative, and especially ethical point of view, regarded every human being as a moral agent who is complete in himself, and separate from all others. Hence sin would necessarily appear to him as the free act of the individual, and, in his opinion, there could be no other connection between the sin of the one (Adam), and the sin of the many (his posterity), than that which exists between the example, on the one hand, and voluntary imitation on the other. Every infant is accordingly in the same condition in which Adam was prior to the fall. Neither sin nor virtue is inherent, but the one, as well as the other, developes itself, when man comes to make use of his liberty, for which he himself is alone responsible.(1) Augustine, on the contrary, resting his system on more profound conceptions, which, however, might easily prevent a clear insight into the moral relations of man, considered the human race as a concrete totality. With a predominant bias towards religion, he directed his attention more to the inner and permanent state of the soul, and its absolute relation to God, than to the passing and external action of the individual. This tendency, as well as the experience of his own heart and life, led him to suppose a mysterious connection subsisting between the transgression of Adam, and the sin of all men-a connection which loses itself in the dim beginnings of nature no less than of history. Mere Mere suppositions, however, did not satisfy his mind; but, carrying out his system in all its logical consequences, and applying a false exegesis to certain passages, he laid down the following rigid proposition as his doctrine: "As all men have sinned in Adam, they are justly exposed to the vengeance of God because of this hereditary sin and guilt of sin."(2) (1) Pelag. lib. 1. de lib. arb. in Aug. de pecc. orig. c. 13: Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles, vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis: capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute ita et sine vitio procreamur, atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit; he even admits the preponderance of good in man, when he (according to August. de nat. et gr. c. 21,) speaks of a naturalis quædam sanctitas, which dwells in man, and keeps watch in the castle of the soul over good and evil, and by which he means conscience. Comp. Julian (quoted by August. in Op. imp. i. 105): Illud quod esse peccatum ratio demonstrat, inveniri nequit in seminibus. 122: Nemo naturaliter malus est: sed quicunque reus est, moribus, non exordiis accusatur. Other |