suet, p. 344, Irenæus must be understood as having explained the temptation by the serpent (in opposition to the Ophites), πνευματικῶς, not ἱστορικῶς, but it is not evident to what extent he did so. But Irenæus speaks elsewhere plainly enough of the fall of Adam as an historical fact, iii. 18. (Gr. 20.) p. 211. (Gr. 248.) iii. 21. (Gr. 31.) p. 218. (Gr. 259,) ss. Thus he labours to defend the threatening of God: "for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," from the chronological point of view, by taking the word "day" in the sense of " period," for one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." Adam and Eve died during that period on the same day on which they were created, and disobeyed the command of God, viz. on a Friday, adv. hær. v. 23. 2.

(4) Tert. adv. Judæos, ii. p. 184, de virg. vel. 11, adv. Marc. ii. 2, ss., and other passages. He insists upon the literal interpretation of the particulars of the narrative, as they succeeded each other in order of time: de resurr. carn. 61: Adam ante nomina animalibus enunciavit, quam de arbore decerpsit; ante etiam prophetavit, quam voravit.

(5) On the Gnostic (Basilidian) doctrine of the fall (ayas agz) comp. Clem. Strom. ii. 20, p. 488. Gieseler, Studien und Kritiken, 1830, p. 396. Baur, p. 211. The author of the Clementine Homilies goes so far in idealizing Adam, as to convert the historical person into a purely mythical being (like the AdamCadmon of the Cabbalists), while he represents Eve as far inferior to him. Hence Adam could not trespass, but sin makes its first appearance in Cain; vide Credner, ii. 258, iii. 284. Baur, Gnosis, p. 339. Schliemann, p. 177. On the other hand, the Gnostic Cainites rendered homage to Cain as the representative of freedom from the thraldom of the demiurgus; the Sethites considered Cain as the representative of the bylic, Abel as that of the psychical, and Seth as that of the pneumatic principle, as the ideal of humanity. Neander, Kirchengeschichte, i. 2, p. 758, 759, [translat. ii. p. 105, 106.]

§ 62.

STATE OF INNOCENCE AND FALL.

The Fathers of the primitive church differed in their opinions concerning the original excellencies of the first

man,(1) and the nature of his sin. (2) But they all believed that the temptation of the serpent was a real temptation to sin, and, accordingly, that the transgression of the Divine commandment was to be considered as a fall from a state of innocence followed by disastrous effects upon man.(3) On the contrary, the author of the Clementine Homilies denied that Adam could have sinned,(4) and the Ophites thought that by this event man was elevated to his proper dignity, (at least in one respect,) and prepared for the enjoyment of full liberty, because the prohibition had proceeded from the jealousy of Jaldabaoth, but the act of disobedience had been brought about by the intervention of wisdom (Sophia), the symbol of which is the serpent.(5)

(1) These were especially exaggerated by the author of the Clementine Homilies (see the preceding §.) Adam possessed prophetic gifts, hom. iii. 21, viii. 10. Credner, ii p. 248, and Baur, p. 363,) which, however, Tertullian de resurr. carn c. 61, also ascribed to him. The Ophites taught that Adam and Eve had light and luminous bodies, see Baur, p. 187. The theologians, previous to the time of Augustine, attached less value to what was afterwards called justitia originalis. According to Theophilus of Antioch (ad Aut. ii. 24, 27.) Adam was vos, and had to be treated as a child; he was neither mortal, nor immortal, but capable of either mortality or immortality. Clement of Alexandria maintains the same, Strom. vi. 12, p. 788: "They may learn from us (says he in opposition to the Gnostics), that Adam was created a perfect being, not in relation to his moral excellencies, but in respect to his capacity of choosing virtue ; for there is certainly a difference between the aptitude to virtue, and the real possession of it. God will have us to be happy by our own exertions, hence it belongs to the nature of the soul to determine itself, etc." Comp. Baur, Gnosis, p. 493. He thus limits the original excellencies, Strom. iv. p. 632, to what is purely human, viz. talents: Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν χαρακτηριζόντων τὴν ἀνθρώπου ἰδέαν τε καὶ μορφὴν ἐνεδέησεν αὐτῷ.

(2) Justin M., attributes the fall mainly to the cunning malignity of Satan, dial. c. Tryph. c. 119, p. 205. A beast (Ingior)

seduced man. On his own part, he added disobedience and credulity; comp. Semisch, p. 393-94. Clement of Alexandria conceives that it was voluptuousness which caused the fall of the first man. Coh. p. 86: "Όφις ἀλληγορεῖται ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ γαστέρα έρπουσα, κακία γηΐνη εἰς ὅλας τρεφομένη. Comp. Strom. iii. 17, p. 559, (470. Sylb.) Clement does not (like the Encratites whom he combats) find fault with the cohabitation of our first parents as a sinful act in itself, but he objects that it took place too soon; this is also implied in the passage Strom. ii. 19, p. 481: Tà μèv αἰσχρὰ οὗτος προθύμως εἵλετο, επόμενος τῇ γυναικί.

(3) The notion that the tree itself had been the cause of death (its fruit being venomous,) was combated by Theophil. ad Autol. ii. 25: Οὐ γάρ, ὡς οἴονταί τινες, θάνατον εἶχε τὸ ξύλον ἀλλ' ἡ παρακοή. Comp. § 61, note 5. Adam could not sin, because the Slov Tua, or the copía itself having been manifested in him, the latter must have sinned. But such an assertion would be impious.

(5) The Ophites confound their own doctrines, for at one time they render Divine homage to the serpent, at another they say, that Eve had been seduced by it. Epiph. Hær. 37. 6. Baur, p. 178, ss.

§ 63.

THE EFFECTS OF THE FALL.

Death was the punishment which God had threatened to inflict upon the transgressors of his laws. Nevertheless the act of transgression was not immediately succeeded by death, but by a train of evils which came both upon man and woman. Accordingly both death and physical evils were considered as the effects of Adam's sin; thus, e. g. by Irenæus, and others.(') But the opinions of the Fathers were not as yet fully developed concerning the moral depravity of every individual, and the existence of sin in mankind generally, as the effect of the sin of the first man. Many felt too much disposed to look upon sin as the voluntary act of a moral agent, to conceive of a kind of hereditary tendency

transmitted from one generation to another. The sinful acts of every individual appeared to them less the necessary consequence of the first sin, than a voluntary repetition of it.(2) In order to explain the mysterious power which almost compels men to sin, they had recourse not so much to original sin, as to a supposed influence of the demons, which, however, cannot constrain any man to trespass.(3) Nevertheless we meet in the writings of Irenæus with passages which show that he believed the effects of the fall to be of greater importance.(+) Tertullian and

Origen alike favoured the theory of original sin, but on different grounds. Origen thought that the soul of man was stained with sin even in its former state, and thus enters in a sinful condition into the world. To this idea was added another, which was allied to the notions of Gnostics and Manichæans, viz. that physical generation is in itself a sinful act.(5) According to Tertullian, the soul propagates itself with all its defects and faults, as matter is propagated. The phrase "vitium originis," (original sin,) which was first used by him, is in perfect accordance with such a view.(") But both were far from considering inherent depravity as constituting accountability, and still farther from believing in the entire absence of human liberty.(7)

(1) Iren. iii. 23, (35 Gr.) p. 221, (263 Gr.): Condemnationem autem transgressionis accepit homo tædia et terrenum laborem et manducare panem in sudore vultus sui et converti in terram, ex qua assumtus est; similiter autem mulier tædia et labores et gemitus et tristitias partus et servitium, i. e. ut serviret viro suo : ut neque maledicti a Deo in totum perirent, neque sine increpatione perseverantes Deum contemnerent (comp. c. 37, p. 264, Grabe.) ib. V. 15, p. 311, (423, Grabe.) :......propter inobedientiæ peccatum subsecuti sunt languores hominibus. V. 17, p. 313, (p. 426.) V. 23, p. 320, (p. 435): Sed quoniam Deus verax est, mendax autem serpens, de effectu ostensum est morte subsecuta eos, qui manducaverunt. Simul enim cum esca et mortem adsciverunt, quoniam inobedientes manducabant: ino

bedientia autem Dei mortem infert, et sqq. (Hence the devil is called a murderer from the beginning.) But Irenæus also regards the penalty inflicted by God as a blessing, iii. 20. 1: Magnanimus (i. e. Maxgóvuos) fuit Deus deficiente homine, eam quæ per verbum esset victoriam reddendam ei providens. He compares the fall of man to the fate of the prophet Jonas, who was swallowed by the whale in order to be saved. Thus man is swallowed by the great whale (the devil) that Christ may deliver him out of his jaws. According to Cyprian, de bono patientiæ, p. 212, even the higher physical strength of man (along with immortality) was lost by the fall; Origen also connected the existence of evil in the world with sin. Comp. above, § 48.

(2) Though Justin M. uses strong expressions in complaining of the universal corruption of mankind (dial. c. Tryph. c. 95), he does not speak of original sin, and the imputation of Adam's guilt. Every man deserves death, his disobedience being equal to that of our first parents. Dial. c. Tr. c. 88: "O (scil. yśvos avθρώπων) ἀπὸ τοῦ ̓Αδὰμ ὑπὸ θάνατον καὶ πλάνην τὴν τοῦ ὄρεως ἐπεπτώκει, παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αιτίαν ἑκάστον αὐτῶν πονηρευσαμένου. C. 124: Οὗτοι (scil. ἄνθρω ποι) ὁμοίως τῷ ̓Αδὰμ καὶ τῇ Εὔᾳ ἐξομοιούμενοι θάνατον ἑαυτοῦς ἐργά Lovrai, x. 5. λ. Compare Semisch. 1. c. p. 397-399. See ibid. p. 401, in reference to the difficult passage, dial. c. Tr. c. 100, which many have considered an argument for original sin : Παρθένος οὖσα Εὔα καὶ ἄφθορος τὸν λόγον τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρεως συλλαβοῦσα, παρακοὴν καὶ θάνατον ἔτεκε. According to Clement of Alexandria, man now stands in the same relation to the tempter, in which Adam stood prior to the fall, Coh. p. 7: Eis yàg ó áñareùv, ἄνωθεν μὲν τὴν Εὔαν, νῦν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους εἰς θάνατον ὑποpegav, comp. Pæd. i. 13. 158. 59. Clement indeed admits the universality of sin among men, Pæd. iii. 12, p. 307: To μèv yag ἐξαμαρτάνειν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτον καὶ κοινόν ; but the very circumstance that some appear to him by nature better than others (Strom. i. 6, p. 336,) shows that he did not consider man as absolutely depraved, nor pass a general sweeping judgment upon the whole human race, as if all formed but one vast mass of corruption. None commits iniquity for its own sake, Strom. i. 17, p. 368. But he rejects the doctrine of original sin properly called in the strongest terms, Strom. iii. 16, p. 556, 57: Aɛyéтwσαv hй Tоû èñógνευσεν τὸ γεννηθέν παιδίον, ἢ πῶς ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ ̓Αδὰμ ὑποπέπτωκεν ἀρὰν τὸ undèv évegyñoav. He does not regard the passage, Ps. li. 5, as decisive. (Comp. the above passages on liberty and sin in general.