that in the Divine foreknowledge it was certain that all men would infallibly choose as they do, from the motives which induce them; so that in the Divine foreknowledge there was a sure connexion between each motive and the volition consequent upon it, Dr. D. would never have contradicted him.

The President asserts, that a motive is the cause of a volition, and produces it. Then replies Dr. D. man is not the cause of his own volitions; his soul is not; nor does the will produce them: for they cannot have two distinct causes. This inference is just; but if the President had said, man never wills but from some motive, which was the very thing he intended, his acute opponent would have found no fault with his doctrine.

The chief part of the Examination is devoted to a very loose paragraph of the Inquiry; and truly Dr. Dana makes the great metaphysician appear ridiculous, by substituting volition where the President uses the word motive; because the Inquiry, (p. 11, and 12,) says,

"I have rather chosen to express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable is, than to say, that the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be perfectly and properly distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind's volition or choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the preference or choice itself; but that the act of volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable."

Dr. Dana was a divine that always insisted on strict propriety of speech. If then, says he, a motive, which is an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, is not properly DISTINCT from the mind's preferring and choosing, which is a volition; we may use motive and volition as synonymous; for if they denote not distinct things, they must be two names for the same thing. With this weapon, thus prepared by the President himself, Dr. D. dissevers every bone and muscle of his opponent's

Inquiry. Motive causes volition, says the President. Then volition causes volition, according to your own scheme, and contrary to it, says Dr. Dana. Volition is always as the greatest appearance of good, says the former: and the latter remarks, then volition is always as volition; and then, a man always wills as he determines to will.

Into this difficulty the President was brought, we must think, by not accurately distinguishing between the operations of the faculties of the understanding, and those of the heart, or faculty of feeling. Agreeable is an attribute of certain sensations and emotions, in which human happiness consists. All our happiness consists in such sensations as are termed agreeable, or in those emotions which are termed affections. Were we destitute of these, we could not be the subjects of happiness. This is the principal sense of the word agreeable; but it is also used to characterize any thing which is the occasion of an agreeable, feeling. Hence those material objects which excite pleasing sensations are called agreeable objects; and those thoughts which are followed by felicitous affections are called agreeable thoughts.

Any thing is said to seem as it is mentally seen, that is, perceived or conceived of, or thought of, by any one. That contemplated action which seems agreeable, is an action which we conceive would promote or indulge some agreeable feeling. When several acts are contemplated, and we conceive that one would most promote those feelings in which our happiness consists, it is said to "seem most agreeable" to us. Now an agreeable feeling is one mental exercise; the conception of that agreeable feeling another; and the thought, that any particular act of body or mind will induce that agreeable feeling, is a third.

That is said to appear good to us, and for us, which we think of as conducive to our happiness; or, which we think will be, or remember has been, the occasion of agreeable feelings.

Thoughts are the operations of the seven faculties of the understanding; feelings, of the heart; and volitions, of the will. Now it must be manifest, that a motive, according to the scheme of the President himself, is either

some thought, or some feeling; is either a conception of something in an action contemplated; or a judgment that the act will be good, or agreeable; or a remembrance of some pleasure afforded by a similar action; or a feeling of an agreeable kind. In consequence of some one, or all of these operations, the contemplated action is, by the faculty of volition, chosen to be done; or preferred to some other contemplated action. This choosing or preferring is an operation of a very different faculty, from any which perceives, conceives, judges, approves, reasons, remembers, is conscious, or feels; so that an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choosing, DO SEEM, actually, to be perfectly and properly distinct. They are as distinct as any two operations, or exercises, of the human mind, that can be mentioned: and if strict propriety of speech is insisted on, as it ought to be, we shall deserve reprehension if we confound them.

We agree, that "voluntary action," whether it be purely mental, or connected with bodily motion, is the effect of a mental faculty of agency, which operates either instinctively, or in consequence of the mind's volition, so that voluntary action is the fruit of volition, and is determined by it.

"If strict propriety of speech be insisted on," says the President," the act of volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable."

Here is the very root of the difficulty, Dr. Dana judges, which the President attempted to explain; and in which he has failed. Dr. D. remarks,

"The enquiry in this place is not, Whether the highest motive hath always a causal influence on the will? But, admitting this to be the case, what is it that causeth any supposed motive to be highest in the mind's view?-Now, as there is a manifest difference between an object's actually appearing most agreeable, and the cause of this appearance; the proper question, in the first place, is, What is the ground, reason, or cause of the agreeable appearance itself? For, admitting the strongest motive to be the more immediate cause of volition, how doth this prove that it is the original cause? Whence is it that any proposed object hath the greatest appearance of good? From

No. L.

what cause? Hither we must ultimately recur for the ground of volition.-Till the answer to this question is found, the original ground of volition is not discovered." Examination, p. 1.

These interrogations are certainly very pertinent, for the President had informed the Doctor, that an act of volition is always determined by something which causeth it [the motive] to appear most agreeable. Dr. D. insists upon knowing what this something is, which in fact causeth the motive, which causeth volition.

On the assertion of the President, that "the act of volition itself is always determined," by something, we must remark, that a mental determination is neither more nor less than a volition, or an operation of the faculty of will. A mind that determines to perform any act, wills to do it. Now the President would not have maintained, that every act of volition is the consequence of a prior volition. He must have intended, therefore, that every act of volition is in consequence of some mental view, which is a motive; and that every mental view which moves us to volition, becomes a motive in consequence of being caused by something in or about the mind's view, to seem or appear most agreeable. What this something in or about the mind's view, which causes one view to be more agreeable, and another most agreeable, he has not informed us.

Shall we, then, undertake to say what it is? We can but give our opinion; that those views which are followed by the most agreeable feelings, are the most agreeable views. Man has feelings, because his Maker has given him a faculty of feeling; and has placed him in a situation favourable to the operation of that faculty. Of his feelings some are agreeable and others disagreeable; and of the agreeable ones, some are more agreeable, and others most agreeable. Why one feeling is, in its own nature, more agreeable than another, we can assign no other reason than this, that God has so constituted the human mind and the nature of things, that it is so. No other reason can be assigned why we think, or feel, or choose, or act at all. No other reason can be offered, why love is a felicitous, and hatred a painful emotion; or why the sensation consequent upon touching a smooth substance is pleasing; or a rough, gritty surface unpleasant, to one of a delicate hand.

It is a fact, too, that some thoughts are ordinarily the occasion of our having certain agreeable affections; while others are almost invariably followed by some one of the disagreeable passions; and for this we can account, in no other way than by saying, that God has so constituted the mind that it is so; or that it is natural for us thus to feel. God, who intended to make Wisdom's ways, ways of pleasantness, and the way of transgressors hard, has rendered the amiable affections pleasing, in their own nature, to him who exercises them, and all immoral passions painful. With the same design his hand has coupled, in the formation of our mental nature, certain thoughts with certain feelings. Hence if a man's conscience condemn him, the mental act of disapprobation is followed by the painful emotion of shame. If his conscience approves of his own conduct, his heart feels esteem for himself, and delight in the approved actions.

It is worthy of remark, that similar views of the same thing are not always equally agreeable or disagreeable; but our agreeable or disagreeable feelings, consequent upon any views, are dependent on, and according to, the nature and degree of the antecedent mental operations, which are the occasion of them. Thus a very lively and energetic view of the goodness of God to us, will be followed by a proportionate emotion of love, or of gratitude, or of both.

Would we, therefore, pursue our investigations into the nature and origin of all those motives that excite our wills to volition, we must attempt to account for our thoughts; for we never feel but in consequence of some thought, and our feelings correspond with them, as accurately as our actions of an external kind with our volitions. "As a man thinketh, so is he," in his feelings, volitions, and actions.

Should one be able to show how a man comes by every one of his thoughts, and what is the occasion of each; he would then be required to account for the difference in energy and vivacity, which he experiences, at different times, in similar thoughts about the same thing; and so would arrive at that which CAUSETH any particular VIEW TO BE MOST AGREEABLE, at any particular time.

To the work of giving the history of the thoughts and