tainly if any man were to ask him, as an abstract question, whether he would wish to see France curtailed, he would not answer in the negative. But another question arose-To whom the detached members of its territory should be given? For if they were given to ⚫ a power incapable of maintaining them, such power would be weakened instead of strengthened by the accession. To put the question fairly, he would enquire, Whether, for instance, the security of the Netherlands would not be endangered, rather than confirmed, by the possession of Lille and Valenciennes? If, indeed, the policy had been to humiliate France, or to reduce it as far as possible to a second-rate power, then no measure should have been observed in the treatment of it: It should have been dismembered to any extent, provided its provinces could have been put in possession of those who were able to preserve them. But the allies had very different objects in view. With respect, indeed, to the spoils and trophies of former conquests, it was but just, that when fortune turned in favour of the allies, these acquisitions should be considered as in some measure the just fruits of victory, as far as related to the restoring them to their original possessors. The mode of removing them might be humiliating, but the principle was just, and such as no sensible Frenchman would dispute. If, on the other hand, the provinces of France had been dismembered, a feeling of hatred would have been excited never to be conquered. And how would any state, though gifted with these accessions, be able to make a stand against the desperate exasperation of a people, stung into putting forth all its strength? And how could such a risk be justifiable, when, as in the case of the Netherlands, the best means of defence in other states were to be found in the states themselves? The great object

of England had been to keep the alliance entire. Where the different interest of the allies excited some natural disputes and difficulties, the ministers of England felt that they should have incurred unpardonable guilt, if they had not given way in matters not of pre-eminent importance, in order to reconcile all parties. It was not unnatural that the countries bordering on France should wish to have their_territories augmented, and it was a happy circumstance for this country to be so situated as to be able to be a sort of disinterested mediator in those contentions; for though the proximity of our position to France rendered the state of that country a matter of the highest importance to us, yet our insular situation, precluding the notion of any immediate interest with its condition, allowed our interposition and arbitration to be viewed without prejudice or passion.

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Upon the whole, he might fairly say, that there had rarely been an arrangement where all interests had been so carefully provided for. What was it that had been undertaken? We were bound to restore the unmolested possession of France to its king at the end of five years; but we were not bound to restore it to any other government then existing : and thus time was given to the king to correct those evils which could not be corrected in a

moment. Throughout all these transactions, Great Britain had no merely personal object in view; her conduct had been purely disinterested, and she had taken especial care not to prejudice the King of France in the eyes of the people of France. As to the removal of the pictures and statues, that was a great act of justice, whether considered in relation to the past or the future. Whatever partial and temporary exasperation might exist on this subject, sure he was, that if those works of art had remained in France,

they would have been a perpetual rallying sign for revolutionary principles, inasmuch as they were the trophies of revolutionary triumphs. Proud he was of the part which this country had borne in the transaction, because not a single statue or picture had been taken for itself: still prouder was he be cause it had obtained that every one of them should be restored to their origi nal owners. Indeed, so strong was his feeling on this particular point, that, much as he deprecated their remaining in France, he should have preferred even that to their being sent either to this country, or to any to which they did not rightfully belong.

As to another part of the great arrangement, to which the papers on the table related, namely, that respecting the Ionian islands, it was in com. pliance with the general views of the allies and of Europe, that the British government had taken those islands under its protection; and he thought it must be felt that government would not have done its duty, if it declined to accede to that proposition. And here he would ask those who talked so much about the prevalence of a jealousy in Europe against our maritime power, whether the voluntary surren der of these islands to this country af. forded any ground to justify that opinion? It was, indeed, a most gratifying proof of the general confidence of the allies, to place a people so interesting for various reasons, under the protection of this great and liberal nation; and he felt fully assured, that that confidence would never be found to have been misplaced; that Great Britain would do her duty towards those whom she undertook to protect. "In considering the whole of the great transaction under discussion, I feel," said he, "the most sincere sa tisfaction, not only from a review of the object of the great alliance of which we formed a part, but from a

VOL. IX. PART I.

reflection upon the result. The object was, to put down the principle of universal empire and military despotism, which the power of France was so long employed to promote. Yes, I shall ever maintain, that a project of universal empire filled the mind and actuated the efforts of him against whom this country has so long been compelled to wage war. Views of aggrardisement were, indeed, pursued by the French government, which were utterly in onsistent with the safety of Europe. Yet those were the views of Buonaparte, and of that revolution of which he was the champion. But I believe that no rational being could now be found to entertain a doubt upon this subject in any quarter of the world, namely, that the views of the revolutionists and their principal captain were alike inconsistent with the general safety of Europe, and the establishment of real liberty. The defeat of such views must therefore be grateful to every good man, while in the existing state of mental cultivation there is every prospect of the improvement and advance of rational liberty and the happiness of mankind. What a consolatory contrast does this present to the state and tendency of the late revolutionary government of France! That government was, indeed, a systematically organised despotism. What, for instance, was its conduct with regard to the liberty of the press? That liberty in this country is subject to no restraints, but those which are necessary to the safety of the government; and even with respect to that safety, how many instances might be found where writers are tolerated, while, to use a familiar phrase, they sailed very near the wind' indeed. Yet such is the high and just estimate attached to the enjoyment of the liberty of the press in Great Britain, that abuses of that li berty are often overlooked, lest its

B

importance and utility should be impaired. But what was the system in France under Buonaparte? Why, a censorship was established, the functions of which were not confined to politics merely, but extended to every description of writing. This censor ship was, indeed, often exercised in making a total alteration in the sentiments of a writer, and that, too, in the discussion of moral and philosophical subjects-in disquisitions upon topics unconnected with politics. But such was the rigour of the system uniformly pursued by him, whose whole object was the gratification of his own will, in the establishment of a complete military despotism, and in rendering man a mere machine. Thanks, how ever, to the manly perseverance of this country, and the distinguished valour of its allies, that abominable system is put down-put down, too, by efforts on our part to which every quar ter of the world bore honourable testimony for what was the quarter which had not been, in the course of the war, the scene of some glorious achievement for Great Britain?"

As to the general merits of the treaty under consideration, he called upon their lordships to compare it fully with any treaty recorded in our history. In former arrangements, at the conclusion of a war, it had often been represented, that this country neglect ed to keep what she had acquired; but in this instance he rather apprehended, that however some might suppose we had kept too much, it could hardly be alleged that we had kept too little. It had also been objected to former arrangements, that the interests of our allies were sacrificed and our own obligations deserted; but "all Europe" said he, "bear testimony to our good faith and generosity on the present oc

casion."

Lord Grenville proposed an amend

ment on the address brought forward by the Earl of Liverpool, one exactly similar to which was proposed in the other house by Lord Milton. In the speeches pronounced by these noblemen, the right of interfering with the internal arrangements of France, exercised by the allied powers of Europe, was distinctly recognised. "It is my firm conviction," said Lord Grenville, with that manly openness which charac terizes his parliamentary eloquence, "that not only the happiness, but the safety of Britain, depended on the interposition of foreign powers with the internal affairs of France, which appears to some among us so unjustifiable in itself, and so perilous when viewed as a precedent." His lordship then begged the House to advert to the Revolution of 1688, the principles of which would amply justify any steps this government might take with regard to France, in order to prevent the possibility of a speedy renewal of hostilities. "Did not our great deliverer," said he, "with no vested right, and no claim to the crown but the people's will, land upon the British shores with a foreign army? He thought that not only the interest of this country, but the safety of Europe, depended upon his measures. He came to drive away an odious tyrant and the pensioners of France. He claimed to be, in his own words, vindex securitatis Europe, assertor libertatis Britanniæ; and it was for some time a matter of doubt, whether it would not be necessary for him to do that which of late had been so severely reprobated, namely, to call in the aid of a foreign army for the final establishment of the li berties of the country. In the present case, as the war was necessary, it was just, and the conqueror had a right, by the law of nations, to impose upon the conquered such terms as would prevent the recurrence of the evil, for

the remedy of which the war was undertaken. For these reasons, upon this important point he had never entertained an opinion opposite to that of the noble earl; and upon some of the minor questions, respecting the restoration of the monuments of art plundered in the spirit of the most uncivilized barbarism, he had entertained as little doubt. The propriety of returning them to their real owners did not depend upon the intrinsic value of the objects themselvse, but upon the im. portance attached to them by the vanity and vain-glory of the actual possessors. The motive that had induced the French to concentrate these works in Paris, was not a love and reverence of the arts; they had been seized and borne away as the spoil, and in the insolence of conquest: their pride was gratified by this humiliation of mankind. The exaltation of themselves by the debasement of other nations was the ruling principle of French revolutionary policy; and in this view it became a matter of moment to re. move this food for vanity, which, in stead of satisfying, only excited a fresh appetite for conquest and domination. By this removal, also, a moral lesson had been read to the people of France on the respect due to property, while the dignity and independence of the other nations of Europe had been effectually asserted. His lordship even regretted that, by the delay of this retribution, a shadow of doubt had been cast upon its justice. Notwithstand ing, however, of all this coincidence of opinion in regard to France, Lord Grenville condemned much of what had been done. The territorial arrangements described in the treaties, appeared to him to be, in many particulars,extremely unwise, and the maintenance of so large a British force was regarded by him as establishing a

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precedent very dangerous to the domestic welfare of our country."

The speeches delivered in the House of Commons were more numerous, as well as more abundant in detail. Those of Sir James McIntosh and Mr Horner were the best on the side of the opposition; Mr Douglas, Mr Charles Grant, and Lord Castlereagh, defended the treaties with equal talent, and, as it seems to us, upon views of justice as well as of prudence. But, in truth, with regard to the greater part of the topics discussed on this occasion, even now it were hazardous for the annal

list to express any very determinate opinion. Of the propriety of our interference with the arrangements of France, and of our using the advantages of our victory for the purpose of curbing in future the too military spirit of that country, we have not the shadow of a doubt. But whether the measures adopted by us were the best adapted for securing the repose of Europe, it may not be very easy, even after the experience of more years than have yet elapsed, to decide. These things must be left to "time, the teacher of all." In the meanwhile this much may be asserted, that if the measures adopted by the ministry, should in the end be found to be unavailing, they may at least console themselves with the reflection, that their opponents in parliament made mention of no system of arrangements, ex facie, so worthy of England, or so promising of ultimate success.

At the time when the definitive treaty, and a large mass of minor documents were submitted to the inspection of parliament, Mr Brougham took occasion to move for a copy of a treaty concluded at Paris, on the 26th of September in the preceding year, between the sovereigns of Rus sia, Austria, and Prussia, which has

*

come to be known by the name of the Christian Treaty. The language in which this treaty is conveyed, is indeed, as this gentleman admitted, inoffensive. But, according to him, the harmless, and even unmeaning appearance of it, ought to have excited the suspicion of the reflective. "There was nothing," he contended," in their peculiar situation or character, there was nothing in the circumstances of the times, that at all required that those sovereigns should put themselves ostentatiously forward as the defenders of that Christianity which no danger menaced, or of those principles which all good men must be ready to sustain. These sovereigns were not suspected of any inclination to depart from Christianity. There was no charge or impeachment preferred against their character or views, which called upon them either with a view to their own vindication, or to what was passing in the world, to enter into a treaty, containing stipulations such as had seldom been heard of from the earliest times, such at least as had not been published since the time of the Crusades, such certainly as had no parallel in modern Europe. For the principles avowed in this treaty he expressed his deference; they were material to the happiness of all states and kingdoms, yet he saw no necessity for any public pledge upon the subject, either from the sovereigns alluded to, or from any other Christian prince. But notwithstanding the principles which this treaty declared a disposition to hold sacred, there was something so singular in its language as to call for observation, and to warrant no little jealousy. After profess ing at the outset a resolution in the administration of their respective states, and in their relations with every other government, to take as their sole guide the precepts of their holy religion, namely, the precepts of justice, chris

tian charity, and peace, the contracting parties pledge themselves in the very first article of the treaty. 'on all occasions, and in all places, to lend each other aid and assistance;' and that they will lead their subjects and armies in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to pro tect religion, peace, and justice. Was there nothing to excite suspicion in such language? When sovereigns spoke of leading armies to protect religion, peace, and justice, was there no ground for alarm? He feared that there was much reason to apprehend the consequences of this treaty, notwithstanding the sacred principles which it professed to revere. He feared that something more was meant than what immediately met the eye. He could not think that this treaty referred to objects wholly spiritual. Why were they to engage to lead their armies to support the Christian religion, when no power had menaced it? Such a treaty appeared to him very extraordinary, when it was remembered, that but a few weeks before the parties to it had concluded, not only a treaty of peace among themselves, but one which was to secure the repose of all Europe. He always thought there was something suspicious in what a French writer had called les abouchemens des rois. When crowned heads met, the result of their united councils was not always favourable to the interests of humanity. It was not the first time that Austria, Russia, and Prussia, had laid their heads together. On a former occasion, after professing vast regard for truth, religion, and justice, they had taken a course which had brought much misery on their own subjects, for whose welfare they affected the greatest concern, but they had made a war against an unoffending country, which had found little reason to felicitate themselves on finding their