Bolingbroke," admits, that in separating England from her allies, in taking a part with the enemy, and in negotiating a separate peace, this minister acted a treacherous part. Although the contemporaries of Bolingbroke could produce no direct evidence of his guilt, they had no doubt that the systematic violations of honor and good faith, which marked the whole course of the negotiation, had their origin in a design to set aside the act of settlement and to bring in the Pretender. It was difficult to imagine, why the English ministers should place themselves in this new and reversed position, with respect to France and to their former allies, if they had no other object in view but peace. It was, therefore, suspected, that they had some secret and ulterior design, in which the friendship of France might be of use, and to which the allies, and particularly the Dutch must be disinclined. The writer in the Edinburgh Review, (No, CXXVI,) whose language and argument we are here adopting, gives accumulative proofs of the falsehood and treachery of the English ministry to their allies, during the years 1711 and 1712. They began with a wanton and useless attempt at deception. On the 12th-23d January 1711, Bolingbroke wrote to Buys, Pensionary of Amsterdam, that to obtain a good peace, the first advances must come from the enemy, though he had despatched the Abbé Guatier ten days before, with a message from the English ministry, to Torcy proposing a renewal of negotiation. In disregard of mutual engagements between the English and Dutch governments, made on the April following, that no negotiations should be entered into by either party, without the knowledge and concurrence of the other, Bolingbroke sent Prior (the poet,) privately to Paris in July, with proposals which were to be kept secret from the allies. The Grand Pensionary Heinsius, was afterwards told, that proposals of peace had come from France, but that the queen had refused to enter into a separate treaty, and had desired to have specific terms transmitted to her, which could be laid before her allies, while the fact was concealed, that the first advances had been made by England, and that Prior had been the bearer of specific proposals to the French.

"After several conferences in London, private articles in favor of England were signed by Menager, on the 27th of September, and Sth of October, and accepted by Bolingbroke and Dartmouth, the two Secretaries of State, on behalf of their mistress. General propositions for the allies were at the same time presented, which were transmitted to Holland, while the private articles were kept secret. In the midst of this duplicity, Bolingbroke had the effrontrey to complain of the Dutch for manifesting a want of confidence in his sincerity, and both he and Oxford boast of the honesty of their proceedings." In December Bolingbroke desired Lord

Raby (who was made Earl Strafford at this period), the English minister at the Hague, to assure Buys, that neither Spain nor the Indies should be allotted to any prince of the House of Bourbon, though the contrary had been tacitly, and by implication, settled with Menager in the preceding October; and so secret was this determination kept, that it was not communicated to the English plenipotentiaries at Utrecht till after the conferences had been opened. As the negotiations advanced, the impatience of the English ministry for peace, and their undisguised partiality for France, became every day more apparent. In spite of the remonstrances of their own plenipotentiaries, they hurried on the conclusion of a definite treaty, with a precipitancy which left many of the articles intended for the particular benefit of England undigested and useless. Their treaty of commerce, in particular was so defective, that it was rejected by the House of Commons. In the affair of Tournay, their conduct was little short of treason. While still at war, they privately suggested to the French government pretexts for insisting on the cession of that important place to France, though at an earlier stage of the negotiation, Louis had consented to leave it in possession of the Dutch, as an essential part of their barrier."

The defeat of a division of Eugene's army at Denain, was owing to the separation of the English from the allied troops. And, soon after, to desertion of the cause was added treachery, in Ormond, the successor of Marlborough in the command of the English army, having apprised Villars, by intelligence communicated through Bolingbroke, and by him to Torcy, that Eugene entertained the project of surprising either Nieuport or Furnes, measures were taken accordingly by the French commander to prevent its success.

That peace was the true policy of England, is not now contested; it is of the means adopted, and the sacrifice of national honor to procure it, that we find so much cause for censure. The delay in the negotiation, notwithstanding the uncommon labors of Bolingbroke to bring it to a successful termination, gave rise to a resolution of the ministry, which displays both its eagerness for peace, and the confidence placed in his abilities. It was determined to send his lordship incognito to France in 1712, to remove, as his instructions expressed it, "all difficulties and differences, that might obstruct the general suspension of arms between England and France from taking place, or settling the treaty of peace in such a course, as might bring it to a happy and speedy conclusion." Accordingly, he set out for Dover on the second of August, accompanied by Prior and the Abbé Guatier. The next day he landed at Calais, and according to the historians of that period, his whole journey to Paris was not less marked

with high respect, than his arrival in that city. In his first letter from Fontainbleau, addressed to the other secretary Lord Dartmouth, he informs him, that he took all possible precaution to conceal his name, and to avoid all sort of ceremony, by stopping to refresh himself as little as possible; and when he did stop, by choosing to do it out of the great towns. His care was, however, in a great measure fruitless; and the authorities did their utmost, in the places through which he passed, to show their respect to his royal mistress, so that he arrived at least as much fatigued with compliments, as tired with his journey. Having accomplished the object of his mission with much address and firmness, he took leave of the king of France, August 27th, receiving from his majesty a diamond ring valued at about 4000 pounds sterling. He left Mr. Prior at Paris, to take care of some private affairs still under negotiation, and resumed the management of affairs at home. It was, afterwards, made a matter of grave complaint by his enemies, and the fact was represented to the queen in strong colors, that he should have been at the opera in Paris, one evening when the Pretender was also present, although the latter was in another part of the house from that in which Bolingbroke was seated.

We now resume the thread of our narrative. Bolingbroke finding all hopes cut off at home, began to think of improving his wretched fortune upon the continent. He had left England with a very small fortune, and his attainder totally cut off all resources for the future. In this depressed situation, he began to listen to some proposals which were made him by the Pretender, who was then residing at Barr, in France, and who was desirous of admitting Bolingbroke into his secret councils. A proposal of this nature had been made to him shortly after his arrival at Paris, and before his attainder at home; but while he had yet any hopes of succeeding in England, he absolutely refused, and made the best applications his ruined fortune would permit, to prevent the extremity of his prosecution.

He had for some time waited for an opportunity of determining himself, even after he found it vain to think of making his peace at home. He let his Jacobite friends in England know that they had but to command him, and he was ready to venture in their service the little all that remained, as frankly as he had exposed all that was gone. At length, (says he, talking of himself,) these commands came, and were executed in the following manner. The person who was sent to me, arrived in the beginning of July 1715, at the place I had retired to in Dauphiné. He spoke in the name of all the friends whose authority could influence me; and he brought me word that Scotland was not only ready to take arms, but under some sort of dissatisfaction to be withheld

from beginning; that in England the people were exasperated against the government to such a degree, that far from wanting to be encouraged, they could not be restrained from insulting it on every occasion; that the whole tory party was become avowedly Jacobites; that many officers of the army, and the majority of the soldiers, were well affected to the cause; that the city of London was ready to rise, and that the enterprises for seizing of several places, were ripe for execution; in a word, that most of the principal tories were in a concert with the Duke of Ormond: for I had pressed particularly to be informed whether his grace acted alone, or if not, who were his council; and that the others were so disposed, that there remained no doubt of their joining as soon as the first blow should be struck. He added, that my friends were a little surprised, to observe that I lay neuter in such a conjuncture. He represented to me the danger I ran, of being prevented by people of all sides from having the merit of engaging early in this enterprize, and how unaccountable it would be for a man, impeached and attainted under the present government, to take no share in bringing about a revolution so near at hand, and so certain. He intreated that I would defer no longer to join the Chevalier, to advise and assist in carrying on his affairs, and to solicit and negotiate at the court of France, where my friends imagined that I should not fail to meet a favorable reception, and from whence they made no doubt of receiving assistance in a situation of affairs so critical, so unexpected, and so promising. He concluded, by given me a letter from the Pretender, whom he had seen in his way to me, in which I was pressed to repair without loss of time to Comercy; and this instance was grounded on the message which the bearer of the letter had brought me from England. In the progress of the conversation with the messenger, he related a number of facts, which satisfied me as to the general disposition of the people; but he gave me little satisfaction as to the measures taken to improve this disposition, for driving the business on with vigor, if it tended to a revolution, or for supporting it to advantage if it spun into a war. When I questioned him concerning several persons whose disinclination to the government admitted no doubt, and whose names, quality, and experience were very essential to the success of the undertaking; he owned to me that they kept a great reserve, and did at most but encourage others to act by general and dark expressions. I received this account and this summons ill in my bed; yet important as the matter was, a few minutes served to determine me. The circumstances wanting to form a reasonable inducement to engage, did not excuse me; but the smart of a bill of attainder tingled in every vein, and I looked on my party to be under oppression, and to call for my

assistance. Besides which, I considered first that I should be certainly informed, when I conferred with the Chevalier, of many particulars unknown to this gentleman; for I did not imagine that the English could be so near to take up arms as he represented them to be, on no other foundation than that which he exposed. It has been said in a preceding part of this narrative, that "not sooner was it universally known that he (Bolingbroke) had retired to France, than his flight was construed into a proof of his guilt." With sorrow for the tarnished fame of this brilliant, but erratic statesman, we can see no other construction which could be put upon such an act. That, from the height of power in England, with the fairest prospects before him, he should be reduced within a few months to the condition of an attainted exile, was a state of things which, whilst it would render him suspected by impartial men, was not yet beyond the possibility of satisfactory explanation. But when we learn, in addition, that in one short year he was Secretary of State to Queen Anne, and Secretary of State to the Pretender, this fact carries with it his decisive and unmitigated condemnation. The case is stated with force and legal precision in the article from which we have already borrowed, in the 143d number of the Edinburgh Review, and which we attribute to Lord Brougham himself. "It is not often that a guilty person can make an honest-looking, worthy defence, not seldom that the excuses offered by suspected culprits work their own conviction. But never yet did any one, when charged with a crime, draw the noose around his own neck more fatally than Bolingbroke did, when he resorted to so wretched an explanation of the act, which, unexplained, was a confession-the flight from his accusers. If that act, standing alone, was fatal to the supposition of his innocence, the defence of it was, if possible, more decisive to his condemnation."

"A statesman, professing inviolable attachment to the Revolution Settlement, is accused of treasonable correspondence with the exiled family; he flies, and because he has been, as he alleges, falsely accused of that offence, he immediately proceeds to commit it. Suppose he made the only feasible excuse for running away from his accusers--that the public prejudices against him were so strong as to deprive him of all chance of a fair trial-did he not know that all such prepossessions are in their nature, in the nature of the people, in the nature of truth and justice, temporary, and pass away? Then would not innocence, if acting under the guidance of common sense, and an ordinary knowledge of mankind, have waited more or less patiently, more or less tranquil, for the season of returning calm, when justice might be surely expected? But could any thing be more inconsistent with all the supposition of innocence than instantly to commit the

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