THE PREFACE. Shall neither trouble the reader, nor myself, with any I apology for the publishing they be in any measure truly ferviceable to the end for which they are defigned, to establish men in the principles of religion, and to recommend to them the practice of it with any confiderable advantage, I do not fee what apology is neceffary; and if they be not fo, I am fure none can be fufficient. However, if there need any, the common heads of excufe in thefe cafes are very well known; and I hope I have an equal right to them with other men. I fhall chufe rather in this preface to give a fhort account of the following difcourfes; and, as briefly as I can, to vindicate a fingle passage in the first of them from the exceptions of a Gentleman, who hath been pleafed to honour it fo far, as to write a whole book against it. The defign of thefe difcourfes is fourfold. 1. To fhew the unreasonablenefs of Atheism, and of fcoffing at religion; which I am forry is fo neceffary to be done in this age. This I have endeavoured in the two firft of thefe difcourfes. 2. To recommend religion to men from the great and manifold advantages which it brings both to publick fociety and to particular perfons. And this is the argument of the third and fourth. 3. To reprefent the excellency, more particularly, of the Chriftian religion; and to vindicate the practice of it from the fufpicion of thofe grievous troubles and difficulties which many imagine it to be attended withal. And this is the fubject of the fifth and fixth. 4. To perfuade men to the practice of this holy religion, from the great obligation which the profeffion of Chriftianity lays upon men to that purpose, and, more particularly, from the glorious rewards of another life; which is the defign of the two next difcourfes. a 3 Having Having given this short account of the following dif courfes, I crave leave of the reader to detain him a little longer, whilst I vindicate a passage in the first of these fermons from the affaults of a whole book purposely writ against it. The title of the book is, Faith vindicated from the poffibility of falfhood. The author, Mr. J. S. the famous author of Sure footing. He hath indeed, in this laft book of his, to my great amazement, quitted that glorious title. Not that I dare affume to myself to have put him. out of conceit with it, by having convinced him of the fantafticalness of it. No; I defpair to convince that man of any thing, who, after fo fair an admonition, does still perfift to maintain, (Letter of thanks, p. 24. &c.), that first and felf-evident principles not only may, but are fit to be demonftrated; and (ibid. p. 11.) that thofe ridiculous identical propofitions, That faith is faith, and, A rule is a rule, are firft principles in this controverfy of the rule of faith, without which nothing" can be folidly concluded either about "rule or faith." But there was another reafon for his quitting of that title; and a prudent one indeed! He had forfaken the defence of Sure footing, and then it became convenient to lay afide that title, for fear of putting people any more in mind of that book. I expected indeed, after his Letter of thanks, in which he tells us, p. 14. he "intended to throw afide the rubbish "of my book, that in his answer he might the better lay open the fabrick of my difcourfe, and have nothing there "to do, but to speak to folid points; " I fay, after this, I expected a full answer to the folid points (as he is pleafed to call them) of my book; and that (according to his excellent method of removing the rubbish, in order to the pulling down of a building) the fabrick of my book would long fince have been demolished, and laid even with the ground. But efpecially when, in the conclufion of that most civil and obliging letter, he threatened" never to leave following on his blow, till he had either brought Dr. Still, and me to lay principles that would bear the test, or it was made evi"dent to all the world that we had none," I began, as I had reafon, to be in a terrible fear of him, and to look upon myfelf as a dead man. And indeed who can think himself fo confiderable, as not to dread this mighty man of demonftration, this prince of controvertifts, this great lord and profeffor profeffor of first principles? But I perceive, that great minds are merciful, and do fometimes content themselves to threaten, when they could deftroy. 66 For, inftead of returning a full anfwer to my book, he, according to their new mode of confuting books, manfully falls a-nibbling at one fingle paffage in it, p. 118. [vol.3. p. 308, 9. of this edition]; wherein he makes me to fay, (for I Say no fuch thing), that "the rule of Christian faith, and confequently faith itself, is poffible to be falfe." Nay in his Letter of thanks, p. 13. he says, "it is an avowed pofition," in that place," that faith is poffible to be falfe." And to give the more countenance to this calumny, he chargeth the fame pofition (in equivalent terms) of the poffible falfhood of faith, and that as to the chiefest and most fundamental point, the tenet of a Deity, upon the forementioned fermon. But because he knew in his confcience, that I had avowed no fuch pofition, he durft not cite the words either of my book or fermon, left the reader fhould have difcovered the notorious falfhood and groundleffness of this calumny nay, he durft not fo much as refer to any particular place in my fermon where fuch a passage might be found. And yet this is the man that has the face to charge others with falfe citations; to which charge, before I have done, I fhall fay fomething, which, what effect foever it may have upon him, would make any other man fufficiently afhamed. But yet I must acknowledge, that in this position which he faftens upon me, he honours me with excellent company, my Lord Faulkland, Mr. Chillingworth, and Dr. Stillingfleet; perfons of that admirable strength and clearness in their writings, that Mr. S. when he reflects upon his own Style, and way of reasoning, may blush to acknowledge that ever he has read them. And as to this position which he charges them withal, I do not know (nor have the leaft reafon upon Mr. S.'s word to believe) any fuch thing is maintained by them. As for myself, whom I am now only concerned to vindicate, I fhall fet down the two paffages, to which I fuppofe he refers. In my fermon, [vol. 1. p. 32.] I endeavour, among other things, to fhew the unreasonableness of Atheism upon this account: Because it requires more evidence for things "than "than they are capable of" To make this good, I dif courfe thus: "Ariftotle hath long fince obferved, how un"reasonable it is to expect the fame kind of proof for eve"ry thing, which we have for fome things. Mathemati"cal things, being of an abstracted nature, are only capable "of clear demonftration. But conclufions in natural philofophy are to be proved by a fufficient induction of expe"riments; things of a moral nature, by moral arguments; "and matters of fact, by credible teftimony. And though "none of these be strict demonftration, yet have we an un"doubted affurance of them, when they are proved by the "best arguments that the nature and quality of the thing "will bear. None can demonftrate to me, that there is "fuch an island in America as Jamaica; yet, upon the te"ftimony of credible perfons, and authors who have written "of it, I am as free from all doubt concerning it, as from "doubting of the clearest mathematical demonftration. So "that this is to be entertained as a firm principle, by all those who pretend to be certain of any thing at all, That "when any thing is proved by as good arguments as that 66 thing is capable of, and we have as great affurance that "it is, as we could poffibly have fuppofing it were, we "ought not in reafon to make any doubt of the existence of "that thing. Now to apply this to the prefent cafe: The "being of God is not mathematically demonftrable; nor 66 66 66 can it be expected it should; becaufe only mathematical "matters admit of this kind of evidence. Nor can it be proved immediately by fenfe; because God being fuppofed "to be a pure fpirit, cannot be the object of any corporeal 66 fenfe. But yet we have as great affurance that there is a God, as the nature of the thing to be proved is capable "of, and as we could in reafon expect to have, fuppofing "that he were." Upon this paffage it must be, if any thing in the fermon, that Mr. S. chargeth this pofition (in equivalent terms) of the poffible falfhood of faith, and that as to the chiefeft and most fundamental point, the tenet of a Deity. And now I appeal to the reader's eyes and judgment, whether the fum of what I have faid be not this, That though the existence of God be not capable of that strict kind of demonftration which mathematical matters are; yet that we bave an undoubted affurance of it. One would think, that |