injury that he has sustained by reason of the servant's negligence or misconduct. Where contract is for the whole time of the servants, the master is entitled to any compensation the servant receives for services to outside parties. In many jurisdictions a servant is given by statute a lien upon property of master in certain cases for wages performed within a certain time. These statutes are by no means uniform. 7. Death of master is termination of contract, but insanity is not. Voluntary dissolution of a partnership is not a termination but dissolution by the death of a partner is a termination. Performance prevented by acts of the law is excuse for nonperformance. 8. Where a confidential relation exists between master and servant, the servant will be restrained by equity from revealing or using for his own advantage any TRADE SECRETS of the master. It is the same where there is an express stipulation to that effect in the contract, or where servant acquires his knowledge surreptitiously. Where the servant is employed to devise or perfect an instrument he cannot use such perfected instruments for any purpose of his own. Where, however, the servant is merely performing general duties in a particular department of service, he can control absolutely any invention he may conceive or perfect while thus employed. 9. Servant's liability for their own negligence or other misconduct is governed by the ordinary doctrines of torts. The servant is liable to the master for any damage, either negligent or wilfull, inflicted directly upon the master, or. for which the master has been forced to pay others. The servant is not liable to third parties for mere nonfeasance. 10. A master is bound to use ordinary care to prevent injury to servant in the course of the employment, and cannot contract for exemption from failure to do so. The master must furnish a reasonably safe place in which to work. This must vary in individual cases in accordance with the character of the work. The same rule applies to machinery and appliances. This duty of the master is a continuing one and the servant may rely upon the performance of this duty by the master. Of course the servant must be himself free from continued negligence, in order to recover. It is the duty of the master to adopt, and make known to employes, reasonable rules for the carrying on of a dangerous business, and for the protection of the employes. A servant is presumed to have notice of and to have assumed all risks incident to all dangers and defects which to a person of his experience and understanding are or ought to be patent and obvious. 11. The question as to how far a master is liable to third parties for acts of a servant is governed by the ordinary doctrines of agency. The master may maintain action against third persons for any loss of services due to an injury inflicted upon the servant by such third person. 12. Where a master uses due diligence in the selection of competent and trusty servants, and furnishes them with suitable means to perform the service in which he employs them, he is not answerable, where there is no countervailing statute, to one of them for an injury received by him in consequence of the carelessness of another, while both are engaged in the same service. This rule does not relieve the master from lia bility for the consequences of his own negligence or the negligent servant. Thus the master is liable for the torts of a servant to the latter's fellow-servants, if the servant is known to the master to be incompetent, or if the master has negligently employed an incompetent servant. In many States the doctrine does not apply where one servant is given power to superintend the actions of the others. This is the so-called "superior servant "limitation. Where one servant is injured by the negligent performance by another of the personal duties which every master owes to his servants, then the master is universally held liable. This is the "vice-principal" limitation. Some States have added a limitation where the servants are employed in different departments of service. In some States by statute railroad companies are excepted from the application of the fellow-servant rule. These statutes have been held constitutional and the railroads are not allowed to contract against this liability. Fellow-servants are those engaged in a common employment. A common employment is generally held to be service of such a kind that all who engage in it in the exercise of ordinary sagacity, may be able to foresee that the carelessness of fellow-servants may probably expose them to injury. 1. Marriage. HUSBAND AND WIFE. ANALYSIS. 2. Rights of husband. 3. Wife's separate estate. 4. Dower and courtesy. 5. Disabilities arising from coverture. 7. Divorce. 1. Marriage is a civil status existing between one man and one woman, and arises out of a contract between them to live together as husband and wife. As in the case of an ordinary contract, there must be mutual consent and capacity to contract. There are certain disabilities which render parties incapable of making a valid contract of marriage. These are now: 1, Usually relationship nearer than cousins; 2, prior marriage undissolved; 3, want of mental capacity; 4, want of age. The age at which parties are capable of making a marriage contract varies from fourteen to eighteen in males and twelve to sixteen in females. At common law the age of legal consent was fourteen for males and twelve for females. In the absence of statute no formalities were necessary at common law, but statutes have made certain formalities requisite in practically every jurisdiction. 2. By virtue of the marriage status the husband has certain personal rights. He is the head of the family. He can fix the residence or domicile of the family. The husband may restrain the liberty of the wife when it is necessary to prevent her from committing a crime or adultery, and perhaps a tort for which he would be liable. The husband has a right to the services of his wife, and may maintain an action against any one who wrongfully deprives him of them. By virtue of the marriage status the husband has also certain rights in and to the property of the wife. Of the wife's freehold estates the husband is seized during coverture, and is entitled to all the rents and profits. He cannot, however, dispose of or incumber the estate which remains to the wife or her heirs after coverture ceases. In the wife's chattels real the husband acquires a sort of joint tenancy. He may sell, assign, mortgage or otherwise dispose of them during coverture. They are liable for his debts and, after the death of the wife, become his, absolutely, subject to her ante-nuptial debts. He cannot leave them by will so as to defeat the wife's right of survivorship. The personal chattels which belong to wife at time of marriage, or which come to her during coverture, vest absolutely in the husband. He is entitled to her choses in action if he reduces them to possession during coverture. On his death they vest in his representatives except the wife's paraphernalia, that is, articles of wearing apparel or personal ornament. Statutes, however, usually provide for an allowance to wife out of the personal estate, which is usually prior even to the debts of the husband. 3. The wife's equitable separate estate is the name given to the estate, real or personal, which equity permits a married woman to hold free from the control of her husband. To create such an estate, it must be settled to her sole and separate use. She usually has power to convey such estate, without a provision to that effect in the instrument creating the estate, and in most States the wife may change such estate by contract. By statute in most States the wife is given power to hold her own property free from the control of her husband. 4. The principles relating to dower and courtesy are treated under the head of Real Property. 5. Marriage imposes no disabilities upon the husband except so far as he is incapacitated from entering into valid transactions with the wife. The wife, however, is incapacitated at common law from acting as a feme sole. She cannot make a binding contract even with her husband's consent. This is true even as to necessaries. But a contract executed by the wife is enforceable against the other party. But in equity a married woman may charge her equitable separate estate. In most jurisdictions, however, enabling statutes have |