ledge may, in a subordinate sense, be necessary to the very existence of the religious life." This declaration, as it bears upon our point, is, however, nullified by the assertion contained in another of our extracts, that "religion can exist without the co-operation of logical thinking properly so called." At first sight, this appears like a contradiction; but on closer examination it will be found not to be such. Mr. Morell regards religion itself as a very different thing from the religious life; and it is to the existence of the latter, and not of the former, that he affirms knowledge to be necessary in a subordinate sense. That religion may exist without knowledge, is the principle which he really holds and applies. It is the "perfection" and "full development" of the religious life which includes the true province of knowledge, according to his theory. Thus he regards the theology of Christianity, not as lying at the foundation of that system, but as the result of its operation upon society. The importance attached by himself to that view of the gospel, strengthens the proof of his genuine meaning, which such a view must in itself involve.

We have already intimated that Mr. Morell makes a broad distinction between the logical and the intuitional consciousness as the sources of human knowledge. We acknowledge the propriety of such a distinction, though we think it is here pressed to quite unwarrantable lengths. Now it may be thought that the denial of the essential relation of knowledge to religion is intended only to apply to that knowledge which is embraced by the logical consciousness. Such, however, is not the case. The whole scope of this discussion excludes knowledge as knowledge, whether logical or intuitional, from that religious essence which it identifies with feeling alone; and we are told as much in so many words where it is said, "Religion cannot be a form of pure intellection."*

The argument by which the non-essential character of religious knowledge is attempted to be established is as follows:

"Did religion consist essentially in knowledge, then it must exactly follow the developments of knowledge in the human mind; so far at least as our knowledge is conversant with religious objects. This is, however, by no means the case. Nothing is more evident than the fact, that there may be many gradations of religious intensity in men whose amount of knowledge is as nearly as possible identical: and, on the other hand, there may be about an equal manifestation of religious intensity where the degrees of knowledge are immensely at variance."†

This argument is a mere sophism. If it were contended by any one that knowledge constituted the only essential element of religion, it might be satisfactory to reply, that the measure of knowledge and the measure of religion are different. But no one, as far as we are acquainted with the matter, contends for this. The doctrine which Mr. Morell had to controvert is, that knowledge, though not the only one, is, along with others, one essential element of religion. That doctrine his argument does not touch. The measure of religion may differ from the measure of knowledge, because the other elements of the subject do not exactly coincide with this particular element. Air may be essential to human life; but it does not follow that the life is proportioned to the supply of air; because there are other things besides air upon

which life essentially depends. Mr. Morell has effectually answered his own argument in the following sentence, which he seems to have italicised for our special benefit:-"Every emotion presupposes a mind aroused or excited, and an object arousing and exciting it: and on examining attentively the phenomena of the case, we find that there is a highly fluctuating proportion between the energy of the subject on the one hand, and the influence of the object on the other."

The passage we have just copied does more than answer the argument in opposition to which we have brought it forward. It contradicts the very principle of that portion of this religious philosophy which we are now examining. When it tells us that "every emotion presupposes an object arousing or exciting the mind," it implies that, in the instance of religion, a knowledge of religious truth must precede the exercise of religious feeling. The object whose necessary influence is conceded, can only be possessed in the form of such knowledge. This is, in fact, a representation of the matter absolutely required by the scheme of mental faculty with an exposition of which the book before us opens. According to that scheme, intellectual consciousness, by the nature of the case, gives rise to emotional activity throughout the whole range of particulars enumerated. These two classes of mental facts are exhibited in correspondence with each other; and the former is invariably regarded as the cause of the latter. Thus it is said—" As there is a faculty which brings us into direct contact with things, as outward objects, so there must be a form of emotion which has its origin entirely in the perception of such objects."-" The domestic affections....are occasioned by conceptions which the understanding furnishes to us." And again, with immediate reference to the power of intuition" The emotional states which correspond with these different spheres of our intellectual activity are very clearly defined."§ This exposition of cause and effect would amply serve to confute our author out of his own mouth, if it were carried no farther than we have indicated; but it is carried much farther, being expressly adopted in the region of religion itself. We are actually told, that "the religious emotions spring from our contemplation of the Infinite Being." "The existence of a God" is stated to be a conception of the intuitional as distinguished from the logical consciousness:¶ and it is even affirmed that the absolute stands before us in all its living reality" when we "admit the reality of an intellectual intuition."**

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After this we are surely entitled to say that the metaphysical display which gives such an imposing air to Mr. Morell's discussion is, in its bearing upon this part of his book at least, little better than parade. We could offer many valid objections to these metaphysics as they stand; and where we might adopt the principles laid down, we should frequently have to protest against the applications made of them. Some favourite positions are used very much as a child uses his rattle. But were we to admit the whole of this preparatory disquisition, we should be no nearer than we are to the religious philosophy for which it professes to smooth the way. No sooner does our author enter upon his philosophy, than he inverts the order of the metaphysical theory on

which he avowedly constructs it. Having taken great pains to shew how the horse draws the cart, he incontinently proceeds to put the cart before the horse. Having taught, that intellectual gives rise to emotional activity that knowledge precedes feeling by virtue of a causal influence—and that religion is the result of a belief in an Infinite Being -he assumes as the positions granted to him-that feeling, independent of knowledge, is the sole essence of religion-that the province of the intellect is not to originate, but to perfect emotion in this department of human interest-and that it is a sense of dependence, not a consciousness of truth, to which we owe our acquaintance with God.

Our previous observations have rendered it unnecessary that we should expend much labour upon the last of the propositions which we set down for remark, viz. that the feeling of absolute dependence produces a sense of Deity.

We object to the propriety of this term, "sense of Deity," understanding it to mean such a conception of a Divine Being as may exist independently of any apprehension of truth concerning him. If we take our author rightly, he intends to teach that the sense leads to the truth, not the truth to the sense. This, we believe, will not bear a moment's serious consideration; and it is not necessary that we should do more than repeat, in opposition to it, the language we have already quoted, to the effect that "the religious emotions spring from our contemplation of the Infinite Being.'

We wish, however, to follow up our simple protest against the principle on which the doctrine before us is constructed, by a word or two relating to Mr. Morell's development of this doctrine.

After having furnished himself with "the sense of Deity," as the result of pure feeling, he proceeds to inform us that it gives rise to different ideas of God as it connects itself with different forms of human consciousness. Thus, in connection with the sensational, the perceptive and the logical consciousness, it conducts to views of the Divine Being which answer respectively to these modes of intellectual activity; and it is in its alliance with the intuitional consciousness that it attains to a true notion of Deity. "The absolute feeling of dependence, seeking its object through all the different stages of the human consciousness," is, we are told, "driven onwards from one resting-place to another, until, in the region of faith, it finds the absolute Being of which it had ever dreamed, to whose existence it had ever tacitly pointed, and united to which it gives the highest and the purest intensity to all the activities of the human mind." Now, there is one cardinal fault in this analysis which vitiates the whole conclusion. It fails to shew, in any consistent or intelligible manner, how the idea of Being is arrived at. That idea constitutes the great peculiarity of the faith described; and yet there is nothing, according to this scheme, upon which it rests. The scheme does not terminate in Being, but in abstraction. It has in this respect all the deficiency which Mr. Morell, in our judgment improperly, attributes to a logical process of religious investigation. The nearest approach he makes to a proof of his conclusion is in the following statement:

"The great spheres to which our intuitions are directed, are those of the beautiful, the good and the true-and corresponding to these are three classes of emotions-the aesthetical, the moral, and those hitherto unnamed heavings 2 M

VOL. V.

of the spirit when it contemplates the awful majesty and immensity of Being— pure, eternal Being."*

Here, again, the cart is put before the horse-that which ought to be an intuition according to the theory, being treated as an emotion in this exposition-but we pass that by. What we desire specially to say is, that "the beautiful, the good and the true," being abstractions, and the æsthetical and the moral emotions embracing the two former as abstractions, we cannot perceive how "the heavings of the spirit" which relate to the latter should contemplate "Being-pure eternal Being." What the spirit does contemplate must be of the same nature as the things contemplated by æsthetical and moral emotion; and as they are but abstractions, it must be an abstraction too. It is not in this way, therefore, that God—the true God-the pure and eternal Being-can be discovered; and if this were all we had to help us in the discovery, the whole question of religion would present itself to us only in a loose and intangible form. God would be anything and everything we ourselves might choose to make him. Setting a special revelation on one side, the Infinite Being is either made known to us by a divine intuition directed immediately to his existence; or his existence is inferred from natural facts by a process of rational investigation; or, as we ourselves believe, our conviction as to his person and character is a combined result of these two causes; and our religious safety depends upon our seeking for him in these plain paths, instead of trusting to a blind sense of Deity, which is to wander onwards in search of the object of its worship toward that land of impalpable shadows in which imagination has fixed the residence of the beautiful, the good and the true.

It must be very evident that we could not, in the pages of this Magazine, discuss the other topics to which Mr. Morell's work invites. our attention, as we have done the fundamental one that has just passed under our review. To do so would be to extend this article to the length of the volume on which it is written. We must therefore content ourselves with merely indicating the course of thought by which these speculations on the peculiar essence of religion are succeeded.

The essence of Christianity is regarded as lying, not in the religious truth it contains, but in the influence it exerts. "Christianity, like every other religion, consists essentially in a state of man's inner consciousness, which develops itself into a system of thought and activity only in a community of awakened minds."† Christianity itself is not a science, but a life: it does not consist in any development of thought, but in the flow of holy affections."

Revelation is treated in the same entirely subjective form. "Revelation is a process of the intuitional consciousness gazing upon eternal verities."S "God has instituted a series of means by which the world should be gradually awakened to a sense of heavenly and eternal realities. In this awakening all revelation essentially consists."

Inspiration is represented as a spiritual fitness produced in man, by God, for the reception of the matter of revelation. Revelation, in

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the Christian sense, indicates that act of divine power by which God

*P. 86.

+ P. 104.

P. 256.

§ P. 141.

| P. 141.

presents the realities of the spiritual world immediately to the human mind; while inspiration denotes that especial influence wrought upon the faculties of the subject, by virtue of which he is able to grasp these realities in their perfect fulness and integrity." "Inspiration....is a higher potency of a certain form of consciousness, which every man in some degree possesses."†

Theology is described as the result of a reflective analysis of the religious life, after the various influences just enumerated have been brought to bear upon it. "Theology is the reflection of the understanding upon those vital intuitions, so as to reduce them to a logical and scientific expression." "The essential prerequisites of Christian theology are these two-a religious nature awakened by the development of the Christian life, and the application of logical reflection to the elements of divine truth which that life spontaneously presents."§ This is a very finely-spun theory; but it possesses no more than cobweb strength. The philosophy of it we have already exploded; but it might justly be rejected without any philosophical examination. It does not, in its substance, answer to fact; but gives a false representation of the nature, the origin, and the influence of the Christian system. It is also, in its form, an abuse of terms; so that the very words Christianity, Revelation, Inspiration and Theology, are employed by it in non-natural senses, adapted to the purpose in hand, but which put aside the ideas that those words are commonly intended to express.

It is but repeating the view of Mr. Morell's system which we have all along kept before ourselves, to say, that that system, as developed in the manner we have just pointed out, is, from beginning to end, an attack upon the proper function and distinctive importance of Truth. Our readers will, therefore, not be surprised to learn, that one of the marked features of this book is the distorted form in which it exhibits Faith.

"The term faith," we are informed, "as used in ordinary language, is very indefinite. It is often employed, for example, to designate the final conclusion we draw from a train of reasoning, particularly if that reasoning be of a moral and not a demonstrative kind. The sense, however, in which we now employ it, is altogether different from this. Faith we regard to be the highest intellectual sensibility."||

Now we think that few things are more definite than the meaning of the term faith as used in ordinary language. We do not, however, consider this description of its ordinary meaning to be a correct or fair one. Faith, as every one knows, is the belief of truth; and it naturally manifests itself by all the moral exercises to which truth corresponds. It thus includes what we understand by "the highest intellectual sensibility." But to divorce it from its primitive signification, and confine it to this sensibility, is only to throw confusion over the subject. No one has a right to tamper in this way with common language for the interest of his own opinions, putting new senses upon old terms, in order to avail himself of the sanction of those terms in favour of doctrines which they were never designed to shelter.

The province which Mr. Morell assigns to theology, conducts him to a conclusion bearing a very close resemblance to Mr. Newman's theory

* P. 150.

† P. 166.

P. 141.

§ P. 202.

|| P. 24.